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“I had a presentiment then  
that there is in this world  
a kind of desire like stinging pain.” 
 
Yukio Mishima 
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CHAPTER 1 
PAIN 
 
 
 
“Liebe ist kein Gefühl.  
Liebe wird erprobt,  
Schmerzen nicht.” 
 
Ludwig Wittgenstein 
 
 
 
What does it mean to suffer? What does it mean to encounter pain? Is it 
possible to ask these questions outside the political background that immediately 
leads us to try to eradicate pain? Is it possible to grasp the ontological side of 
pain, the one connected with the unavoidable negativity of human existence, 
beyond the reparative measures that try to mitigate this or that pain? Or are we so 
trapped in the words that constitute the bars of these questions that we are unable 
to grasp the negativity that, beyond the bars of language, sustains and jeopardizes 
our existence? The intention of the following pages is to approach the 
philosophical notion of negativity through a phenomenological and then 
psychoanalytic analysis of pain in order to show what I call the ontological side of 
pain: namely the side of pain related to the drive.  
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1.1  
REASON AND NEGATIVITY 
 
 
 
The complexity of the questions above lies in the fact that they do not try to 
grasp a particular object using language as forceps; strictly specking they do not 
simply want to indicate or name a particular “pain.” On the contrary they try to 
query the side of pain that is not ascribable to any semantic reification. The 
purpose of this question is indeed to grasp something that is beyond language and 
for this reason is structurally impossible to be reached with words.  
Jacques Lacan calls this beyond of language the Real, and describes it as the 
hole in the Symbolic, the non-space that escapes signification and meaning 
although it is inevitably corollary. If in fact the Real is the hole around which the 
Symbolic is coiled, this hole persists as the non-space that cannot be reduced to a 
stable concept, a non-space that defies signification and meaning.1 If then, as 
Lacan suggests, the Real is “quelque chose qu'on retrouve à la même place, qu'on 
n'ait pas été là ou qu'on y ait toujours été”2, it is precisely because the Real is the 
negativity always present in the structure of the Symbolic as both its condition of 
possibility and its insuperable limit.  
For this reason even if we affirm that the Real is the radically other of 
reason, the other side that is structurally impossible to grasp by the category of 
reason, we have to acknowledge the fact that the Real is also its inexplicable root. 
Even though the Real escapes signification and meaning, questioning the structure 
of the Real is not meaningless in itself. The Real is the inevitable consequence of 
																																																						
1 The Real “est le domaine de ce qui subsiste hors de la Symbolisation”. J. Lacan, Écrits, Editions 
du Seuil, Paris, 1966, p. 388. 
2 J. Lacan, Le Séminaire : Livre II, Le moi dans la théorie de Freud et dans la technique de la 
psychanalyse, 1954-1955, Points, Paris, 2015, p. 342. 
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the Symbolic production of meaning and from within the Symbolic order we can 
try to determine their relation and trace its social and political effects. 
From a certain point of view the history of philosophy consists of the most 
sophisticated attempts to overcome this beyond of reason by trying to dominate it 
with reason itself. The claim of philosophy has always been to produce a thought 
able to penetrate anything, to turn anything into a clear and distinct concept3, and 
in this way to master4 even the most disturbing and distressing aspects of 
existence5. In order to achieve this fantasy of sovereignty, philosophy traditionally 
denies that negativity cannot be overcome. Sometimes simply ignoring it and 
sometimes making it an aspect of the all-encompassing power of reason, 
philosophy always pretends to master negativity. Despite these efforts on the part 
of philosophy, if we acknowledge that negativity cannot be mastered by reason 
and that, on the contrary, by escaping understanding it jeopardizes the structure of 
meaning itself, then it appears clear that the universal claims of the cogito are 
																																																						
3 “Nous ne nous devons jamais laisser persuader qu'à l'évidence de notre raison. Et il est à 
remarquer que je dis, de notre raison, et non point, de notre imagination ni de nos sens.” R. 
Descartes, Discours de la méthode, Pour bien conduire sa raison et chercher la vérité dans les 
sciences, PUF, Paris 1987, p. 47. 
4 “The psychological explanation: familiarizing something unfamiliar relieves, comforts, and 
satisfies us, besides giving us a feeling of power. With the unknown, one is confronted with 
danger, discomfort, and care; the first instinct is to abolish these painful states.” F. Nietzsche, 
Twilight of the Idols, edited by A. Ridley and J. Norman, translated by J. Norman, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 2005, p. 179. (Translation slightly modified by me). 
5 Since Aristotle uses the term θαῦµα to refer to the first sensation that leads towards philosophy 
(Aristotle, Metaphysics 1, 982 b) it is common to say that for the Stagirite philosophy begins with 
the feeling of wonder. Nevertheless translate θαῦµα simply with wonder is deceptive and imply a 
fundamental misunderstanding of Aristotle’s theoretical framework. If in fact we think that θαῦµα 
is the term used by Ulysses when in the Odyssey he meets for the first time the giant and 
horrendous Polyphemus (Homer, Odyssey, 9, 190), we immediately understand that the meaning 
of the term if far more complicated. As not infrequently in the ancient Greek some words mean 
something and its opposite. In addition to wonder θαῦµα means in fact horror, terror, and fear. A 
more accurate interpretation of the Aristotelian θαῦµα should then lead us to the understanding of 
the fact that philosophy is in itself always been a psychological reaction of the fear of death, pain 
and unhappiness, namely all the things that compromise our (well-)being in the world. 
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nothing but a fantasy. Indeed, as evidenced by the flaws in any philosophical 
system, there is no Aufhebung for what, as irreducibly other than reason, cannot 
be understood and then mastered by reason. 
However, it is important to point out that, together with the traditional 
history of philosophy, there exists a counter-history, and even a counter-
philosophy, that slips away from the celebration of the power of the cogito and 
that tries to deal with the insistence of negativity. Paul Ricoeur names this 
resistance to the cogito: the cogito brisé6 – the broken cogito. This name works 
perfectly because instead of offering a new definition that cunningly reaffirms the 
all-embracing power of the cogito, it underlines the historical and theoretical fact 
that the cogito has always been and will always be broken – precisely because the 
subject, starting from whom the cogito is established, is structurally constituted as 
a division. Indeed “the hole marks both the place of the Real and the internal 
division or distance by which we are constituted as subjects and destined to 
pursue the phantom of meaning through the signifier's metonymic slide.”7 When 
in fact the subject enters into the chain of the signifier it has already undergone 
the division that creates it as a subject (that is, as a being able to understand and 
communicate meaning). 
According to Lacan, the subject is always constituted as a division between 
registers – Imaginary, Symbolic, and Real – that permeate and structure him or 
her as a “manque à être”8, as a signifier who, trapped in the metonymic chain of 
																																																						
6 “Le Cogito brisé : tel pourrait être le titre emblématique d'une tradition, sans doute moins 
continue que celle du Cogito mais dont la virulence culmine avec Nietzsche, faisant de celui-ci le 
vis-à-vis privilégié de Descartes.” P. Ricouer, Soi-même comme un autre, Éditions du Seuil, Paris 
1990, p. 22. 
7 L. Edelman, No Future, Queer Theory and the Death Drive, Duke University Press, Durham 
2004, p. 15, 16. 
8 “L'être du sujet est la suture d'un manque. Précisément du manque qui, se dérobant dans le 
nombre, le soutient de sa récurrence - mais en ceci ne le supporte que d'être ce qui manque au 
signifiant pour être l'Un du sujet : soit ce terme que nous avons appelé dans un autre contexte le 
trait unaire, la marque d'une identification primaire qui fonctionnera comme idéal.” J. Lacan, 
Problèmes cruciaux de la psychanalyse in Autres écrits, Éditions du Seuil, Paris 2001, p. 200. 
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the signifiers, never fully coincides with the fixity of a stable concept9. From this 
perspective, the all-embracing power of the cogito appears to be nothing but a 
fantasy produced by the Symbolic in an attempt to fill the hole of the Real. The 
broken cogito emerges then as an attempt to think the unavoidable negativity that 
both structures the subject as a division and that accompanies it throughout its 
life. 
In the field of American literary criticism, queer theory – which was born to 
give voice to all the forms of intersections that do not let themselves be captured 
by any kind of either gender binarism or normative sexual identity – has become, 
in particular with the work of Leo Bersani and Lee Edelman10, a privileged 
philosophical perspective to think about negativity and its relation with the 
division of the subject. Indeed, if the broken cogito is not just a new way to 
reaffirm the cogito but instead is the effort to escape the cogito’s insistence on its 
sovereignty, if the broken cogito constitutes itself not as a stable identity that 
adheres to the all-embracing power of reason but instead is the unyielding denial 
of any fixed identity, and if the broken cogito gives voice to the negativity that 
does not let itself be captured by reason and instead insists in its dismantling 
power, then it appears clear that “broken cogito” and “queer” are just different 
ways to “define” the same thing – although this thing remains structurally devoid 
of definition. Indeed, whereas the cogito cannot accept the gap that constitutes us 
subjects (and for this reason creates the fantasy of reason’s sovereign control) 
queerness conversely “insists on the Real of a jouissance that social reality […] 
has already foreclosed”11 in the structuring of the subject.  
																																																						
9 “C'est en tant que le sujet se situe et se constitue par rapport au signifiant que se produit en lui 
cette rupture, cette division, cette ambivalence, au niveau de laquelle se place la tension du désir.” 
J. Lacan, Le Séminaire: Livre VII, L’éthique de la psychanalyse, 1959-1960, Éditions du Seuil, 
Paris 1986, p. 366. 
10 The so-called “antisocial thesis” or “antisocial turn” in queer theory (as it has been defined at 
the MLA annual convention in 2005) has been theorized by Leo Bersani (Homos, Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge 1995) and Lee Edelman (No future; Duke University Press, Durham 
2004). The reflections of the following chapters emerge from the psychoanalytic intersection 
between this theoretical framework and the philosophy of the broken cogito. 
11 L. Edelman, No Future, cit., p. 25. 
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Lacan uses the term jouissance12 to translate the Freudian notion of the 
death drive,13 namely the anti-social, anti-economical, and anti-symbolic drive 
that checkmates one’s sovereignty over the world and oneself. “Jouissance evokes 
the death drive that always insists as the void in and of the subject, beyond its 
fantasy of self-realization, beyond the pleasure principle”14, which is also to say, 
beyond the illusory sovereignty produced by the cogito. Therefore, as Lee 
Edelman suggests, “Queerness is never a matter of being or becoming but, rather, 
of embodying the remainder of the Real internal to the Symbolic order.”15 The 
death drive is in fact structurally marked in the constitution of the subject from the 
very moment that subject is produced by entering the chain of the signifiers16 that 
lets it give meaning to the world – even though that meaning, as jouissance 
reminds us, cannot remove the negativity that permeates the Symbolic and 
jeopardizes every Sinngebung. 
But why use pain as a placeholder for negativity? Why use an experience so 
saturated with the Symbolic to reveal the negativity that refuses meaning and 
consequently the Symbolic itself? Certainly the counter-philosophers that try to 
deal with negativity respond to the notion of pain. Pain is for them a common 
theme. Nevertheless it is not simply for historical reasons that it is necessary to 
focus on pain. There are in fact theoretical instances that lead us to think of pain 
as the privileged experience in which the subject feels its structural division. 
According to phenomenology17, pain is one of the most peculiar moments18 
in which we discover the impenetrable difference that constitutes our subjectivity 
																																																						
12 See J. Lacan, Le Séminaire: Livre VII, L’éthique de la psychanalyse, 1959-1960; J. Lacan, Le 
Séminaire : Livre XI, Les quatre concepts fondamentaux de la psychanalyse, 1964; J. Lacan, Le 
Séminaire : Livre XX, Encore, 1972-1973. 
13 See S. Freud, Beyond Pleasure Principle. 
14 L. Edelman, No Future, cit., p. 25. 
15 Ibidem 
16 “The death drive marks the excess embedded within the Symbolic through the loss, the Real 
loss, that the advent of the signifier effects.” L. Edelman, No Future, cit., p. 9. 
17 See M. Merleau-Ponty, Phénoménologie de la perception; G. Marcel, Etre et avoir; F. Chirpaz, 
Le corps; M. Henry, Philosophie et phénoménologie du corps: Essai sur l’ontologie biranienne.  
18 Along with pain phenomenology indicates also tiredness, sickness, and sexual stimulation. 
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- the one that both ties us to and divides us from our body at once. As Chirpaz 
affirms: 
 
vivant la douleur, la présence découvre au cœur de soi sa corporéité comme 
étrange, c’est-à-dire à la fois comme mystérieuse et autre. Même répétée, la 
douleur ne parvient jamais à se rendre familière parce que l’existence ne parvient 
jamais à s’habituer à elle. Le plaisir, par contre, sitôt qu’il apparaît, se donne 
d’emblée comme familier. La présence le reconnaît comme sien et se reconnaît en 
lui.19 
 
Phenomenology focuses on pain as the most estranging experience and asks 
if it is not through hurting that our body draws our attention to its étrangeté. Is it 
not when a specific part of our body does not work in the way it is supposed to 
that we actually are cognizant that we possess this specific part of the body? Is it 
not through pain that we discover that the body (that we are) is also a foreign 
matter that imposes itself as a structural difference? In the absence of pain the 
difference between our body and us is not perceived and we perceive the body as 
one with ourselves. The various organs, membranes, or body parts that together 
allow us to perform an activity are not taken into account when we normally 
perform it. When we eat, for instance, we do not think, for the most part, of 
having a tongue, teeth, a throat etc. although these parts together make it possible. 
It is exactly the proper functioning of each of these parts that makes the activity a 
																																																						
19 F. Chirpaz, Les corps, Editions klincksieck, Paris, 1988, p. 21. Obviously the question at stake 
becomes with masochism much more complicated: could erotic stimulation be counted as 
pleasure? And could the excess of erotic stimulation still be counted as pleasure and, e converso, 
could the excess of erotic stimulation be counted as pain even when it is experienced as pleasure? 
Complicating enormously the dichotomy between pain and pleasure, masochism needs a reflection 
that goes beyond the phenomenological approach. Indeed, as we will see in the following pages, 
the impossibility to answer these questions with the strong subjectivity offered by phenomenology 
will lead us to approach a psychoanalytic perspective with which it is possible to give an account 
to the drives that lie at the core of the division of the subject. After building my theoretical 
framework I will able to face these questions directly in the first chapter when I will discuss the 
Freudian notion of primary masochism. For the moment it is important to consider pain just as 
phenomenology does: as a feeling that a subject - devoid of unconscious - does not want.   
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kind of automatism that allows us to think about something else at the same time. 
Indeed each new activity is complicated for the simple fact that we have not yet 
developed the skills that will make this activity a habit and, for this reason, we 
have to think through all the movements and focus on all the parts of our body 
needed to carry it out. Once we have mastered those skills, the body parts that we 
use for it "disappear", so to speak, into the activity itself. However, when one of 
these parts starts to hurt, we can no longer perform an activity as if this part did 
not exist: the part now claims our attention. Instead of being a useful tool, it seems 
to become an obstacle – an obstacle sometimes so unbearable that we are no 
longer able to perform the activity and must reorganize our entire life in order to 
avoid this pain.  
Pain is therefore a privileged experience that reminds us, with sharp clarity, 
that we are composed of parts which do not always agree with each other, parts 
that can work in the way we want or not, parts that can become so painful that we 
would rather remove them than keep them. The parts that constitute our body – 
the parts of the body that we are – can in fact become estranged and even 
dangerous, to the point that we have to cut them off20. For this reason, even if it is 
probably true that pain is not the only experience that reminds us we have a 
body21, it is nonetheless true that pain is one of the most significant moments in 
which we realize that this body that we are is also a foreign matter that sometimes, 
and for different reasons22, reclaims its structural difference from ourselves. 
Indeed we can say that this body – that is, our “véhicule de l'être-au-monde”23 – 
does not coincide perfectly with our self and does not always lets itself be 
dominated and controlled by our will.  
																																																						
20 See Jean-Luc Nancy, l’intrus. 
21 For instance it can be consider undisputed the fact according to which in the stimulation of any 
erogenous zone one becomes aware of that part of the body. 
22 Reasons that are be related to the sexual, to identity, to illness, and so on. For a more detailed 
phenomenological analysis concerned the body mind problem in relation to pain, illness and 
sexual arousal, see my article Chirpaz e l’ambiguità del leib in tropos, Rivista di ermeneutica e 
critica filosofica, Anno VI, Numero 2, 2013. 
23 M. Merleau-Ponty, Phénoménologie de la perception, Gallimard, Paris 1976, p. 97. 
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In order to give an account to the intrinsic difference between the body and 
the “self,” phenomenology coins the term Leib distinguishing it from Körper. If in 
fact the term Körper indicates only the body-machine studied by physics, 
chemistry, and biology, the term Leib refers to the complicated difference that 
unites the self to the “extraneous matter” that is its body. Phenomenology wants 
to underline the co-implication of body and mind (that allows an escape from the 
classical metaphysics of the soul24) without falling into the scientistic perspective 
offered by all organicistic Reductionisms25. Although phenomenology considers 
the body the conditio sine qua non of the self, it maintains that the self could 
never be reduced to its body.  
In this way phenomenology proposes what has been called the embodied 
cogito, namely a cogito that, emerging from the body, has constantly to deal with 
its intrinsic difference. In so doing, phenomenology makes an interesting 
theoretical move that, escaping from the dualism of body and soul, puts the 
universal claims of the traditional cogito at risk. If in fact the subject of the cogito 
offered by the Cartesian tradition cannot deal with the insecurities of the body – 
with its structural difference – and for this reason presupposes a clear separation 
between the mind and body, the notion of Leib blends them together in a single 
																																																						
24 In the Iliad and the Odyssey the body and soul are the same. In fact, in Homeric language there 
is no trace of any term that designates the living body as a separate thing from the soul. With the 
Orphic tradition, on the other hand, in particular with Pythagoras, and later with Plato, there is 
born a conception of the soul not only understood as a vital breath that gives life to the body, but 
as something separate and ontologically distinct from the body. There are many passages in which 
Plato plays semantically equating the body - σώµα - with a tomb - σεµα - thus identifying the body 
as the prison of the soul (see Cratylus, 400c; Gorgias, 493a; Phaedo 62b, 82e). Certainly Plato 
does not debase the body as such. For example, the beauty of the body is enhanced in the 
Symposium, but takes in scala amoris, the lowest level of the ascent that leads to contemplation of 
the good (The Symposium, 210a, 210b, 210c). Therefore, although Plato does not affirm that the 
body is something bad in itself, he constantly insists in a clear ontological distinction between the 
soul and the body that lead to the consideration according to which the former is superior to the 
latter at a metaphysical and, consequently, ethical level. 
25 As an eminent example of this way to think see F. Crick and C. Koch “A frame work for 
consciousness” in «Nature Neuroscience» February 6th, 2003, p. 126; F. Crick, “Visual perception: 
Rivalry and consciousness” in «Nature» 376, 1996, p. 486. 
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substance. Assuming in fact that the body is the condition of thought, instead of 
dividing sharply the res cogitans from the res extensa26, phenomenology affirms 
their union in Leib: the living body that perceives itself and is able to think. In this 
way the body, instead of being other than cogito, becomes its support and its 
structure, in a word, it becomes its condition of possibility. As is evident, by 
making the uncertainties of the body the condition of any cogitationes, 
phenomenology compromises the cogito with the particularity of a single body, 
preventing in this way the cogito from joining the universal truth. Indeed, to 
incarnate the cogito in a living body means to acknowledge the fact that the cogito 
is bound to the universal truth in a way that makes a complete conjunction of the 
two impossible. The theoretical foundation that makes the cogito the direct 
expression of the truth is in this way undermined. The body in fact, although it is 
the condition of possibility for any thought of the truth, reveals itself to be also 
what obstructs the achievement of the truth. Located between the cogito and the 
truth, the body becomes at the same time the point of their union and of their 
separation. Stranded in the body, the cogito must give up its universal claims. 
Despite this fundamental theoretical move, the phenomenological approach 
itself encounters a basic problem. Even if phenomenology understands the 
implications that, through the body, undermine the all-encompassing claim of the 
cogito, it still affirms – with the notion of Leib – an existential unity that does not 
take into account the divisive power of the death drive. The self of 
phenomenology, despite being ousted by the body to which it is linked, remains 
always thought of as a strong unity. But as psychoanalysis points out, the self is 
always already constituted as a division. Indeed, although it is true, as 
phenomenology affirms, that while we exist we perceive ourselves as a living 
unity, it is also true that we perceive the estranging and overwhelming power of 
the drives that resist any unity of the self and, on the contrary, erupt to undermine 
any fantasy of sovereignty. The death drive is structurally implicated in the 
constitution of the subject and, although – since it works unconsciously – we may 
																																																						
26 As indeed Descartes understood perfectly, if we do not fully separate the res cogitans from the 
res extensa we would never accede to a cogito as the truth of the subject. See R. Descartes, 
Meditationes de prima philosophia.    
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remain ignorant of its operation, it cannot be avoided. Ignoring (or pretending to 
ignore) the death drive, phenomenology27 ends up relapsing into a strong 
subjectivity very close to the Cartesian one that it challenges. The subject of 
phenomenology, even if it cannot have access to the universal truth, is a strong 
entity that does not perceive any other division except the one with its own body. 
But the division that constitutes our being in the world does not inhere just in the 
difference between the body and the self and cannot be solved through a 
theoretical concept that purports to overcome that difference. Like the all-
encompassing cogito, the unity of the subject is in fact just a Symbolic fantasy 
produced to protect against the Real. But the drive as the expression of the Real 
erupts, reminding us of the division by which we are subjects of language.  
Reducing the problem of the division of the subject to a body/mind 
problem, phenomenology is therefore unable to grasp the ontological status of 
pain – the one that is linked with the negativity that constitutes the Real and that 
emerges any time we get in touch with pain. In order to understand the connection 
between pain and the division of the subject beyond the phenomenological 
perspective, it is useful first to trace the etymology of the word “pain” and then to 
analyze it through the lens of psychoanalysis. To indicate what we call in English 
“pain,” the Latins used the word dolere, a word whose etymological root – dar = 
dal, dol – means to break, to break up. It is interesting to notice that this root that 
binds pain to breakage is not present just in the Ancient Latin but also in the 
Sanskrit dalati, darmati that means to burst, to break, to cleave; in the Ancient 
Greek, dèro (δέρω) means to flay; in the Ancient Slavic, dera means to lacerate; 
and in the Gothic, tair-an provides the root from which we derive the English 
verb “to tear”. Furthermore, even if we change the semantic strain, we find a 
different root but with the same meaning. Indeed the Ancient Greek word λύπη 
(pain) derives from the Sanskrit lûmp-ati that means to break and the Sanskrit 
rug’â (pain) comes from rug’ that means “to break” as well.28  
																																																						
27 Mutatis mutandis the same thing can be said for existentialism. 
28 Dizionario etimologico comparato delle lingue classiche indoeuropee (Sanscrito, Greco, 
Latino), a cura di F. Rendich, Palombi editore, Roma 2010; The Oxford Dictionary of English 
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At first sight this etymology reveals nothing more than the simple fact that 
pain is always perceived as the thing able to break the subject apart. What is pain 
in fact if not something that breaks us? What is pain if not something that impedes 
the subject’s freedom of movement or thought, jeopardizing the subject’s 
sovereignty over his body and his ability to interact with the world? Nihil sub sole 
novum then? On the contrary, from a psychoanalytic perspective this etymology 
reveals something much more interesting linked to the root of human subjectivity. 
Indeed, if we acknowledge that being broken is the only possibility for a subject 
to be a subject, that the structure of the subject itself is a breakage, then we 
understand that pain, instead of being what breaks the supposed unit of the 
subject, is what reveals its intrinsic division. From this perspective, pain reveals 
nothing but the occasion in which we experience the unavoidable negativity that 
structures us as subjects always lacerated by the drives. Indeed, just as the 
Symbolic cannot escape the negativity that emerges through the drives, so it 
cannot remove the pain that these drives inscribe in the subject. To interpret with 
a psychoanalytic lens the etymology that I traced back from different semantic 
strains is to understand that pain, far more than simply what breaks the subject 
apart, is what makes him feel the breakage that he has always been.  
What I am trying to describe of course is not a particular kind of pain that 
afflicts either the body or the mind, but, on the contrary, what I have called the 
ontological side of pain. Using the term “ontological”, I refer to the side of pain 
that, although it is present in any empirical reifications of pain, cannot be reduced 
to any of them, and that, for this reason, cannot be cured or redeemed. Indeed, 
although we can try to cure this or repair that pain, we cannot avoid the encounter 
with pain. Pain in fact, as an expression of negativity, “speaks to the fact that life, 
in some sense, doesn’t ‘work’”29. This is the reason why, regardless of any 
political and ethical measures that try to erase pain, its inevitable persistence 
shows with sharp clarity the inability of the Symbolic to suture the wound of the 
Real. From this perspective it becomes clear that to grasp the ontological status of 
																																																																																																																																																					
Etymology, Edited by C.T. Onions, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1966; Il vocabolario 
etimologico della lingua italiana, a cura di O. Pianigiani, Albrighi e Segati, Roma 1907. 
29 L. Berlant and L. Edelman, Sex or the Unbearable, Duke University Press, Durham 2014, p. 11. 
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pain means neither to focus on the particular pain that afflicts our life and that of 
others, nor to feel the difference that separates our body from us, but rather to 
insist on the negativity that structures us as subjects; it means to track down the 
wound that was produced with our coming into existence and that hurts any time 
we get in touch with pain.  
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1.2 
SCREAM AND SILENCE  
 
 
 
In the Philosophische Untersuchungen Wittgenstein suggests: 
 
How do words refer to sensations? - There doesn’t seem to be any problem here; 
don’t we talk about sensations every day, and name them? But how is the 
connection between the name and the thing named set up? This question is the 
same as: How does a human being learn the meaning of names of sensations? For 
example, of the word “pain”. Here is one possibility: words are connected with the 
primitive, natural expressions of sensation and used in their place. A child has hurt 
himself and he cries; then adults talk to him and teach him exclamations and, later, 
sentences. They teach the child new pain-behavior.  
“So you are saying that the word ‘pain’ really means crying?” - On the contrary: 
the verbal expression of pain replaces crying, it does not describe it30 
 
Regrettably, all the English translations that I consulted render the German 
verb Schreien with “to cry”, muffling in this way the distressing content of the 
paragraph. Schreien in fact is not only the tearful sobbing that seeks consolation, 
but it is the desperate scream of anguish that surpasses all possible signification 
and meaning and – as in the Edvard Munch painting31 – expresses what exceeds 
articulation in words. The intention of Wittgenstein is to show the impenetrability 
of pain and its refusal of translation into words. The scream then, even when it 
emerges from pain, dares not speak its name. If the sound of the scream is always 
																																																						
30 L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigation, translated by G.E.M Anscombe, P.M.S. Hacker, 
and J. Schulte, Blackwell publishing, Hoboken 2009, p. 95, paragraph 244. Italic mine. 
31 “You know my picture, The Scream? I was being stretched to the limit –nature was screaming in 
my blood– I was at breaking point . . . You know my pictures, you know it all – you know I felt it 
all.” From the diary of Edvard Munch, quoted in S. Predeaux, Edvard Munch Behind the Scream, 
Yale University Press, New Haven 2005. 
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perceived as a disturbing noise it is because the scream screams itself without 
pronouncing those words that could explain what this “itself” really means. Like 
the Real, the scream imposes its presence beyond the words that, in trying to 
grasp it, would end up denying it. As a wordless voice, the scream can then be 
seen as a theft of meaning that emerges to give voice precisely to what does not 
let itself be reduced to meaning and nevertheless paradoxically continuously lures 
for a signification.  
This is the reason why, when a scream catches us unprepared, that is, when 
we do not know the causes and the context that allow us to interpret it, its 
unsettling sound is always felt as Unheimlich32. Without being able to find its 
reason we confronted with the absence of meaning that the scream as such always 
reifies; we come too close to that unbearable Real that escapes the Symbolic. But 
as Wittgenstein suggests, there is no definition able to grasp the scream of pain, 
not even the word “scream” itself. All the expressions that try to account for the 
experience of pain turn out to be merely “behavior” around pain or, if we want, an 
ethics – the ethics of the Symbolic – that teaches us how to respond to pain, how 
to deal with or repair it, but that cannot grasp its Real. Pain, therefore, maintains 
an untranslatable core that is expressed through the scream but cannot be 
signified: a core that, for this reason, cannot be the object of either ethics or 
politics and because it is what structurally escapes the sense that sustains both of 
them. Indeed all the political and ethical attempts to translate negativity into 
meaning, to redeem this pain or to repair that pain, cannot avoid the fact that the 
ontological side of pain survives any attempts to erase it as the unavoidable 
negativity of human existence. This is the reason why, in its being both 
incomprehensible and Real, pain gives voice to, but cannot explain, the side of 
ourselves that cannot be processed through reason, and that on the contrary, 
explodes in the scream that exceeds any possible signification.  
																																																						
32 “The «uncanny» is that class of the terrifying which leads back to something long known to us, 
once very familiar” and nevertheless impossible to be completely understood. S. Freud, The 
Uncanny, in Collected Papers. Ed. James Strachey, Vol. 4, Basic Books Inc., New York 1959, p. 
370.  
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Certainly, as Edelman has made clear, as much as it is impossible to grasp 
the Real it is also impossible to position ourselves outside of the Symbolic33. 
Every theorization, concept, or idea, is a product of the Symbolic. Pain itself, in 
the moment of being thought and expressed, turns out to be nothing but a concept. 
And even if we use scream as an expression of the unavoidable negativity that 
emerges from pain, we do nothing but use a product of the Symbolic. 
Nevertheless, as Edelman suggests, it is important to acknowledge that even if it 
is true that we are trapped in the prison of language, we can experience the fact 
that the boundaries of this prison do not coincide with the boundaries of the Real. 
In its limitlessness, the Real exceeds any boundaries. The fact that we cannot 
understand ourselves outside of language does not mean that there is not an 
outside of language, hence the necessity to find some figurative images to render 
the Real without assuming that those images can grasp the Real itself. What in 
fact erupts from the inside and tears the subject apart is what does not let itself be 
mastered by reason and insists in its untranslatability as the voice without words 
that tempts us toward meaning even if it imposes itself as the meaningless thing 
par excellence.  
From this perspective it is obvious that Schreien should not be thought of as 
the Real itself but as a figurative image for what cannot be expressed through 
words, as the reaction to the Real’s laceration of the Symbolic, as the meaningless 
word that explodes the “sense” of pain itself. If, as Nietzsche suggests, “what 
actually arouses indignation over suffering is not the suffering itself, but the 
senselessness of suffering”34, it is because pain imposes itself as a void of 
meaning, an emptiness that claims to be filled by the signification of the 
Symbolic. In this sense, the emptiness of meaning that characterizes pain reminds 
us of the hole in the Symbolic that characterizes the Real. Both of these voids 
impel us toward a signification that is always unable to grasp and then fill them. 
Their presence, although generating meanings, never coincides with them. The 
meaning with which we coat pain in order to withstand it cannot in fact coat the 
																																																						
33 See L. Edelman, No Future, Queer Theory and the Death Drive. 
34 F. Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality, Edited By K. Hansel-Pearson, translated by C. 
Diethe, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2008, p. 44. 
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Real to which pain responds. Consequently, even if we master a particular pain, 
even if the Symbolic finds a way to signify pain, to give it a sort of “meaning”, we 
cannot erase the ontological persistence of pain as the negativity intrinsic in the 
human condition. As an expression of negativity, pain can be sublimated though 
the Symbolic, but its ontological side cannot disappear. 
In the movie The Silence of the Lambs by Jonathan Demme, there is a scene 
in which the FBI agent, Clarice Starling (Jodie Foster), is talking with an 
imprisoned serial killer Dr. Hannibal Lecter (Anthony Hopkins), trying to get him 
to reveal the real name of another serial killer, known as Buffalo Bill, who has 
kidnapped Catherine, the daughter of Senator Ruth Martin: 
 
Clarice Starling: Doctor we don’t have any more time for any of this now. 
Hannibal Lecter: But we don't reckon time the same way, do we? - This is all the 
time you'll ever have.  
Clarice Starling: Later. Listen to me. We've only got five... 
Hannibal Lecter: No! I will listen now. After your father's murder, you were 
orphaned. You were ten years old. You went to live with cousins on a sheep and 
horse ranch in Montana. And…? 
Clarice Starling: [tears begin forming in her eyes] And one morning, I just ran 
away. 
Hannibal Lecter: Not "just", Clarice. What set you off? You started at what time? 
Clarice Starling: Early, still dark. 
Hannibal Lecter: Then something woke you, didn't it? Was it a dream? What was 
it? 
Clarice Starling: I heard a strange noise. 
Hannibal Lecter: What was it? 
Clarice Starling: It was … screaming. Some kind of screaming, like a child's voice. 
Hannibal Lecter: What did you do? 
Clarice Starling: I went downstairs, outside. I crept up into the barn. I was so 
scared to look inside, but I had to. 
Hannibal Lecter: And what did you see, Clarice? What did you see? 
Clarice Starling: Lambs. And they were screaming. 
Hannibal Lecter: They were slaughtering the spring lambs? 
Clarice Starling: And they were screaming. 
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Hannibal Lecter: And you ran away? 
Clarice Starling: No. First I tried to free them. I … I opened the gate to their pen, 
but they wouldn't run. They just stood there, confused. They wouldn't run. 
Hannibal Lecter: But you could and you did, didn't you? 
Clarice Starling: Yes. I took one lamb, and I ran away as fast as I could. 
Hannibal Lecter: Where were you going, Clarice? 
Clarice: I don't know. I didn't have any food, any water, and it was very cold, very 
cold. I thought, I thought if I could save just one, but … he was so heavy. So 
heavy. I didn't get more than a few miles when the sheriff's car picked me up. The 
rancher was so angry he sent me to live at the Lutheran orphanage in Bozeman. I 
never saw the ranch again. 
Hannibal Lecter: What became of your lamb, Clarice? 
Clarice Starling: They killed him. 
Hannibal Lecter: You still wake up sometimes, don't you? You wake up in the dark 
and hear the screaming of the lambs. 
Clarice Starling: Yes. 
Hannibal Lecter: And you think if you save poor Catherine, you could make them 
stop, don't you? You think if Catherine lives, you won't wake up in the dark ever 
again to that awful screaming of the lambs. 
Clarice Starling: [choking up] I don't know. I don't know. 
Hannibal Lecter: Thank you, Clarice. Thank you. 
Clarice Starling: Tell me his name, Doctor. 
Hannibal Lecter: … Dr. Chilton, I presume. I think you know each other. 
Dr. Chilton: Okay. Let's go. 
Clarice Starling: It's your turn, Doctor. 
Dr. Chilton: Out! 
Clarice Starling: Tell me his name! 
Boyle: I'm sorry, ma'am. We've got orders. We have to put you on a plane. Come 
on, now. 
[Chilton and the guards start leading Clarice out] 
Hannibal Lecter: Brave Clarice. You will let me know when those lambs stop 
screaming, won't you? 
Clarice Starling: Tell me his name, Doctor!35 
																																																						
35 http://www.script-o-rama.com/movie_scripts/s/silence-of-the-lambs-script-transcript.html 
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As we can see from the dialogue, Clarice is completely absorbed by her task 
and desperately tries to make Hannibal reveal the real name of Buffalo Bill in 
order to save Catherine. From a literal perspective the name that she is looking for 
is the specific name of the serial killer. However, from a psychoanalytic 
perspective, what she is trying to do is to master the Real to escape its threat. To 
give a real name to Buffalo Bill means not just arresting the killer but also 
arresting the Real that the killer represents. As Lecter points out, to capture 
Buffalo Bill means to silence the scream of the lambs that have haunted her since 
her childhood. Even if she is not aware of it, she hopes that “if Catherine lives, 
she won't wake up in the dark ever again to that awful screaming of the lambs”. 
For Clarice, it is clear that the only chance to “make them stop” is to “save poor 
Catherine,” to sublimate the insistence of the Real into a fixed identity in the 
prison of meaning. Nevertheless, Lecter’s relentless questions – which evoke the 
insistence of the Real – reveal to Clarice the inconsistency of her unconscious 
hope and leave her as confused as she was in front of the lambs that she tried to 
save. 
As she recalls it, the first time she faced the scream of the lambs, she tried to 
save them by opening “the gate to their pen, but they wouldn't run, they just stood 
there, confused”. From a psychoanalytic standpoint, the scene can be read as the 
first encounter between Clarice and the Real. Indeed, as an allegory for the drives, 
the lambs did not act in accord with her will and, on the contrary, just “stood 
there” wrapped in the incomprehensibility of their behavior. The drives work in 
fact in unpredictable ways, often against the flourishing of the subject to the point 
of embracing death, like the lambs. If the drives have the power to jeopardize 
one’s sovereignty over the world and oneself, it is because, as the main expression 
of the Real, they can neither be controlled nor understood. 
Clarice’s inability to understand or control her drives even if she could 
clearly feel the angst of the scream shows the structural gap within the subject. 
Gap that, in those unexpected and uncontrollable moments in which the drives 
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obtrude themselves on the life of the consciousness36, opens like a chasm, 
overwhelming the subject. When she “heard a strange noise”, when “some kind of 
screaming, like a child's voice“ woke her up in the night is the moment when 
Clarice cannot bear the angst of the Real and surrenders to the force of the drives. 
Indeed when she hears, without knowing the reasons, the intolerable and 
unlocalized scream, she cannot resist her own drive to watch. Clarice’s drives are 
in fact not just aural but also scopophilic: she needs to watch in order to 
understand, in order to master by seeing the intolerable sound. But she fails to 
recognize that the drive to see itself, to see what cannot be mastered, to see the 
horror of the Real, is always implicated in what presents itself as the lawful 
Symbolic pursuit of reason.  
The link between knowledge and vision is very old and deeply-roted in 
western culture. The stem of the polythematic ancient Greek word Oράω (that 
means “to see”) is Oιδ- from which we derive Oιδα that is translated with "I 
know." The reasoning implied is: “I know because I have seen." "Oιδ-" is also the 
root of the English word “idea”, the Italian “idea”, the Spanish “idea”, the French 
“idée”, the German “Ideen” and so on, and lead to the same reasoning: "since I 
saw I could produce an idea"37. Now the contribution that psychoanalysis adds to 
philosophical thought is not merely that seeing is not sufficient to know38 but that 
the will to see in order to know is indissolubly linked to what escapes the will 
itself.39 In other words, the problem at stake here is not simply that our senses are 
inaccurate and ambiguous and therefore the knowledge that we derive from them 
is erroneous, but that knowledge itself is always already compromised with what 
																																																						
36 Following Lacan, Edelman calls those moments: moments of “encounter”. 
37 This is the reason why Enzo Paci affirms in the preface to the Italian translation of Die Krisis 
der europäischen Wissenschaft und die transzendentale Phänomenologie: Eine Einleitung in die 
phänomenologische Philosophie by Husserl: “Quando io ho visto, tenendo presente i termini greci, 
vuol dire che so.” (E. Husserl, La crisi delle scienze europee e la fenomenologia trascendentale, il 
Saggiatore, Milano 2008, pag. 12.) 
38 Question clarified already by Epicurus that, with the “theory of effluvium”, tried to give an 
account of the fact that perceptions are subjective and unreliable and by the Stoics that, for this 
reason, formulated the notion of ἐποχή that runs through the history of philosophy up to Husserl. 
39 See Lacan, Kant avec sade in Ecrits. 
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cannot be reduced to a pure object of knowledge: the Real. Our relation with 
knowledge, our need to know, is in fact deeply rooted with the drives that both 
push us through knowledge and escape this same knowledge. Like in a sort of 
unconscious synesthesia, “brave Clarice” tries to fill with gaze the hole that the 
scream has opened inside of her without recognizing that her need to see, her urge 
to see in order to know, belongs to the very same hole.  
Furthermore, in talking to Hannibal, Clarice has to recognize not only that it 
is impossible to control the drives, but also that is impossible to redeem them. 
Hannibal’s relentless questions, exasperated by the framing of the camera that 
slowly gets closer to his face, have the power to lead Clarice back to the encounter 
with the Real, showing that she is still trying to master her drives and their 
vicissitudes. This attempted mastery is evidenced by her battle against, and 
fascination with, serial murderers—which is why the “love story” with Lecter is 
so important: what drives her is the encounter with him as her mirror, as her 
specular image (hence the persistent shots of them superimposed on one another 
via their reflections in a glass). This “detective work” is the sublimation of her 
drive toward the Real itself — her desire to see into the abyss that leads her to the 
pen where the lambs are locked up and where she hears them “screaming.” As 
Nietzsche wrote in the aphorism 146 of Beyond Good and Evil: “Whoever fights 
with monsters should see to it that he does not become one himself” because 
“when you stare for a long time into an abyss, the abyss stares back into you” 40 
and maybe it will reveal that you are the very same monster or, at least, that there 
is a part of you that irresistibly drawn to it and that you cannot control. 
Despite Clarice’s belief that saving “poor Catherine” means silencing the 
lambs, she finally has to admit that she “doesn’t know” if this will definitively 
silence the screams she continues to hear. When Hannibal rhetorically invites her 
to let him know when the lambs stop screaming, she can do nothing but keep 
asking for Buffalo Bill’s real name, screaming the request with increasing 
desperation – as if she could cover with her own scream the scream of the Real – 
																																																						
40 F. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, edited by R.P. Horstmann and J. Norman, translated by J. 
Norman, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2002, p. 69. 
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revealing in this way that, deep inside, she feels now as then that the lamb is still 
“so heavy”: so heavy as to be unbearable. Even if Clarice were able to arrest 
Buffalo Bill41, sublimating in this way the insistence of the Real, she could never 
silence its scream. Even if she consciously would like to end this unbearable 
sound, she is unconsciously driven toward and by it, just as Hannibal Lecter and 
Buffalo Bill, more explicitly, are driven by fixations on the void. 
Buffalo Bill is just a placeholder, a figurative image for the Real she can 
never arrest. The Real will always scream in Clarice’s nights as the relentless 
voice of the negativity that surpasses signification. When in the last scene of the 
movie Clarice is celebrating that she killed Buffalo Bill and finally feels relieved, 
Hannibal calls to ask the same old question: “Well, Clarice? Have the lambs 
stopped screaming?”42 In this way Hannibal underlines that it does not matter 
what sort of sublimation she undertakes: “pour le réel, quelque bouleversement 
qu'on puisse y apporter, il y est toujours et en tout cas, à sa place, il l'emporte 
collée à sa semelle, sans rien connaître qui puisse l'en exiler.”43 As if it comes 
from the unconscious, Lecter’s call throws her back in the vortex of the drives. 
Immediately she reacts with the same scheme of sublimation by which she dealt 
with Buffalo Bill: chasing him. Indeed, during the last instants of the call she 
asks: 
 
Clarice Starling: Where are you, Dr Lecter? 
Hannibal Lecter: I have no plans to call on you, Clarice. The world's more 
interesting with you in it. So you take care now to extend me the same courtesy. 
Clarice Starling: You know I can't make that promise.44 
 
Clarice cannot resist chasing the killer in order to trap her own drives to kill. 
The movie ends with Clarice’s invoking over and over again the name of 
Hannibal Lecter. Another name that could finally trap and erase the Real, showing 
																																																						
41 As she does in the end of the movie. 
42 http://www.script-o-rama.com/movie_scripts/s/silence-of-the-lambs-script-transcript.html 
43 J. Lacan, Séminaire sur la lettre voilé, in Ecrits, p. 25.  
44 http://www.script-o-rama.com/movie_scripts/s/silence-of-the-lambs-script-transcript.html 
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in this way that she is still unwilling to recognize that the Symbolic will never fill 
the hole of the Real. The title of the movie does not appear in the credits at the 
end of the movie, suggesting in this way that, even if Clarice was able to arrest 
Buffalo Bill, even if she was able to sublimate for a while the insistence of the 
Real, she will never be able to silence the lambs – she will never find the silence 
of the lambs. And probably she does not want to. The bitter irony that runs 
throughout the film, and that leads her to the paradox that emerges from the 
relation between the drives and the human being's conscious life, is in fact that she 
seeks a silence that can only come with the lambs death. Her need of silence, 
masked behind his abiding lawful work, turns out to be a deep need of death – a 
need that she sublimates chasing those who chase the innocent “lambs”.  
A few pages after the paragraph I quoted above from the Philosophische 
Untersuchungen, Wittgenstein adds: “«Surely I can (inwardly) undertake to call 
THIS 'pain' in the future.»” - «But is it certain that you have undertaken it? Are 
you sure that it was enough for this purpose to concentrate your attention on your 
feeling?» - A queer question” - 45. Wittgenstein uses the adjective “Seltsame” to 
define his question. I agree with Anscombe who acutely translated the term as 
“queer”. This question is in fact exquisitely queer. Not only because the object of 
this question cannot be reduced to a stable concept, but also because, in the way 
that it is placed, this question queries language itself and the subject that language 
sustains.  
Wittgenstein suggests that we can sublimate pain in the Symbolic by 
producing a structure of meaning to deal with it; but, as an ante litteram queer 
theorist, he ironizes both that suggestion and our confidence in meaning: Are we 
sure that the word “THIS ‘pain’” means exactly what we are talking about? Is 
what we are trying to grasp really something that depends on our will and can be 
so easily managed with language and reason? Or is it something else - something 
that is beyond our conscious reality and does not let itself be fully understood? If 
in fact it is always a sublimated version of pain that we understand and try to cure, 
what about its ontological side? What about the rest that we fail to grasp? In this 
																																																						
45 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigation, cit., p. 100, paragraph 263. Italic mine. 
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way Wittgenstein not only puts into question the empirical capacity of a single 
individual to repair pain or redeem it, but he also shows the structural wound 
inscribed in the subject of language. The problem that remains unaddressed by 
political and ethical responses to pain is the intrinsic negativity of human 
existence that checkmates the cogito’s rational claims and the fantasy of 
sovereignty that it produces in the subject.  
As Edelman observes, there are “moments that signal the failure or even the 
inadequacy of knowledge as such, moments when the frameworks of knowing are 
not simply incoherently at odds with each other but incapable of accommodating 
the encounter with something unnamable in the terms they offer and irreducible to 
relation.”46 Instead of focusing, like phenomenology, on the intentionality that 
takes for granted a fixed identity, Wittgenstein gives voice precisely to those 
moments, querying – or queering – the unity of the subject and its fantasy of 
being able to grasp and make sense of any kind of pain. He does not see pain as 
the accident that, in showing the complex relationship between the body and the 
mind, identifies a strong subjectivity able to work through and overcome it; 
rather, he sees it as the expression of the unavoidable negativity that structures the 
subject. 
Now, if pain, as I argue, is the meaningless experience whose screams must 
be silenced into meaning, if pain is the experience that the Symbolic must redeem 
it from its intrinsic negativity, then masochism poses a particularly difficult 
challenge to the Symbolic insofar as it designates the pain that does not want 
redemption, the pain that take pleasure upon itself, the pain that embraces 
negativity. Of course, as we have seen, all possible experiences, even those closest 
to the Real, need the screen of the Symbolic. This is the reason why even forms of 
masochism, “as embodiments of unintelligibility, of course, must veil what they 
expose, becoming, as figures for it, the means of its apparent subjection to 
meaning.”47 Therefore, all the symbols, rituals, metaphors, and the most 
sophisticated scenic aspects of theater that sustain masochism make it, from a 
																																																						
46 L. Berlant and L. Edelman, Sex or the Unbearable, cit., p. 10. 
47 L. Edelman, No Future, cit., p. 106, 107. 
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certain point of view, the quintessence of the Symbolic. Nevertheless, masochism 
cannot be reduced to any of these symbols since what it seeks is always beyond 
the Symbolic. Indeed, although masochism is built on symbols, although symbols 
form the structure of its fantasy, they are not the core of masochism. If, as Lacan 
argues, “le masochisme est le majeur de la jouissance que donne le Réel”48, it is 
because masochism, beyond the symbolic expressions with which it manifests 
itself, escapes any meanings that could once and for all grasp, understand, and 
redeem it. As I will argue in the following chapters, as the reification of 
something that inexplicably lures the subject towards what hurts him, in its 
insistence on perpetrating what wounds the subject beyond his will, masochism 
shows “the internal limit to signification and the impossibility of turning Real loss 
to meaningful profit in the Symbolic without its persistent remainder: the 
inescapable Real of the drive.49  
Instead of redeeming, repairing, avoiding, or curing pain, masochism 
embraces the negativity that jeopardizes the subject. And if psychiatry, 
psychoanalysis, philosophy and the “BDSM community” itself all try to explain 
this thing – making it into a perversion, a statement, a way to overcome fears and 
anxieties, or a way to break away from common sexual morality – the intention of 
my work is to show that the drives that push someone to embrace pain and self-
destruction cannot be “understood.” Masochism is and remains incomprehensible. 
This is the reason why, rather than offering reasons for masochism – the 
presumed reasons that create or turn someone into a masochist – I will investigate 
masochism in order to approach the Real and its relation with sex, life, and death. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																																						
48 J. Lacan, Le Séminaire: Livre XXIII, Le sinthome, 1975-1976, Éditions du Seuil, Paris 2005, p. 
90. 
49 L. Edelman, No Future, cit., p. 106, 107. 
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CHAPTER 2 
PLEASURE 
 
 
“O Rose thou art sick. 
The invisible worm, 
That flies in the night 
In the howling storm: 
Has found out thy bed 
Of crimson joy: 
And his dark secret love 
Does thy life destroy.” 
 
William Blake 
 
 
 
According to David Halperin, “The History of Sexuality, Volume I, contains 
the only original account of sexuality that the twentieth century has produced 
other than Freud’s, and it offers the only account of sexuality that can rival 
Freud’s and provide a genuine alternative to the normalizing discourses of 
conventional psychoanalysis.”50 Since Deleuze and Guattari also distance 
																																																						
The reason why I often use the original version of the texts that I quote is due to the fact that the 
translation is either misleading or simply nonexistent.  
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themselves from conventional psychoanalysis by offering a strongly anti-
normalizing and anti-pathologizing account of sexuality, Halperin’s statement 
might sound hyperbolic. Nevertheless, he points out an important issue underlying 
Foucault’s anti-psychoanalytic attempt to de-psychologize sexuality. Indeed, even 
if both Deleuze and Guattari, like Foucault, are devoted to resisting power and 
social constraints (including those imposed by psychoanalysis), Deleuze and 
Guattari still consider desire an essential element of sexuality51 – the element by 
which the “becoming multiple” of their Schizoanalysis52 is possible. Foucault, to 
the contrary, rejects desire because he considers it irremediably compromised by 
the structures of domination that trap the subject inside its spiral. If Deleuze and 
Guattari fight psychoanalysis from the “inside,” re-elaborating the notion of 
desire, Foucault rejects psychoanalysis in toto, building his account of “sexuality” 
on the notion of pleasure(s).  
In this chapter I present Foucault’s theory of pleasure(s) and in the next one 
Deleuze and Guarrati’s theory of desire exploring the political reasons for their 
struggle against social constraints and the theoretical reasons for their division in 
relation to pleasure/desire. My intention in this two chapters is to criticize both 
positions, showing how masochism – which all three of these philosophers 
assumed to be a privileged object to express their positions – actually shows the 
weak point of both analyses of sexuality. This critique will allow me to show why 
the death drive is fundamental for the comprehension of masochism. 
 
																																																																																																																																																					
50 D. Halperin, Saint Foucault: Towards a Gay Hagiography, Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 
121. Halperin also express the same thought in a more recent book: “Foucault […] offered the 
only theoretical approach to sexuality sufficiently substantive and original to compete with 
psychoanalysis – and to afford a meaningful intellectual alternative to it within the field of 
sexuality studies”: D. Halperin, What Do Gay Man Want? An Essay on Sex, Risk, and Subjectivity, 
The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor 2007, p. 4. 
51 For Deleuze’s answer to Foucault’s theory of pleasure see Deleuze, Désir et plaisir par Gilles 
Deleuze, Lettre de Deleuze à Michel Foucault, (1977) English translation in A. Davidson, 
Foucault and its interlocutors, The University of Chicago Press, 1997. I will discuss this topic 
extensively in the second part of the chapter. 
52 See G. Deleuze and F. Guattari, Capitalisme et schizophrénie. L'anti-Œdipe.  
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2.1 
LE DISPOSITIF DE SEXUALITE 
 
 
 
What Foucault calls the dispositif53 of sexuality in Volume I of The History 
of Sexuality is a series of discourses, practices, rules, incitements, and inspections 
that instead of repressing54 sex was able to produce a scientia sexualis: namely a 
																																																						
53 In an interview right after the publication of the first volume of the History of Sexuality Alain 
Grosrichard asked Foucault: “tu parles, toi, d'un«dispositif de sexualité». Quel est pour toi le sens 
et la fonction méthodologique de ce terme : «dispositif» ?” and Foucault answered: “Ce que 
j'essaie de repérer sous ce nom, c'est, premièrement, un ensemble résolument hétérogène, 
comportant des discours, des institutions, des aménagements architecturaux, des décisions 
réglementaires, des lois, des mesures administratives, des énoncés scientifiques, des propositions 
philosophiques, morales, philanthropiques, bref : du dit, aussi bien que du non-dit, voilà les 
éléments du dispositif. Le dispositif lui-même, c'est le réseau qu'on peut établir entre ces éléments. 
Deuxièmement, ce que je voudrais repérer dans le dispositif, c'est justement la nature du lien qui 
peut exister entre ces éléments hétérogènes. Ainsi, tel discours peut apparaître tantôt comme 
programme d'une institution, tantôt au contraire comme un élément qui permet de justifier et de 
masquer une pratique qui, elle, reste muette, ou fonctionner comme réinterprétation seconde de 
cette pratique, lui donner accès à un champ nouveau de rationalité. Bref, entre ces éléments, 
discursifs ou non, il y a comme un jeu, des changements de position, des modifications de 
fonctions, qui peuvent, eux aussi, être très différents. Troisièmement, par dispositif, j'entends une 
sorte - disons - de formation, qui, à un moment historique donné, a eu pour fonction majeure de 
répondre à une urgence. Le dispositif a donc une fonction stratégique dominante. Cela a pu être, 
par exemple, la résorption d'une masse de population flottante qu'une société à économie de type 
essentiellement mercantiliste trouvait encombrante : il y a eu là un impératif stratégique, jouant 
comme matrice d'un dispositif, qui est devenu peu à peu le dispositif de contrôle-assujettissement 
de la folie, de la maladie mentale, de la névrose.” M. Foucault, Le jeu de Michel Foucault, 
(interwiew with D. Colas, A Grosrichard, G. Le Gaufrey, G. Livi, G. Miller, J. Miller, J-A. Miller, 
C. Millet, G. Wajeman) in M. Foucault, Dits et Ecrits, Tome III (1976-1979), Gallimard, Paris 
1994, Text 206, pp. 298, 299. 
54 “Indeed, it is not a question of denying the existence of repression. It's one of showing that 
repression is always a part of a much more complex political strategy regarding sexuality. Things 
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stratified and complex relation of judges, priests, doctors, psychiatrists, and 
psychoanalysts who, in pursuing the “truth of sex,” were able to produce and 
discipline desire. “Produce” and “discipline” are key terms that cross almost the 
entire philosophical work of Foucault and that characterize in particular the first 
part of his analysis of sexuality.  
According to Foucault, by extrapolating various groups of people from the 
general and indistinct mass of the anti-socials and giving them physical and 
psychological characteristics, specific places to stay, and treatments to follow, 
modern society created figures such as the fool,55 the pervert,56 and the criminal.57 
The same mechanism is used by Foucault in the first volume of The History of 
Sexuality to understand how something like sex emerges from the general and 
indistinct mass58 of what he calls la chair59 – the flesh. As Foucault clarifies in an 
																																																																																																																																																					
are not merely repressed. There is about sexuality a lot of defective regulations in which the 
negative effects of inhibition are counterbalanced by the positive effects of stimulation. The way 
in which sexuality in the nineteenth century was both repressed but also put in light, underlined, 
analyzed through techniques like psychology and psychiatry shows very well that it was not 
simply a question of repression.” M. Foucault, An Interview by Stephen Riggins, (1982), in Ethics: 
Subjectivity and Truth, edited by P. Rabinow, The New Press, New York, p. 126. 
55 See M. Foucault, Histoire de la folie a l’âge classique. 
56 See M. Foucault, Les anormaux. 
57 See M. Foucault, Surveiller et punir : Naissance de la prison. 
58 “The discursive explosion of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries caused this system centered 
on legitimate alliance to undergo two modifications. First, a centrifugal movement with respect to 
heterosexual monogamy. Of course, the array of practices and pleasures continued to be referred to 
it as their internal standard; but it was spoken of less and less, or in any case with a growing 
moderation. Efforts to find out its secrets were abandoned; nothing further was demanded of it 
than to define itself from day to day. The legitimate couple, with its regular sexuality, had a right 
to more discretion. It tended to function as a norm, one that was stricter, perhaps, but quieter. On 
the other hand, what came under scrutiny was the sexuality of children, mad men and women, and 
criminals; the sensuality of those who did not like the opposite sex; reveries, obsessions, petty 
manias, or great transports of rage. It was time for all these figures, scarcely noticed in the past, to 
step forward and speak, to make the difficult confession of what they were. No doubt they were 
condemned all the same; but they were listened to; and if regular sexuality happened to be 
questioned once again, it was through a reflux movement, originating in these peripheral 
sexualities. Whence the setting apart of the "unnatural" as a specific dimension in the field of 
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interview published in Ornicar? Bulletin périodique du champ freudien, sex is not 
a “donné préalable”, is not a trans-historical object but is a cultural product of 
modern society, a cultural object that, like madness, arose in a particular historical 
period. Of course Foucault is not arguing that people just started having sex in 
modern times but rather that a specific attention that slowly started to interrogate, 
to interpret, and finally to classify “le corps, les organes sexuels, les plaisirs, les 
relations d'alliance, les rapports interindividuels”60 has produced “un ensemble 
hétérogène, qui a finalement été recouvert par le dispositif de sexualité, lequel a 
produit, à un moment donné, comme clef de voûte de son propre discours et peut-
être de son propre fonctionnement, l'idée du sexe.”61 In the first volume of The 
History of Sexuality he affirms: 
 
The notion of "sex" made it possible to group together, in an artificial unity, 
anatomical elements, biological functions, conducts, sensations, and pleasures, and 
it enabled one to make use of this fictitious unity as a causal principle, an 
																																																																																																																																																					
sexuality. This kind of activity assumed an autonomy with regard to the other condemned forms 
such as adultery or rape (and the latter were condemned less and less): to marry a close relative or 
practice sodomy, to seduce a nun or engage in sadism, to deceive one's wife or violate cadavers, 
became things that were essentially different. The area covered by the Sixth Commandment began 
to fragment. Similarly, in the civil order, the confused category of "debauchery," which for more 
than a century had been one of the most frequent reasons for administrative confinement, came 
apart. From the debris, there appeared on the one hand infractions against the legislation (or 
morality) pertaining to marriage and the family, and on the other, offenses against the regularity of 
a natural function (offenses which, it must be added, the law was apt to punish). Here we have a 
likely reason, among others, for the prestige of Don Juan, which three centuries have not erased. 
Underneath the great violator of the rules of marriage-stealer of wives, seducer of virgins, the 
shame of families, and an insult to husbands and fathers-another personage can be glimpsed: the 
individual driven, in spite of himself, by the somber madness of sex. Underneath the libertine, the 
pervert.” M. Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Introduction, Pantheon Books, New 
York 1978, pp. 38 and 39. 
59 “le sexe, on le voit apparaître, il me semble, au cours du XIXe siècle […] On a une sexualité 
depuis le XVIIIe siècle, un sexe depuis le XIXe. Avant, on avait sans doute une chair.” M. 
Foucault, Le jeu de Michel Foucault, cit., p. 12. 
60 Ibid. p. 312. 
61 Ibid. p 312. 
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omnipresent meaning, a secret to be discovered everywhere: sex was thus able to 
function as a unique signifier and as a universal signified. Further, by presenting 
itself in a unitary fashion, as anatomy and lack, as function and latency, as instinct 
and meaning, it was able to mark the line of contact between a knowledge of 
human sexuality and the biological sciences of reproduction; thus, without really 
borrowing anything from the these sciences, excepting a few doubtful analogies, 
the knowledge of sexuality gained through proximity a guarantee, of quasi-
scientificity; but by virtue of this same proximity, some of the contents of biology 
and physiology were able to serve as a principle of normality for human sexuality. 
Finally, the notion of sex brought about a fundamental reversal; it made it possible 
to invert the representation of the relationships of power to sexuality, causing the 
latter to appear, not in its essential and positive relation to power, but as being 
rooted in a specific and irreducible urgency which power tries as best it can to 
dominate; thus the idea of "sex" makes it possible to evade what gives "power" its 
power; it enables one to conceive power solely as law and taboo. Sex - that agency 
which appears to dominate us and that secret which seems to underlie all that we 
are, that point which enthralls us through the power it manifests and the meaning it 
conceals, and which we ask to reveal what we are and to free us from what defines 
us - is doubtless but an ideal point made necessary by the deployment [dispositif] 
of sexuality and its operation. We must not make the mistake of thinking that sex is 
an autonomous agency which secondarily produces manifold effects of sexuality 
over the entire length of its surface of contact with power. On the contrary, sex is 
the most speculative, most ideal, and most internal element in a deployment 
[dispositif] of sexuality organized by power in its grip on bodies and their 
materiality, their forces, energies, sensations, and pleasures.62 
 
As stated in this paragraph, according to Foucault, “sex” is a complex 
cultural instance even though it has been imposed as a natural object by society. 
However, the intention of Foucault is not just to show that sex is a speculative 
artifact; he also needs to establish the  theoretical ground from which he can 
launch his attack. What he really wants to point out is that in creating sex, the 
dispositif of sexuality also creates the fantasy of a “truth” linked to it – a truth 
																																																						
62 M. Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Introduction, cit., pp. 154 and 155. Italics 
mine. 
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that, hidden in the meshes of desire, could be revealed only through a hermeneutic 
of this same desire. Indeed, the shrewd question that runs through the entire first 
volume of the history of sexuality is: are we sure that desire is able to reveal the 
hidden truth of the subject or, to  the contrary, is desire, and the truth that it brings 
with it, just a product of a dispositif of sexuality, a product able to discipline the 
bodies and the pleasure(s) they contain? 
According to Foucault, the Christian pastoral of the seventeenth century, in 
“prescribing as a fundamental duty the task of passing everything having to do 
with sex through the endless mill of speech,” 63 began the history of a meticulous 
attention to the “chair” that increased during the last centuries covering not only 
medicine, psychiatry, and psychoanalysis, but also the state systems of justice, 
prison, and education64. In this way, from the Christian pastoral of the seventeenth 
century to the medicine of eighteenth century, the psychiatry of the nineteenth 
century, and the psychoanalysis of the twentieth century, the “Western man has 
been drawn for three centuries to the task of telling everything concerning his 
sex”65 thus creating the conditions whereby the dispositif of sexuality could instill 
																																																						
63 “The catholic pastoral prescribed as a fundamental duty the task of passing everything having to 
do with sex through the endless mill of speech” ibid., p. 21 
64 “One could mention many other centers which in the eighteenth or nineteenth century began to 
produce discourses on sex. First there was medicine, via the "nervous disorders"; next psychiatry, 
when it set out to discover the etiology of mental illnesses, focusing its gaze first on 6 6 excess," 
then onanism, then frustration, then "frauds against procreation," but especially when it annexed 
the whole of the sexual perversions as its own province; criminal justice, too, which had long been 
concerned with sexuality, particularly in the form of "heinous" crimes and crimes against nature, 
but which, toward the middle of the nineteenth century, broadened its jurisdiction to include petty 
offenses, minor indecencies, insignificant perversions; and lastly, all those social controls, 
cropping up at the end of the last century, which screened the sexuality of couples, parents and 
children, dangerous and endangered adolescents-undertaking to protect, separate, and forewarn, 
signaling perils everywhere, awakening people's attention, calling for diagnoses, piling up reports, 
organizing therapies. These sites radiated discourses aimed at sex, intensifying people's awareness 
of it as a constant danger, and this in turn created a further incentive to talk about it.” Ibid., pp. 30 
and 31. 
65 Ibid., p. 23. 
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the idea that sex is “harboring a fundamental secret:”66 “a secret whose discovery 
is imperative”67 since it concerns the truth of the subject. “Hence the fact that over 
the centuries [sex] has become more important than our soul, more important 
almost than our life; and so it is that all the world's enigmas appear frivolous to us 
compared to this secret, minuscule in each of us, but of a density that makes it 
more serious than any other.”68 
In an interview originally published in Le Nouvel observateur on March 
1977 (right after the publication of the first volume of The History of Sexuality) 
with the title: "Non au sexe roi",  Foucault affirms: 
 
Since Christianity, the Western world has never ceased saying: "To know who you are, 
know what your sexuality is." Sex has always been the forum where both the future of 
our species and our "truth" as human subjects are decided. Confession, the examination 
of conscience, all the insistence on the important secrets of the flesh [chair], has not been 
simply a means of prohibiting sex or of repressing it as far as possible from 
consciousness, but was a means of placing sexuality at the heart of existence and of 
connecting salvation with the mastery of these obscure movements. In Christian 
societies, sex has been the central object of examination, surveillance, avowal and 
transformation into discourse.69 
 
This perspective clarifies how psychoanalysis – the discipline that emerges 
precisely with the purpose of showing the fundamentality that sex has for the 
existence of human beings and that, for this reason, produces a “discourse” that 
places at the center of its own reflection a deep analysis of desire – is not just one 
of the social constraints that, controlled by the dispositif of sexuality, controls the 
subjects, but is somehow the culmination of a procedure of production and 
discipline that, pushing the subject to reveal everything concern his sexuality, is 
																																																						
66 Ibid., p. 69. 
67 Ibid., p. 35. 
68 Ibid., p. 156. 
69 M. Foucault, Power and sex, (interview) in M. Foucault, Politics Philosophy Culture: interview 
and Other Writings 1977-1984, edited by L. Kritzman, Routledge, New York and London, 1988, 
p. 111. 
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able to grasp and manipulate every nuance of it. In fact, if “by making sex into 
that which, above all else, had to be confessed, the Christian pastoral always 
presented it as the disquieting enigma”70, whereas psychoanalysis arose and 
imposed itself as the form of knowledge that finally can solve this enigma, the 
supreme form of knowledge able to penetrate the desire of the subject by 
uncovering its truth, and consequently, revealing who the subject really is. La 
volonté de savoir – the imperative to discourse that the dispositif cunningly 
stitched around sex making it the viaticum for truth – finally finds in 
psychoanalysis the long-sought answer.  
Foucault underlines that “dans l’histoire des procédures qui mettent en 
rapport le sexe et la vérité [la psychanalyse est le] point culminant. De nos jours, 
il n’y a pas un seul discours sur la sexualité qui, d’une manière ou d’une autre, ne 
s’ordonne à celui de la psychanalyse.”71 For this reason, according to Foucault, 
the contemporary man is constantly and increasingly pushed to reveal everything 
concerning his desire to psychoanalysts if he wants to find the truth about himself. 
If sex is the mirror that reflects the deepest truth of oneself, who is better able to 
look into this mirror to tell who the subject really is but the person invested with 
the power to decipher sexual desire?  
 
By creating the imaginary element that is "sex," the deployment [dispositif] of 
sexuality established one of its most essential internal operating principles: the 
desire for sex – the desire to have it, to have access to it, to discover it, to liberate 
it, to articulate it in discourse, to formulate it in truth. It constituted "sex" itself as 
something desirable. And it is this desirability of sex that attaches each one of us to 
the injunction to know it, to reveal its law and its power; it is this desirability that 
makes us think we are affirming the rights of our sex against all power, when in 
fact we are fastened to the deployment of sexuality that has lifted up from deep 
within us a sort of mirage in which we think we see ourselves reflected – the dark 
shimmer of sex.72 
																																																						
70 M. Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Introduction, cit., p. 35. 
71 M. Foucault, Le jeu de Michel Foucault, in Dits et Ecrits cit., p. 313. 
72 M. Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Introduction, cit., pp. 156 and 157. 
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2.2 
FOUCAULT AND SEXUAL LIBERATION 
 
 
 
No repression, just interpretation! could be the motto of the last 
metamorphosis of thisdispositif that, instead of repressing sex, created a series of 
discourses aimed not just at producing and disciplining it but also at  making it 
desirable.73  “One,” argues Foucault, “has to be completely taken in by this 
internal ruse of confession in order to attribute a fundamental role to censorship, 
to taboos regarding speaking and thinking; one has to have an inverted image of 
power in order to believe that all these voices which have spoken so long in our 
civilization repeating the formidable injunction to tell what one is and what one 
does, what one recollects and what one has forgotten, what one is thinking and 
what one thinks he is not thinking – are speaking to us of freedom.”74 Foucault 
concludes the first volume saying, “ironie de ce dispositif: il nous fait croire qu'il 
y va de notre «libération».”75  
This attack is obviously directed against the intellectuals committed to 
sexual liberation – like Reich76, and, in a different manner, Deleuze and Guattari: 
																																																						
73 “Doubtless the secret does not reside in that basic reality in relation to which all the incitements 
to speak of sex are situated-whether they try to force the secret, or whether in some obscure way 
they reinforce it by the manner in which they speak of it. It is a question rather of a theme that 
forms part of the very mechanics of these incitements: a way of giving shape to the requirement to 
speak about the matter, a fable that is indispensable to the endlessly proliferating economy of the 
discourse on sex. What is peculiar to modern societies, in fact, is not that they consigned sex to a 
shadow existence, but that they dedicated themselves to speaking of it ad infinitum, while 
exploiting it as the secret.” M. Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Introduction, cit., 
p. 35. 
74 Ibid., p. 60. 
75 M. Foucault, Histoire de la sexualité 1: La volonté de savoir, Gallimard, Paris 1976, p. 211. 
76 “In Reich's view the problem was entirely one of liberation. To put it somewhat schematically, 
according to him there is desire, drive, prohibition, repression, internalization, and it is by getting 
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those who, according to Foucault, pretend to use the notion of desire to free the 
subject from the social constraints imposed by society without acknowledging 
that the notion of desire is always already completely saturated by the dispositif of 
sexuality. In an interview with Jean Le Bitoux titled “The Gay Science,” Foucault 
affirms: 
 
I would say, schematically, that medicine and psychoanalysis have made extensive 
use of this notion of desire, precisely as a kind of instrument for establishing the 
intelligibility of a sexual pleasure and thus for standardizing it in terms of 
normality. Tell me what your desire is, and I’ll tell you who you are. I’ll tell you if 
you’re sick or not, I’ll tell you if you’re normal or not, and thus I’ll be able to 
disqualify your desire or on the contrary requalify it. This is rather obvious, it 
seems to me, in psychoanalysis. In any case, if we look at the very history of the 
notion of desire, from Christian concupiscence, through the sexual instinct of the 
1840s, and up to the Freudian and post-Freudian notions of desire, I think we’d see 
pretty clearly how this notion functions. Deleuze and Guattari obviously use the 
notion [of desire] in a completely different way. But the problem I have is that I’m 
not sure if, through this very word, despite its different meaning, we don’t run the 
risk, despite Deleuze and Guattari’s intention, of allowing some of the medico-
psychological presuppositions [prises] that were built into desire, in its traditional 
sense, to be reintroduced.77 
 
What we have to bear in mind is that for Foucault power is structurally 
relational and there is no possibility of situating oneself outside of power78. The 
																																																																																																																																																					
rid of these prohibitions, in other words, by liberating oneself, that the problem gets resolved.” M. 
Foucault, The Ethics of the Concern of the Self as a Practice of Freedom, (interview), in Ethics: 
Subjectivity and Truth, cit., p. 284. 
77 M. Foucault, The Gay Science, Critical Inquiry, vol. 37, no.3 (Spring 2011), p. 389. 
78 “Where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is 
never in a position of exteriority in relation to power. Should it be said that one is always "inside" 
power, there is no "escaping" it, there is no absolute outside where it is concerned, because one is 
subject to the law in any case? Or that, history being the ruse of reason, power is the ruse of 
history, always emerging the winner? This would be to misunderstand the strictly relational 
character of power relationships. Their existence depends on a multiplicity of points of resistance: 
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“Repressive Hypothesis” – namely the idea that sex was imprisoned for centuries 
and that now it is simply necessary to free it in order to free the subject – is 
completely overturned by Foucault. As he argues, not only has sex been created 
by a dispositif that also carefully produced a series of discourses supposedly able 
to draw from sex the truth of the subject, but also, with the help of 
psychoanalysis, the dispositif was able to “saturate them [those discourses] with 
desire.” The sexual liberation movement, believing in the possibility of situating 
oneself outside of dominant power with the creation of discourses able to discover 
true desire, does nothing but give to the dispositif another “prise” to grasp – a 
“prise” by which the dispositif could extend its power. Indeed, according to 
Foucault, telling everything about our own sex with the intent of liberating a 
repressed desire does not lead to a true self but, on the contrary, to the creation of 
a “chair” subordinate to the coercive “discipline anatomo-politique du corps 
humaine”79 that we call desire. “Ne pas croire qu'en disant oui au sexe, on dit non 
au pouvoir; on suit au contraire le fil du dispositif général de sexualité. C'est de 
l'instance du sexe qu'il faut s'affranchir si, par un retournement tactique des divers 
mécanismes de la sexualité, on veut faire valoir contre les prises du pouvoir, les 
corps, les plaisirs, les savoirs, dans leur multiplicité et leur possibilité de 
résistance.”80 For this reason Foucault continues affirming in “The Gay Science”: 
 
It seems to me that, by using the word pleasure, which in the end means nothing, 
which is still, it seems to me, rather empty of content and unsullied by possible 
uses – in treating pleasure ultimately as nothing other than an event, an event that 
																																																																																																																																																					
these play the role of adversary, target, support, or handle in power relations. These points of 
resistance are present everywhere in the power network. Hence there is no single locus of great 
Refusal, no soul of revolt, source of all rebellions, or pure law of the revolutionary. Instead there is 
a plurality of resistances, each of them a special case: resistances that are possible, necessary, 
improbable; others that are spontaneous, savage, solitary, concerted, rampant, or violent; still 
others that are quick to compromise, interested, or sacrificial; by definition, they can only exist in 
the strategic field of power relations.” M. Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An 
Introduction, cit., pp. 95 and 96. 
79 M. Foucault, Histoire de la sexualité 1: La volonté de savoir, cit., p. 183. 
80 Ibid., pp. 207 and 208. Italics mine. 
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happens, that happens, I would say, outside the subject, or at the limit of the 
subject, or between two subjects, in this something that is neither of the body nor 
of the soul, neither outside nor inside – don’t we have here, in trying to reflect a bit 
on this notion of pleasure, a means of avoiding the entire psycho-logical and 
medical armature that was built into the traditional notion of desire?81 
 
If the only way to escape this intricate structure of domination is to refuse to 
engage with the hidden “truth” of our desire, one possibility can be found in 
focusing on pleasure(s),82 namely to create an Ars Erotica against the scientia 
sexualis that forces us into the prison of desire. To experiment with an art of 
living focused on increasing our capacity for feeling pleasure instead of looking 
for the hidden “truth” of sexuality is the only strategy that, according to Foucault, 
can free the subject from the servitude of desire, and the dispositif that produced 
it. As Davidson explains: 
 
while ars erotica is organized around the framework of body-pleasure-
intensification, scientia sexualis is organized around the axis of subject-desire-
truth. It is as if one could say that the imposition of true discourses on the subject 
of sexuality leads to the centrality of a theory of desire, while the discourse of 
																																																						
81 M. Foucault, The Gay Science, Critical Inquiry, vol. 37, no.3 (Spring 2011), p. 389. 
82 “Il y a un trait fondamental dans l'économie des plaisirs telle qu'elle fonctionne en Occident: 
c'est que le sexe lui sert de principe d'intelligibilité et de mesure. Depuis des millénaires, on tend à 
nous faire croire que la loi de tout plaisir, c'est, secrètement au moins, le sexe : et que c'est cela qui 
justifie la nécessité de sa modération, et donne la possibilité de son contrôle. Ces deux thèmes 
qu'au fond de tout plaisir il y a le sexe, et que la nature du sexe veut qu'il s'adonne et se limite à la 
procréation, ce ne sont pas des thèmes initialement chrétiens, mais stoïciens ; et le christianisme a 
été obligé de les reprendre lorsqu'il a voulu s'intégrer aux structures étatiques de l'Empire romain, 
dont le stoïcisme était la philosophie quasi universelle. Le sexe est devenu alors le code du plaisir. 
En Occident (au lieu que dans les sociétés dotées d'un art érotique, c'est l'intensification du plaisir 
qui tend à désexualiser le corps), c'est cette codification du plaisir par les lois du sexe qui a donné 
lieu finalement à tout le dispositif de la sexualité. Et celui-ci nous fait croire que nous nous 
libérons quand nous décodons tout plaisir en termes de sexe enfin découvert. Alors qu'il faut 
tendre plutôt à une désexualisation, à une économie générale du plaisir qui ne soit pas 
sexuellement normée.” M. Foucault, Les rapports de pouvoir passent à l’intérieur des corps, in 
Dits Ecrits, Tome III, text 197. 
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pleasure and the search for its intensification is exterior to a science of sexual 
desire. Just as Foucault wanted to divorce the psychoanalitic theory of the 
unconscious from the theory of sexuality, so he wants to detach the experience of 
pleasure from the psychological theory of sexual desire, of sexual subjectivity. The 
modification of the subject aimed at by the true discourse of the science of 
sexuality uses the conceptual structure of desire to excavate the real identity of the 
subject, and so to delimit the domain of psychological intervention. Desire has 
psychological depth; desire can be latent or manifest, apparent or hidden; desire 
can be repressed or sublimated; it calls for decipherment, for interpretation. True 
desire express what one really wants, who one really is, while false desire hides or 
masks identity, one’s true subjectivity. No doubt this is a main part of the reason 
Foucault could not bear the word desire. Although we have no difficulty talking 
about and understanding the difference between true and false desires, the idea of 
true and false pleasure (and Foucualt understood this point even if he never put it in 
exactly this way) is conceptually misplaced. Pleasure is, as it were, exhausted by its 
surface; it can be intensified, increased, is qualities modified, but it does not have 
the the psychological depth of desire. It is, so to speak, related to itself and not to 
something else that it expresses, either truly or falsely. There is no coherent 
conceptual space for the science of sexuality to attach itself to pleasure, and no 
primacy of the psychological subject in the experience of pleasure. Structures of 
desire lead to forms of sexual orientation, kinds of subjectivity; different pleasures 
do not imply orientation at all, require no theory of subjectivity or identity 
formation. The circumscription of true desire is a procedure of individualization; 
the production of pleasure is not.83 
 
What is clearly at stake in Foucault’s strategy is not a need “to liberate our 
desire but to make ourselves infinitely more susceptible to pleasure [plaisirs].”84 
If there is no way to locate ourselves outside of power then we have to resist the 
structures of dominance playing inside of it by playing with the inner potentiality 
																																																						
83 A. Davidson, Foucault, psychoanalysis, and Pleasure, in T. Dean and C. Lane, Homosexuality 
and Psychoanalysis, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 2001, pp. 45 and 46. First italics 
mine. 
84 M. Foucault, Friendship as a Way of Life, (interview), in Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, cit., p. 
137. 
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of a “chair” that can find its own way without following – and falling into – the 
disciplinary itinerary of desire. This is why “the rallying point for the 
counterattack against the deployment [dispositif] of sexuality ought not to be sex-
desire, but bodies and pleasures.”85  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																																						
85 M. Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume I: An Introduction, cit., p. 157. 
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2.3 
FOUCUALT’S ASKĒSIS OF PLEASURE(S) 
 
 
 
Foucault gives S/M as an example of a way in which the subject can enact 
practices of liberation from the dispositif of sexuality. In an interview with 
Gallagher and Wilson, Foucault affirms: “I don't think that this movement of 
sexual practices [S/M] has anything to do with the disclosure or the uncovering of 
S/M tendencies deep within our unconscious, and so on. I think that S/M is much 
more than that; it's the real creation of new possibilities of pleasure, which people 
had no idea about previously.”86 Indeed, for Foucault, S/M is neither a way to 
reveal the “unconscious" desire of the subject nor is it an expression of his drive. 
Rather, S/M opens up “new possibilities of pleasure” that are unrelated to the 
dominant discourse and, in so doing, it provides possibilities for resistance.  
 
The idea that S&M is related to a deep violence, that S&M practice is a way of 
liberating this violence, this aggression, is stupid. We know very well what all 
those people are doing is not aggressive; they are inventing new possibilities of 
pleasure with strange parts of their body - through the eroticization of the body. I 
think it's a kind of creation, a creative enterprise, which has as one of its main 
features what I call the desexualization of pleasure. The idea that bodily pleasure 
should always come from sexual pleasure as the root of all our possible pleasure - I 
think that's something quite wrong. These practices are insisting that we can 
produce pleasure with very odd things, very strange parts of our bodies, in very 
unusual situations, and so on.87 
 
This explicates not only Foucault’s attempt to de-pathologize masochism, 
																																																						
86 M. Foucault, Sex, Power, and the Politics of identity, (interview), in Ethics: Subjectivity and 
Truth, cit., p. 165. 
87 Ibid., p. 165. 
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but also his more general effort to “desexualize pleasure(s)” or, as Halperin 
suggests, to “de-genitalize pleasures.” According to Halperin “the notion of 
‘desexualization’ is a key one for Foucault” that “has been much misunderstood”. 
When Foucault speaks of ‘desexualization,’ he “is drawing on the meaning of the 
French word sexe in the sense of sexual organ.” What Foucault intends for 
‘desexualization of pleasure’ is then not a detachment of pleasure “from all acts of 
a conceivably sexual nature” but a detachment of sexual pleasure “from genital 
specificity, from localization in or dependence on the genitals.” 88 If in fact 
pleasure tends to be located in the areas that we are permitted to experience as 
erogenous, and if we take for granted that pleasure is reachable only through these 
particular zones and in particular ways, it is because our body is trapped inside a 
desire that is socially created and manipulated. S/M on the contrary with its 
peculiar attention to covering the entire surface of the body – stroking, tickling, 
manipulating, torturing, enlarging, squeezing, whipping, cutting, and breaking it – 
“represents a remapping of the body’s erotic sites, a redistribution of its so-called 
erogenous zones, a breakup of the erotic monopoly traditionally held by the 
genitals, and even a re-eroticization of the male genitals as sites of vulnerability 
instead of subjects of veneration.”89 Detaching the primacy of pleasure from the 
genitalia and redistributing pleasure across all surfaces of the body, S/M leads to 
																																																						
88 “The notion of ‘desexualization’ is a key one for Foucault, and it has been much misunderstood. 
When he speaks of ‘desexualization,’ Foucault is drawing on the meaning of the French word sexe 
in the sense of sexual organ. What he means by S/M’s ‘desexualization of pleasure’ is not that 
S/M detaches pleasure from all acts of a conceivably sexual nature (even if it does destroy the 
absolute dependence of sexual pleasure on sexual intercourse narrowly defined) but that S/M 
detaches sexual pleasure from genital specificity, from localization in or dependence on the 
genitals. S/M, along with various related (though often quite distinct) practices of bondage, 
shaving, tit torture, cock and ball torture, piercing, humiliation, flagellation, and fistfucking, 
produces intense pleasure while bypassing to a greater or lesser extent, the genitals themselves. It 
involves the erotization of nongenital regions of the body, such as the nipples, the anus, the skin, 
and the entire surface of the body. And it finds other erotic uses for the genitals than that of 
stimulation to the point of orgasm.” D. Halperin, Saint Foucault: Towards a Gay Hagiography, 
cit., p. 88. 
89 Ibid., pp. 88 and 89. 
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the discovery of unexpected loci of pleasure located all over the body. According 
to Foucault, “the idea [inherent in masochism is] to make use of every part of the 
body as a sexual instrument”90, or, in other words, as a site of potential pleasure.  
However, even though I find Halperin’s book one of the most interesting on 
Foucault, I have some reservations about his reading. Sexe in French does not 
refer only to the genitals but also to sex and to sexuality in general. As we have 
seen, the word “sex” for Foucault is full of cultural meaning and leads to so many 
implications that it is difficult to believe that when he talks of “de-sexualization” 
he is matching sex only with genitals. Although it is true that S/M for Foucault, by 
de-privileging the couple formed by pleasure and genitalia and by resisting 
genitality as the telos of Freudian sexual development,91 can be seen to constitute 
a practice of liberation that checkmates the heteronormative foundation of desire 
that the dispositif of sexuality produces, we can see from some of Foucault’s 
interviews that the idea of desexualization cannot be reduced only to a “de-
genitalization” of pleasure(s), but must refer to a larger project of which the “de-
genitalization” of pleasure(s) is only a part. In the interview with Finas called 
“Les rapports de pouvoir passent à l’intérieur des corps” for example, the 
semantic openness that Foucault attributes to desexualization is evident: 
 
Il y a un trait fondamental dans l'économie des plaisirs telle qu'elle fonctionne en 
Occident: c'est que le sexe lui sert de principe d'intelligibilité et de mesure. Depuis 
des millénaires, on tend à nous faire croire que la loi de tout plaisir, c'est, 
secrètement au moins, le sexe : et que c'est cela qui justifie la nécessité de sa 
modération, et donne la possibilité de son contrôle. Ces deux thèmes qu'au fond de 
tout plaisir il y a le sexe, et que la nature du sexe veut qu'il s'adonne et se limite à la 
procréation, ce ne sont pas des thèmes initialement chrétiens, mais stoïciens ; et le 
christianisme a été obligé de les reprendre lorsqu'il a voulu s'intégrer aux structures 
étatiques de l'Empire romain, dont le stoïcisme était la philosophie quasi 
universelle. Le sexe est devenu alors le code du plaisir. En Occident (au lieu que 
dans les sociétés dotées d'un art érotique, c'est l'intensification du plaisir qui tend 
																																																						
90 M. Foucault, Sexual Choice, Sexual Act, (interview), in Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, p. 152. 
91 See S. Freud, Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality. 
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à désexualiser le corps), c'est cette codification du plaisir par les lois du sexe qui a 
donné lieu finalement à tout le dispositif de la sexualité. Et celui-ci nous fait croire 
que nous nous libérons quand nous décodons tout plaisir en termes de sexe enfin 
découvert. Alors qu'il faut tendre plutôt à une désexualisation, à une économie 
générale du plaisir qui ne soit pas sexuellement normée.92 
 
Beyond the short genealogy that shows the historical conditions that lead to 
the constitution of modern sexuality, what we can clearly read is that Foucault is 
talking about desexualization without referring at all to sex as sexual organ: it is 
in fact difficult to imagine that the Stoics that he mentions were suggesting the 
necessity to moderate the genitals. Instead of the genitals, the Stoics were 
referring to the general and indistinct movements around the chair that will be 
codified in the modern era as what we call sex. The problem, explains Foucault, is 
that, when the concept of sex emerged from the indistinct tangle of the chair 
embracing the “truth” and becoming its most intimate expression, it codified all 
pleasures, establishing itself as the cause and core of them. Hence the necessity to 
desexualize pleasure, hence the necessity to commit oneself to an erotic art that 
certainly could imply a “de-genitalization” of pleasure(s) but that cannot be 
reduced to it. The erotic arts invoked by Foucault are in fact techniques or, as 
Foucault will call them subsequently, practices of souci de soi, by which people 
can experience the “possibility of resistance”93 against the dyad sex/truth that 
imprisoned them in the dispositif of sexuality. Those techniques of 
desexualization, even if they are useful to decentralize pleasure(s) by detaching 
them from the genitals and displacing them all over the body, are aimed at  a real 
Epoché of sex – namely at  a suspension of its supposed value as the center and 
focal point of the truth of the subject. In another interview published in 1977, 
Foucault explains even better the meaning of his concept of desexualization: 
 
																																																						
92 M. Foucault, Les rapports de pouvoir passent à l’intérieur des corps, in Dits Ecrits, Tome III, 
text 197. 
93 M. Foucault, The Ethics of the Concern of the Self as a Practice of Freedom, (interview), in 
Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, cit., p. 292. 
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Ce qu'il y a de fort dans les mouvements de libération de la femme, ce n'est pas 
qu'ils aient revendiqué la spécificité de la sexualité, et les droits afférents à cette 
sexualité spéciale, mais qu'ils soient partis du discours même qui était tenu à 
l'intérieur des dispositifs de sexualité. C'est en effet comme revendication de leur 
spécificité sexuelle que les mouvements apparaissent au XIXe siècle. Pour arriver à 
quoi ? À une véritable désexualisation, enfin... à un déplacement par rapport à la 
centration sexuelle du problème, pour revendiquer des formes de culture, de 
discours, de langage, qui ne sont plus cette espèce d'assignation et d'épinglage à 
leur sexe qu'elles avaient en quelque sorte politiquement bien dû accepter pour se 
faire entendre. Ce qu'il y a de créatif et d'intéressant dans les mouvements de 
femmes, c'est précisément ça.94 
 
Here Foucault gives us an example of a practice of desexualization that does 
not concern either genitals or the capacity “to detach pleasure from the genitalia”, 
but that concerns a group of people who were able to invent a culture and a way 
of life opposed to what he calls the “monarchy of sex.” From these two quotes, it 
is possible to understand that the practices of desexualization mentioned by 
Foucault concern a project which is not limited to the body even if it embraces 
pleasure(s) that are located in the body. Their goal is in fact to evade sex, to 
dethrone it. In the last 10 years of his life and in particular after the publication of 
the first volume of The History of Sexuality, Foucault became increasingly 
concerned with the possibility of creating new cultures in which sex is not the 
core of the truth.  
Foucault, of course, is one of the great opponents of the truth as a trans-
historical constant. An eternal truth without history simply does not exist for 
Foucault. For him, instead, there exist only contingent situations that, as a result 
of certain historical conditions, imposed themselves as conditions of possibility 
for the formation of a “truth” that, for this reason, can be nothing but historical. 
Indeed, he calls these contingent situations historical a priori95. Obviously, 
																																																						
94 M. Foucault, Le jeu de Michel Foucault, in Dits et Ecrits cit., pp. 321 and 322. All italics are 
mine. 
95 See M. Foucault, L’archéologie du savoir, in particular chapter 3 part V “L'a priori historique et 
l'archive.” 
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Foucault is very much aware that each individual, as a product of these historical 
a priori, is inclined to think these contingencies as stable conditions of human 
nature. But in his only paper on Nietzsche he affirms that “si le généalogiste prend 
soin d'écouter l'histoire plutôt que d'ajouter foi à la métaphysique, qu'apprend-il? 
Que derrière les choses il y a «tout autre chose»: non point leur secret essentiel et 
sans date, mais le secret qu'elles sont sans essence, ou que leur essence fut 
construite pièce à pièce à partir de figures qui lui étaient étrangères.”96 All general 
notions that are supposed to be without a history and thus eternal, are nothing but 
fantasies that live as long as the society that produced them. The concept of 
human nature itself is for Foucault a construction of which it is necessary to be 
suspicious. In the debate with Noam Chomsky, he declares in fact that all general 
notions like “the notions of human nature, of justice, of the realization of the 
essence of human beings, are all notions and concepts which have been formed 
within our civilization, within our type of knowledge and our form of philosophy, 
and that as a result form part of our class system.”97 And he adds: 
 
If one admits that [a certain human nature exists], doesn’t one risk defining this 
human nature – which is at the same time ideal and real, and has been hidden and 
repressed until now – in terms borrowed from our society, from our civilization, 
from our culture? I will take an example by greatly simplifying it. The socialism of 
a certain period, at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the 
twentieth century, admitted in effect that in capitalist societies man hadn’t realized 
the full potential for his development and self-realization; that human nature was 
effectively alienated in the capitalist system. And it dreamed of an ultimately 
liberated human nature. What model did it use to conceive, project, and eventually 
realize that human nature? It was in fact the bourgeois model. It considered that an 
alienated society was a society which, for example, gave pride of place to the 
benefit of all, to a sexuality of a bourgeois type, to a family of a bourgeois type, to 
an aesthetic of a bourgeois type. And it is moreover very true that this has 
																																																						
96 M. Foucault, «Nietzsche, la généalogie, l'histoire», in Hommage à Jean Hyppolite, Paris, P.U.F., 
coll. «Épiméthée», 1971, pp. 145-172. 
97 M. Foucault and N. Chomsky, The Chomsky-Foucault Debate on human nature, The New 
Press, New York and London, 2006, pp. 57 and 58. 
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happened in the Soviet Union and in the popular democracies: a kind of society has 
been reconstituted which has been transposed from the bourgeois society of the 
nineteenth century. The universalization of the model of the bourgeois has been the 
utopia which has animated the constitution of Soviet society. The result is that you, 
too, realized, I think, that it is difficult to say exactly what human nature is.98 
 
It is impossible to define once and for all what human nature is – and this 
for the simple reason that “only something which has no history can be 
defined,”99 as Nietzsche points out clearly in the second dissertation of On the 
Genealogy of Morality.  
By the same token, according to Foucault, “homosexuality” cannot be 
defined. Homosexuality has in fact a history and, for this reason, can be neither 
thought as a trans-historical essence nor as a stable Lebensforme100. However, it is 
possible to retrace the history of homosexuality: that is, the history of the 
procedures by which our society created this concept. A “homosexual essence” 
does not exist, but individuals exist who happen to be “homosexual” because, in a 
certain historical period, a definition that abruptly grouped together a certain 
number of otherwise quite different people was created, thereby generality their 
categorical similarity. The polemics of Foucault against the movement of gay 
sexual liberation arises precisely at this point. In an interview released for a 
Spanish journal in 1984 Foucault affirms: “I have always been somewhat 
suspicious of the notion of liberation, because if it is not treated with precautions 
and within certain limits, one runs the risk of falling back on the idea that there 
exists a human nature or base that, as a consequence of certain historical, 
economic, and social processes, has been concealed, alienated, or imprisoned in 
and by mechanisms of repression.”101  
According to Foucault, the problem of sexual liberation concerning 
																																																						
98 Ibid., pp. 43 and 44. 
99 F. Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality, cit., dissertation II chapter 13, p 53. 
100 See M. Foucault, Les anormaux and The Chomsky-Foucault Debate on human nature. 
101 M. Foucault, The Ethics of the Concern of the Self as a Practice of Freedom, (interview), in 
Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, cit., p. 282. 
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homosexuals is in fact that: 
 
les mouvements homosexuels américains […] ont commencé à chercher des 
formes nouvelles de communauté, de coexistence, de plaisir. Mais, à la différence 
des femmes, l'épinglage des homosexuels à la spécificité sexuelle est beaucoup 
plus fort, ils rabattent tout sur le sexe. Les femmes, non. […] Les mouvements 
d'homosexuels restent très pris dans la revendication des droits de leur sexualité, 
dans la dimension du sexologique. C'est normal d'ailleurs, parce que 
l'homosexualité est une pratique sexuelle qui est, en tant que telle, contrée, barrée, 
disqualifiée. Les femmes, elles, peuvent avoir des objectifs économiques, 
politiques, beaucoup plus larges que les homosexuels.102 
 
Foucault is very aware that this analysis leads to a dichotomy. Indeed, if on 
the one hand he argues that “being homosexual” is an historical construction that 
traps the subject inside coercive categories, on the other hand he acknowledges 
the need to claim the right of “being homosexual.” In an interview called Histoire 
et homosexualité dated 1982 he affirms: 
 
Ces catégories ont, en effet, servi à pathologiser l'homosexualité, mais c'était 
également des catégories de défense, au nom desquelles on pouvait revendiquer des 
droits. Le problème est encore très actuel : entre l'affirmation «Je suis homosexuel» 
et le refus de le dire, il y a là toute une dialectique très ambiguë. C'est une 
affirmation nécessaire, puisque c'est l'affirmation d'un droit, mais c'est en même 
temps la cage, le piège.103 
 
This is the reason why Foucault, instead of declaring explicitly whether 
homosexuality is just a social construction or there is also an innate component in 
it104, prefers to suggest the necessity of thinking homosexuality not in terms of a 
																																																						
102 M. Foucault, Le jeu de Michel Foucault, in Dits et Ecrits cit., pp. 321 and 322. 
103 M. Foucault, Histoire et homosexualité, in Dits Ecrits tome IV texte N°311. 
104 “JOH: Does this focus on cultural context and people's discourse about their sexual behavior 
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“true self to discover and release” but as a chance to create new forms of life105 
outside the sex/truth prison. “The problem is not to discover in oneself the truth of 
one's sex, but, rather, to use one's sexuality henceforth to arrive at a multiplicity of 
relationships. […] Homosexuality, argues Foucault, is not a form of desire but 
something desirable. Therefore, we have to work at becoming homosexuals and 
not be obstinate in recognizing that we are.”106 For this reason, talking about the 
gay movement he affirms that although “sexual identity has been politically very 
useful, it limits us”, and therefore, “we have – and can have – a right to be 
free.”107 Consequently, according to Foucault “we should consider the battle for 
gay rights as an episode that cannot be the final stage.”108 What the  
 
gay movement needs now is much more the art of life than a science or scientific 
knowledge (or pseudoscientific knowledge) of what sexuality is. Sexuality is a part 
of our behavior. It's a part of our world freedom. Sexuality is something that we 
ourselves create--it is our own creation, and much more than the discovery of a 
secret side of our desire. We have to understand that with our desires, through our 
desires, go new forms of relationships, new forms of love, new forms of creation. 
																																																																																																																																																					
homosexual behavior and social conditioning? Or do you have any conviction one way or the 
other on this issue? 
MF: On this question I have absolutely nothing to say. "No comment." 
JOH: Does this mean you think the question is unanswerable, or bogus, or does it simply not 
interest you? 
MF: No, none of these. I just don't believe in talking about things that go beyond my expertise. It's 
not my problem, and I don't like talking about things that are not really the object of my work. On 
this question I have only an opinion; since it is only an opinion, it is without interest.” M. 
Foucault, Sexual Choice, Sexual Act, (interview), in Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, cit., p. 142. 
105 “To be "gay," I think, is not to identify with the psychological traits and the visible masks of the 
homosexual but to try to define and develop a way of life.” M. Foucault, Friendship as a Way of 
Life, (interview), in Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, cit.,  p. 138. 
106 Ibid., p. 136. 
107 M. Foucault, Sex, Power, and the Politics of Identity, (interview), in Ethics: Subjectivity and 
Truth, cit., 166. 
108 M. Foucault, The Social Triumph of Sexual Will, (interview), in Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, 
cit., 157. 
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Sex is not a fatality: it's a possibility for creative life.109 
 
Although it is true that Foucault’s “speculation about power seem to have 
found their most receptive audience among cultural activists, members of political 
direct-action groups, participants in various social resistance movements with 
some connection to university, and – most of all, perhaps – lesbian and gay 
militants,”110 we should not think that Foucault was a militant strictu sensu as 
well. Indeed, even if he was for almost his entire life a philosophe engagé, in the 
last part of his life he turned to a mode of thought closer to an ethical or an 
aesthetics111 than a strictly political112 philosophy and this not just because he saw 
many of his political struggles113 failing, but also because he was well aware that 
the homosexual liberation movement was close to falling into the affirmation of a 
“homosexual essence”114 to which he was opposed. In his controversial biography 
of Foucault, James Miller reports an interesting episode: 
 
If Foucault appreciated the sense of community he first discovered in San 
Francisco, he was considerably more ambivalent about the political tactics favored 
																																																						
109 Ibid, p. 163. 
110 D. Halperin, Saint Foucault: Towards a Gay Hagiography, cit., p. 26. 
111 “We have to create ourselves as a work of art”. M. Foucault, On the Genealogy of Ethics, 
(interview), in Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, cit., p. 262. 
112 “I am going to take care of myself.” Ibid., cit., p. 255. 
113 “‘In the beginning of the seventies, I thought that it was possible to put the light, the real, the 
concrete, the actual problem’, Foucault remarks in one public discussion, ‘and then that a political 
movement could come and take this problem and, from the data of the problem, elaborate 
something else. But I think I was wrong…the political, spontaneous movement in which, with a 
great effort, I put my experience, my hopes – well, didn’t happen.’” This comment of Foucault is 
recorded in a cassette tape filed in the Centre Michel Foucault under the title “Talk with 
Philosophers, 23 October 1980” and it is quoted in J. Miller, The Passion of Michel Foucault, 
Simon and Shuster, New York 1993, p. 233. 
114 “The creation of a culture posed a problem of identity. Gays had to do more than assert an 
identity; they had to create it, and Foucault was wary of any suggestion that its creation was 
equivalent to the liberation of an essence.” D. Macey, The Lives of Michel Foucault, Pantheon 
Books, New York 1993, pp 367 and 368. 
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by the most outspoken members of this community. The day after he had taken 
LSD in Death Valley, he was approached at a party by a young gay militant. The 
man expressed thanks to Foucault, whose way of thinking, he said (as Simeon 
Wade recalls the exchange), had 'made things like gay liberation possible.' Foucault 
politely refused the compliment. 'This is a nice thing to say to me,' Wade recalls 
him remarking, 'but really my work has had nothing to do with gay liberation.' 
'What was it like for you before gay liberation?' the young man continued, 
undeterred by the lukewarm response. 'You might not believe this,' Foucault 
replied, 'but I actually liked the scene before gay liberation, when everything was 
more covert. It was like an underground fraternity, exciting and a bit dangerous. 
Friendship meant a lot, it meant a lot of trust, we protected each other, we related 
to each other by secret codes.' 'What do you think of gay liberation now?' wondered 
the young man. 'I believe the term "gay" has become obsolete,' Wade recalls 
Foucault responding. 'The reason for this is the transformation of our 
understanding of sexuality. We see the extent to which our pursuit of pleasure has 
been limited in large part by a vocabulary foisted upon us. People are neither this 
nor that, gay nor straight. There is an infinite range of what we call sexual 
behavior.'115 
 
If Foucault is interested in pleasure(s) – and especially in the 
desexualization of pleasure(s) associated with  S/M – it is because pleasure(s) are 
a way to create new cultures able to get rid of sex or, in other words, to checkmate 
the scientia sexualis that produces and traps some individuals by, for example, 
constructing them as homosexuals. His fondness for the bathhouses in San 
Francisco that he used to frequent when he was teaching in the U.S. similarly 
derives from his belief that those places created “communities” of people engaged 
in discovering new pleasures and different ways of being together. In the 
bathhouses, Foucault not only discovered completely unknown bodily practices, 
such as fist-fucking,116 but also met people who were actually creating new 
																																																						
115 J. Miller, The Passion of Michel Foucault, cit., pp. 254 and 255. 
116 “Fist-fucking is also known as fisting or handballing. It is a sexual technique in which the hand 
and arm, rather than a penis or dildo, are used to penetrate a bodily orifice. Fisting usually refers to 
anal penetration, although the terms are also used for the insertion of a hand into a vagina.” G. 
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cultures beyond the disciplinary insistence of the sex/truth regime.  
As Pat(rick)117 Califia recalls in Gay men, Lesbians, and Sex: Doing it 
together, the first time she went to the house of Steve McEachern – the creator of 
the famous and exclusive S/M club described by Gayle Rubin118 – she was 
embarrassed to discover that her girlfriend and she were the only two girls in the 
middle of more than fifteen gay men. When even her girlfriend disappeared, she 
found herself “sitting alone in a corner, wondering if she was going to spend the 
entire orgy feeling sorry for herself.” Nevertheless, in a short time “a tall, 
handsome man (albeit a little skinny) sat down beside her and said ‘Hi, my 
name’s Joe. How would you like to fist me?’” The man taught her “how to 
perform the very severe manicure handballing required” in order to avoid injures, 
then, he brought her downstairs and, after lying down on his back, “he wrapped 
his arms around his thighs and held them apart” offering his ass.  
 
It was like feeding a hungry animal, remembers Califia, I got into him easily, I 
can’t remember how deep. It seemed like miles. I came to at one point and realized 
just how vulnerable he was, this big man clutching this thighs and groaning 
uncontrollably because I was so far into him. The walls of his gut hugged my hand 
and forearm, smoother and softer and more fragile than anything I’d ever touched 
before. I think I cried. I know I got wet.119  
 
In the pages that follow the story of her first experience as a fister120 she 
points out that those kind of practices “allow people to step outside the usually 
rigid boundaries of sexual orientation.”121 Indeed, as she clarifies, the man who 
																																																																																																																																																					
Rubin, The Catacombs, A temple of the Butthole, in Deviation, Duke University Press, Durham 
and London 2011, p. 416. 
117 At the time he wrote these things, Patrick Califia was a woman and her name was Pat. 
118 See G. Rubin, The Catacombs: A Temple of the Butthole, in Deviations. 
119 P. Califia, Public Sex: The Culture of Radical Sex, Cleiss Press, Pittsburg 1994, pp. 183 and 
184. 
120 Fister is the name for the person who penetrates the other’s rectum with his or her arm. Fistee 
instead, is the person who offers his or her rectum to the other in order to be penetrated by his arm. 
121 P. Califia, Public Sex: The Culture of Radical Sex, cit., p. 184. 
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politely asked her to fist him did not care about her gender. He was just excited by 
the fact that she was a novice to train. Califia herself, who in 1983 declared 
herself not a bisexual person, but “a lesbian”, does not mind “have[ing] sex with 
faggots”122 as long as they share “some aspect of her sexuality (like S/M or 
fisting) that turns her on despite their biological sex”.123 Califia ends her essay 
declaring that she “no longer believes that there is some ahistorical entity called 
homosexuality. Sexuality is socially constructed within the limits imposed by 
physiology, and it changes over time with the surrounding cultures.”124 What S/M 
taught Califia lead her to the same conclusion offered by Foucault, who in an 
interview of 1982 – that is after he had gotten to know the bathhouses of San 
Francisco – affirms: 
 
by getting away from the categorization homosexuality-heterosexuality, I think that 
gays [referring in particular to S/M practitioners] have taken an important, 
interesting step: they define their problems differently by trying to create a culture 
that makes sense only in relation to a sexual experience and a type of relation that 
is their own. By taking the pleasure of sexual relations away from the area of 
sexual norms and its categories, and in so doing making the pleasure the 
crystallizing point of a new culture125 
 
In addition to mitigating the rigid division of gender and sexual orientation, 
S/M breaks the link between power and social injustice. “My own needs dictate 
which role I will adopt”126 declares Califia. It is not color of skin, gender, or the 
amount in one’s bank account that locates someone in the position of the master 
or of the slave, but the fantasy of a person who chooses to play this role. “The 
roles, dialogue, fetish costumes, and sexual activity are part of the drama or ritual, 
the participants are enhancing their sexual pleasure, not damaging or imprisoning 
																																																						
122 Ibid., p. 183. 
123 Ibid., p. 185. 
124 Ibid., p. 187. 
125 M. Foucault, The Social Triumph of Sexual Will, (interview), in Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, 
cit., p. 160. 
126 P. Califia, Public Sex: The Culture of Radical Sex, cit., p. 163. 
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one another”. In fact, concludes Califia, “the difference between real slavery or 
exploitation and S/M is that I am interested in something ephemeral – pleasure – 
and not economic control.”127 In this way S/M usefully exposes the arbitrariness 
and cultural constructedness of social power and class/gender domination in “our 
political system [that] cannot digest the concept of power unconnected to 
privilege.”128 Furthermore, even if S/M acts out structures of dominance, it 
reproduces them in innovative and unexpected ways. Instead of simply 
reproducing them in their culturally normalized forms, S/M plays with these very 
structures by breaking down the rigidity that characterizes the hierarchical order 
of society. S/M relationships are in fact characterized by the fluidity of the roles 
that sustain them more than by the roles themselves. Indeed, in talking about S/M 
Foucault declares: 
 
Of course, there are roles, but everybody knows very well that those roles can be 
reversed. Sometimes the scene begins with the master and slave, and at the end the 
slave has become the master. Or, even when the roles are stabilized, you know very 
well that it is always a game. Either the rules are transgressed, or there is an 
agreement, either explicit or tacit, that makes them aware of certain boundaries. 
This strategic game as a source of bodily pleasure is very interesting. But I 
wouldn't say that it is a reproduction, inside the erotic relationship, of the structures 
of power. It is an acting-out of power structures by a strategic game that is able to 
give sexual pleasure or bodily pleasure.129 
 
Thanks to the “mixture of rules and openness [that] has the effect [of] 
intensifying sexual relations by introducing a perpetual novelty, a perpetual 
tension and a perpetual uncertainty,”130 S/M provides an example of a 
																																																						
127 Ibid., p. 163. 
128 Ibid., cit., p. 163. 
129 M. Foucault, Sex, Power, and the Politics of identity, in Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, cit., p. 
169. 
129 Ibid., p. 169. 
130 M. Foucault, Sexual Choice, Sexual Act, in Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, cit., p. 152. 
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“laboratory-experience”131 in which people are free to increase the possibilities of 
their bodies in unpredictable and creative ways that resist the dispositif of 
sexuality. “Insofar as that encounter produces changes in the relation among 
subjectivity, sexuality, pleasure, and the body, S/M qualifies as self-
transformative practice”132 that changes completely the relation between the 
subject and the truth. Not just because from this perspective there is no longer a 
truth to discover inside the subject but also because the subject itself is lost within 
these practices. Indeed, according to Foucault, the main and most desirable 
consequence of S/M’s fluidity of positions and roles and de-genitalizing power is 
the dissolution of personal identity: 
 
The intensities of pleasure are indeed linked to the fact that you desubjugate 
yourself, that you cease being a subject, an identity. It is like an affirmation of 
nonidentity. Not only because you leave your ID card in the changing room but 
because the multiplicity of possible things, of possible encounters, of possible 
pilings-up [amoncellements], of possible connections, means that, in effect, you 
cannot not fail to be identical to yourself. You could even say that, at the limit, it 
desexualizes.133 
 
This passage is crucial for two reasons that intertwine with one another. On 
the one hand, it lays bare the connection between S/M’s “de-sexualization” of 
pleasure(s) and the practice of “de-subjectification” that – as we will see in a 
minute – Foucault insists characterizes all his philosophical work, and on the 
other hand it exposes the weak point of the ethics of pleasure(s) that Foucault 
attempts to achieve.  
In an interview with Duccio Trombadori originally published in Italian with 
the title Colloqui con Foucault,134 the philosopher recalls that he was able to 
																																																						
131 “You find emerging in places like San Francisco and New York what might be called 
laboratories of sexual experimentation”. Ibid., p. 152. 
132 D. Halperin, Saint Foucault: Towards a Gay Hagiography, cit., p. 88 and 89. 
133 M. Foucault, The Gay Science, cit., p. 400. 
134 M. Foucault, Colloqui con Foucault: Pensieri, opere, omissioni dell’ultimo maître-à-penser, a 
cura di D. Trombadori, Castelvecchi 2005. There are two translations of these interviews. A partial 
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dispose of the philosophies that were dominating the scene of his youth – “the 
Hegelian system, on the one hand, and of the philosophy of the subject, on the 
other”135 – because he discovered a “protean” and “nomadic” way of doing 
philosophy unhooked from the traditional cogito136 – what I identified in the 
introduction as the tradition of the broken cogito. For Foucault, those kinds of 
metaphysics were absolutely unsuitable. If in fact the Hegelian system wanted to 
reduce the multiple and divergent truths of history into the rationality of a closed 
unity, then the philosophy of the subject – either in the form of phenomenology or 
existentialism – “firmly maintained the supremacy of the subject and its 
fundamental value, without any radical breaks,”137 reducing the contradictions of 
human experiences to the uniformity of the Cartesian subject. Not only did the 
Hegelian system and its faith in the all-encompassing power of reason appear 
naïve to Foucault, but so did the philosophy of the subject. Although it was 
centered in the theorization of everyday life experience, it was still unable to hear 
what Foucault called la pensée du dehors138 – which is to say, the force of 
negativity.  
 
The phenomenologist's experience is basically a way of organizing the conscious 
perception (regard réflexif) of any aspect of daily, lived experience in its transitory 
form, in order to grasp its meaning. Nietzsche, Bataille, and Blanchot, on the 
contrary, try through experience to reach that point of life which lies as close as 
possible to the impossibility of living, which lies at the limit or extreme. They 
																																																																																																																																																					
translation with the title Interview with Michel Foucault is in the collection called M. Foucault, 
Power, edited by G. Faubion, The New York Press, New York 2000. The other one, which is 
integral, is contained in M. Foucault, Remarks on Marx, Conversation with Duccio Trombadori, 
Semiotext(e) Columbia University, New York 1991. In the following notes, I will use the one that, 
from time to time, seems closer to the original. Anyway, I will indicate each time which one I am 
referring to. 
135 M. Foucault, Remarks on Marx, Conversation with Duccio Trombadori, cit., p. 44. 
136 “Nietzsche, Blanchot, and Bataille: they are the writers who permitted me to free myself from 
the others who had formed me during my university education at the beginning of the 1950s.” 
Ibid., p. 44. 
137 Ibid., p. 48. 
138 See M. Foucault, La pensé du dehors. 
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attempt to gather the maximum amount of intensity and impossibility at the same 
time. The work of the phenomenologist, however, essentially consists of unfolding 
the entire field of possibilities connected to daily experience. Moreover, 
phenomenology tries to grasp the significance of daily experience in order to 
reaffirm the fundamental character of the subject, of the self, of its transcendental 
functions. On the contrary, experience according to Nietzsche, Blanchot, and 
Bataille has rather the task of "tearing" the subject from itself in such a way that it 
is no longer the subject as such, or that it is completely "other" than itself so that it 
may arrive at its annihilation, its dissociation.139 
 
As evidenced in this quotation, what interests Foucault is not the re-
appropriation of an experience through its putative meaning but on the contrary, 
encountering the limits of experience, namely that point of life in which 
experience itself exceeds reason and therefore cannot be understood. The 
“extreme” or “the limit-experience” to which Foucault is interested escapes the 
grip of consciousness and imposes itself as the totally “other” to a transcendental 
subject that is structurally unable to grasp it. Furthermore, escaping rationality, 
this “other” jeopardizes the stability of a subject that is sustained by rationality. 
 
My encounter with Bataille, Blanchot and, through them, my reading of Nietzsche. 
What did they represent for me? First of all, an invitation to call into question the 
category of the "subject," its primacy and its originating function. And then, the 
conviction that an operation of that kind would not have made any sense if it had 
been confined to speculation: to call the subject into question had to mean to live it 
in an experience that might be its real destruction or dissociation, its explosion or 
upheaval into something radically "other."140 
 
Thanks to these philosophers who “tried to reach a certain point in life that 
is as close as possible to the ‘unlivable,’ to that which can’t be lived through,”141 
Foucault discovered and acquired the method for a philosophy of de-
																																																						
139 M. Foucault, Remarks on Marx, Conversation with Duccio Trombadori, cit., pp. 30/32. 
140 Ibid., p. 46. 
141 M. Foucault, Interview with Michel Foucault, (Interview), in Power, cit., p. 241. 
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subjectification, that is, a philosophy in which “the idea of limit-experience that 
wrenches the subject from itself”142 is the cornerstone. “It is this de-subjectifying 
undertaking,” declares Foucault, “the idea of a "limit-experience" that tears the 
subject from itself, which is the fundamental lesson that I've learned from these 
authors. And no matter how boring and erudite my resulting books have been, this 
lesson has always allowed me to conceive them as direct experiences to "tear" me 
from myself, to prevent me from always being the same.”143 If in the same 
interview Foucault can declare without hesitation that he never considered himself 
a philosopher,144 it is because anti-philosophers such as Nietzsche, Bataille, and 
Blanchot have inspired all his work. “These thinkers, Foucault observes, were not 
"philosophers" in the strict, institutional sense of the term” since they “didn't have 
the problem of constructing systems, but of having direct, personal experiences” 
145 through their philosophy. Foucault declares: “there is no book that I've written 
without there having been, at least in part, a direct personal experience. I had a 
personal, complex, direct relation with madness, psychiatric hospitals, and illness. 
And even with death.”146 
Even if we do not follow the controversial interpretation of Foucault’s life 
and philosophy that James Miller offers in his biography,147 an interpretation 
according to which Foucault always tried to reach death or, at least “limit 
experiences” as close as possible to death (through S/M and drugs from Miller’s 
point of view148), we have to acknowledge that, according to this interview from 
1978, a philosophy of “de-subjectification” – to which Foucault refers as a 
																																																						
142 Ibid., p. 241. 
143 M. Foucault, Remarks on Marx, Conversation with Duccio Trombadori, cit., pp. 31 and 32. 
144 “I don't consider myself a philosopher.” Ibid., p. 29. 
145 Ibid., p. 30. 
146 Ibid., p. 38. 
147 See J. Miller, The passion of Michel Foucault. 
148 “the crux of what is most original and challenging about Foucault's way of thinking, as I see it, 
is his unrelenting, deeply ambiguous and profoundly problematic preoccupation with death, which 
he explored not only in the exoteric form of his writing, but also, and I believe critically, in the 
esoteric form of sado-masochistic eroticism.” J. Miller, The passion of Michel Foucault. cit. p. 9. 
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philosophy that “requires the maximum of intensity and the maximum of 
impossibility at the same time,” or as a philosophy that leads to “limit-experience 
that tears the subject from itself”149 – is not just a phase of his research or a 
peregrine interest, but is instead the theoretical framework that guided Foucault in 
each of his intellectual elaborations.  
This perspective becomes even more evident near the end of his life when 
Foucault abandons the thematization of power’s constraints imposed on the 
subject and starts to elaborate an ethics in which the subject can be rid of himself 
thorough a care of pleasure(s). At the time, Foucault was no longer interested in 
showing how the subject is imprisoned inside historical a priori that reduce him 
or her to a puppet of society, but in understanding how the subject can be changed 
by self-transformative practices. This does not mean either that Foucault was 
disavowing his work on power or that he was no longer interested in 
understanding the possibilities of resisting social constraints, but rather that he 
was changing his perspective and putting at the center of his reflection les modes 
de subjectivation instead of the structures of dominance that produce the subject. 
As Deleuze underlines, “c’est n’est pas du tout qu’il répudie l’œuvre précédente. 
Au contraire, c’est toute son œuvre précédente qui le pousse vers ce nouvel 
affrontement.”150 Indeed, given that the subject is always caught in dynamics of 
power, Foucault was trying to understand how the subject can escape from 
himself, how can he resist the structures that create him as he is.  
Obviously this change of perspective was difficult for Foucault. Deleuze 
talks about a real crisis: “Apres La volonté de savoir il a traversé une crise, de tout 
ordre, politique, vitale, pensée. Comme chez tous les grands penseurs, sa pensée a 
toujours procédé par crise et secousses comme condition de création, comme 
condition d’une cohérence ultime. J’ai eu l’impression qu’il voulait être seul, aller 
là où on ne pourrait pas le suivre, sauf quelque intime. J’avais beaucoup plus 
besoin de lui que lui de moi.”151 It took eight years of silence in which Foucault 
																																																						
149 M. Foucault, Remarks on Marx, Conversation with Duccio Trombadori, cit., p. 30 
150 G. Deleuze, Pourparlers, 1972-1990, Les éditions de minuit, Paris 1990, p. 149. 
151 Ibid., p. 115. 
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published nothing except interviews152 to come out from his crisis with the book 
that marked the turning point153 in the way he conceived his work: The Use of 
Pleasure, Volume 2 of The History of Sexuality. In the preface, he explains the 
reasons why he changed his perspective and how important the crisis was for his 
philosophical thought:  
 
Quant au motif qui m'a poussé [changing my perspective], il était fort simple. Aux 
yeux de certains, j'espère qu'il pourrait par lui-même suffire. C'est la curiosité, la 
seule espèce de curiosité, en tout cas, qui vaille la peine d'être pratiquée avec un 
peu d'obstination non pas celle qui cherche à s'assimiler ce qu'il convient de 
connaître, mais celle qui permet de se déprendre de soi-même. Que vaudrait 
l'acharnement du savoir s'il ne devait assurer que l'acquisition des connaissances, et 
non pas, d'une certaine façon et autant que faire se peut, l'égarement de celui qui 
connaît ? Il y a des moments dans la vie où la question de savoir si on-peut penser 
autrement qu'on ne pense et percevoir autrement qu'on ne voit est indispensable 
pour continuer à regarder ou à réfléchir. On me dira peut-être que ces jeux avec 
soi-même n'ont qu'à rester en coulisses et qu'ils font, au mieux, partie de ces 
travaux de préparation qui s'effacent d'eux-mêmes lorsqu'ils ont pris leurs effets. 
Mais qu'est-ce donc que la philosophie aujourd'hui je veux dire l'activité 
philosophique si elle n'est pas le travail critique de la pensée sur elle-même ? Et si 
elle ne consiste pas, au lieu de légitimer ce qu'on sait déjà, à entreprendre de savoir 
comment et jusqu'où il serait possible de penser autrement ? Il y a toujours quelque 
chose de dérisoire dans le discours philosophique lorsqu'il veut, de l'extérieur, faire 
la loi aux autres, leur dire où est leur vérité, et comment la trouver, ou lorsqu'il se 
fait fort d'instruire leur procès en positivité naïve mais c'est son droit d'explorer ce 
qui, dans sa propre pensée, peut être changé par l'exercice qu'il fait d'un savoir qui 
lui est étranger. L'«essai» – qu'il faut entendre comme épreuve modificatrice de 
soi-même dans le jeu de la vérité et non comme appropriation simplificatrice 
																																																						
152 “C’est pourquoi les entretiens de Foucault font pleinement partie de son œuvre.” Ibid., p. 144. 
153 “Sans doute La volonté de savoir dégageait des points de résistance au pouvoir; mais justement, 
c’est leur statut, leur origine, leur genèse qui restait vagues. Foucault avait peut-être le sentiment 
qu’il lui fallait à tout prix franchir cette ligne, passe l’autre côté. Aller encore au-delà de savoir-
pouvoir. Même s’il fallait remettre en question tout le programme de l’Histoire de la sexualité.” 
Ibid., pp. 148 and 149. 
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d'autrui à des fins de communication – est le corps vivant de la philosophie, si du 
moins celle-ci est encore maintenant ce qu'elle était autrefois, c'est-à-dire une 
«ascèse» [askēsis], un exercice de soi, dans la pensée.154 
 
From this standpoint we understand that the notion of askēsis that Foucault 
brings out from the texts belonging to the Greek155 and Latin156 wisdom, although 
it emerges explicitly only in the last part of his life, should be considered the 
(anti-)philosophical keystone that bears the theoretical elaboration of all his 
books.157 It is this very notion, thought as a technique de transformation de soi 
même, that not only pushes Foucault to change completely the history of sexuality 
but also becomes the final goal of the desexualization of pleasure(s). The reason 
why Foucault decides to dig into texts that belong to antiquity can be read in an 
interview with Rabinow and Dreyfus:  
 
What I wanted to do in Volume Two of The History of Sexuality was to show that 
you have nearly the same restrictive, the same prohibitive code in the fourth 
century B.C. and in the moralists and doctors at the beginning of the empire. But I 
think that the way they integrate those prohibitions in relation to oneself is 
																																																						
154 M. Foucault, Histoire de la sexualité 2 : L’usage des plaisirs, Gallimard, Paris 1984, pp. 14 and 
15. 
155 See M. Foucault, Histoire de la sexualité 2 : L’usage des plaisirs. 
156 See M. Foucault, Histoire de la sexualité 3 : Le souci de soi. 
157 With the exception of The Order of Things that Foucault considered a purely academic book: “I 
have already spoken to you about the "limit-experiences"; this is really the theme that fascinates 
me. Madness, death, sexuality, crime: these are the things that attract my attention most. Instead, I 
have always considered The Order of Things a kind of formal exercise. […] The Order of Things 
is not my "true" book: it has its "marginality" compared to the depth of participation and interest 
which is present in and which subtended the others. Nevertheless, by some peculiar paradox, The 
Order of Things has been the book that has had the greatest success with the public. Probably 
because of the unheard of concentration of criticism that it received at the time of its publication, 
everyone wanted to buy it. Tens of thousands of copies were sold. It’s a paradox that is due to the 
unhealthy character of the consumption of a theoretical text in relation to the quantity of criticism 
that appears in newspapers and magazine.” M. Foucault, Remarks on Marx, Conversation with 
Duccio Trombadori, cit., pp. 99/101. 
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completely different. I don't think one can find any normalization in, for instance, 
the Stoic ethics. The reason is, I think, that the principal aim, the principal target of 
this kind of ethics, was an aesthetic one.158 
 
The attempt of those texts “was not to normalize the population,” indeed 
they were not meant for common people. On the contrary they were reserved for a 
“small elite”159 of people who could afford to have an aesthetic relation with life 
that could try to transform their own lives in an exemplary existence that should 
be remembered. As I said earlier, during the last part of his life Foucault is more 
interested in developing an “aesthetic of existence” or, to put it in other words “an 
art of living” that, borrowing the name from antiquity, he calls askēsis. From this 
perspective, we should remember that the word “aesthetics” comes from the 
Greek verb αἰσθάνοµαι, which means to perceive in physical terms. The ethics of 
Foucault is in fact devoted to an increasing of the capacity to feel pleasure(s) in 
order to transform the self rather than a renunciation of these same pleasures. This 
is the reason why the notion of askēsis theorized by Foucault should not be 
confused with the notion of ascetism.160 The ethics of Foucault is not in fact an 
ethics of sacrifice and deprivation of wordily pleasures aimed to embrace either a 
metaphysical or a religious dimension. There is no transcendence at all in 
Foucault’s account. On the contrary, what Foucault presents is the “pure 
immanence”161 of a life that, following Nietzsche’s step, wants to become art. For 
																																																						
158 M. Foucault, On the Genealogy of Ethics, (interview), in Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, cit., p. 
254. 
159 Ibid., p. 254. 
160 “For Foucault the equation of philosophical askēsis with renunciation of feeling, solidarity, and 
care for one's self and for others – as the price of knowledge – was one of our biggest wrong 
turnings.” Introduction to Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, cit., p XXV. 
161 Absolute immanence is in itself: it is not in something, to something; it does not depend on an 
object or belong to a subject. […] Immanence is not related to Some Thing as a unity superior to 
all things or to a Subject as an act that brings about a synthesis of things: it is only when 
immanence is no longer immanence to anything other than itself that we can speak of a plane of 
immanence. No more than the transcendental field is defined by consciousness can the plane of 
immanence be defined by a subject or an object that is able to contain it. We will say of pure 
immanence that it is A LIFE.” G. Deleuze, Pure immanence, Essays on a Life, Urzone, New York 
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this reason, I agree with Deleuze who explains that “quand Foucault en arrive au 
thème ultime de la «subjectivation», celle-ci consiste essentiellement dans 
l’invention de nouvelles possibilités de vie. Comme dit Nietzsche, dans la 
construction de véritables styles de vie : cette fois, un vitalisme sur fond 
d’esthétique.”162  
Obviously, Foucault’s return to the Greeks should not be read as a 
prescriptive rule. Foucault is far from providing us any prescriptions or rules 
whatsoever. His aim is to show examples of how it is possible to create aesthetic 
relations with life that, by increasing the subject’s capacity to feel pleasure, can 
transform the subject itself. Deleuze suggests that for Foucault: 
 
il s’agit d’inventer des modes d’existence, suivant des règles facultatives, capables 
de résister au pouvoir comme de se dérober au savoir, même si le savoir tente les 
pénétrer et le pouvoir de se les approprier, mais les modes d’existence ou 
possibilités de vie ne cessent de se recréer, de nouveau surgissent, et s’il est vrai 
que cette dimension fut inventé par le Grecs, nous ne faisons pas un retour au 
Grecs quand nous cherchons quels sont ceux qui dessinent aujourd’hui, quel est 
notre vouloir-artiste irréductible au savoir et au pouvoir. Pas plus qu’il n’y a de 
retour aux Grecs, il n’y a de retour au sujet chez Foucault. Croire que Foucault 
redécouvre, retrouve la subjectivité qu’l y avait d’abord niée, c’est un malentendu 
assez profond […] Je crois même que la subjectivation a peu de choses à voir avec 
un sujet. Il s’agit plutôt d’un champ électrique ou magnétique, une individuation 
opérant par intensité (basses autant que hautes), des champs individués et non pas 
des personnes ou des identités. C’est ce que Foucault, dans d’autres occasions, 
appelle la passion.163 
 
The “other occasion” to which Deleuze refers is a dialogue with Werner 
																																																																																																																																																					
2001, pp. 26 and 27. 
162 G. Deleuze, Pourparlers, cit., p. 125. 
163 Ibid., p. 127. Italic mine. 
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Schroeter in which Foucault, after declaring himself a man of passion,164 finally 
reveals that “l’art de vivre c’est de tuer la psychologie.”165 This dialogue is 
fundamental because it lays bare the direction of Foucault’s ethics. If the goal of 
Foucault’s ethics is to establish an aesthetic relation with life that can turn it into a 
work of art, and if this work of art consists precisely in killing off psychology, 
then we understand clearly that the desexualization of pleasure(s) – of which S/M 
is an example – are nothing but practices that lead the subject to get rid of himself. 
Practices that, in other words, lead the subject into a state of passion in which he 
can do nothing but cease being himself. These “technologies of the self”, in a 
Foucauldian expression, are aimed at nothing but creating a desubjectivized art of 
living. 
In this dialogue Foucault also explains the passion that, following Deleuze’s 
interpretation, characterizes the desubjectivized art of living that Foucault 
sustains: 
 
Qu’est–ce que la passion? C’est un état, c’est quelque chose qui vous tombe 
dessus, qui s’empare de vous, qui vous tient par les deux épaules, qui ne connaît 
pas de pause, qui n’a pas d’origine. En fait, on ne sait pas d’où ça vient. La passion 
est venue comme ça. C’est un état toujours mobile, mais qui ne va pas vers un 
point donné. Il y a des moments forts et des moments faibles, des moments où c’est 
porté à l’incandescence. Ça flotte. Ça balance. C’est une sorte d’instant instable qui 
se poursuit pour des raisons obscures, peut–être par inertie. Ça cherche, à la limite, 
à se maintenir et à disparaître. La passion se donne toutes les conditions pour 
continuer et, en même temps, elle se détruit d’elle–même. Dans la passion, on n’est 
pas aveugle. Simplement, dans ces situations de passion, on n’est pas soi–même. 
Ça n’a plus de sens d’être soi–même. On voit les choses autrement.166 
 
If I had not stated identified already the person who wrote these lines one 
																																																						
164 When Werner Schreoter asks directly: “Avez–vous une tendance pour la passion ou l’amour?” 
Foucault answers concisely: “La passion.” M. Foucault, Conversation avec Werner Schroeter, in 
Dits et Ecrits, vol 4. Texte 308, p. 253. 
165 Ibid., p. 256. 
166 Ibid., p. 251. 
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might have thought they had been written by Lacan, or at least by someone who 
wanted to describe what Lacan means by Jouissance. We can, of course, resist 
Deleuze’s interpretation of Foucault – refusing in this way to associate Foucault’s 
askēsis with the passion described in this dialogue – but how then can we explain 
that Foucault not only declares himself a man of passion,167 but also describes the 
state of passion with the same exact words with which he describes the askēsis he 
is trying to achieve? How can we ignore that it is Foucault himself who declares 
that the only form of knowledge that is worthwhile is “celle qui permet de se 
déprendre de soi-même” since the “épreuve modificatrice de soi-même est le 
corps vivant de la philosophie, si du moins celle-ci est encore maintenant ce 
qu'elle était autrefois, c'est-à-dire une «ascèse» [askēsis]?” And what does it mean 
to “kill off psychology” if not to live in a state of passion in which the subject 
“n’est pas soi–même” given that “ça n’a plus de sens d’être soi–même”? After all, 
it is Foucault himself who declared that the question that he tried throughout his 
life was, “can it be said that the subject is the only form of existence possible? 
Can't there be experiences in which the subject, in its constitutive relations, in its 
self-identity, isn't given any more? And thus wouldn't experiences be given in 
which the subject could dissociate itself, break its relationship with itself, lose its 
identity? Wasn't this perhaps the experience of Nietzsche, with the metaphor of 
the Eternal Return?”168 
As we have seen, according to Foucault, “there is no ‘abnormal’ pleasure, 
there is no ‘pathology’ of pleasure”169 and it is for this reason that he tries to 
derive from the ethics of the ancients (Greeks and Romans) an art de vivre 
devoted to the increase of pleasure. Nevertheless he has to admit that:  
 
what seems to have formed the object of moral reflection for the Greeks in matters 
of sexual conduct was not exactly the act itself (considered in its different 
modalities), or desire (viewed from the standpoint of its origin or its aim), or even 
pleasure (evaluated according to the different objects or practices that can cause it); 
																																																						
167 Ibid., p. 253. 
168 M. Foucault, Remarks on Marx, Conversation with Duccio Trombadori, cit., p. 49. 
169 M. Foucault, The Gay Science, cit., p. 388. 
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it was more the dynamics that joined all three in a circular fashion (the desire that 
leads to the act, the act that is linked to pleasure, and the pleasure that occasions 
desire). The ethical question that was raised was not: which desires? which acts? 
which pleasures? but rather: with what force is one transported "by the pleasures 
and desires"? The ontology to which this ethics of sexual behavior referred was 
not, at least not in its general form, an ontology of deficiency and desire; it was not 
that of a nature setting the standard for acts; it was an ontology of a force that 
linked together acts, pleasures, and desires.170 
 
The Greeks were aware of the forces that sustain pleasure as much as desire 
(in fact, Greek tragedians acutely demonstrated the overwhelming power of 
negativity)., They knew, moreover, that the destruction of the subject comes both 
via pleasure and desire. Even if it true, as Foucault argues, that the Greeks were 
not concerned about kinds of pleasure171, it is also true that they were insistent on 
the necessity of moderating their “force.” “The sexual act did not occasion anxiety 
because it was associated with evil but because it disturbed and threatened the 
individual's relationship with himself and his integrity as an ethical subject in the 
making; if it was not properly measured and distributed, it carried the threat of a 
breaking forth of involuntary forces, a lessening of energy, and death without 
honorable descendants”.172 This is the reason why, as Foucault knew, the Greeks 
and the Romans wrote numerous texts that sought to understand and control what 
psychoanalysis has subsequently defined as the drive. Indeed, as Foucault affirms, 
what is essential for Greek and Roman morality is to develop “a certain style of 
																																																						
170 M. Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, Volume II of The History of Sexuality, Vintage Book, New 
York 1990, p. 43. 
171 “In Antiquity people were very attentive to the elements of conduct and they wanted everybody 
to pay attention to them. But the modes of attention were not the same as those that came to be 
known later. Thus the sexual act itself, its morphology, the way in which one seeks and obtains 
one's pleasure, the "object" of desire, do not seem to have been a very important theoretical 
problem in Antiquity. On the other hand, what was an object of preoccupation was the intensity of 
sexual activity, its rhythm, the moment chosen.” M. Foucault, The Concern for Truth, (interview) 
in M. Foucault, Politics Philosophy Culture: interview and Other Writings 1977-1984, cit., p. 260. 
172 M. Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, Volume II of The History of Sexuality, cit., pp 136 and 137. 
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morality that is self-control. Sexual activity is represented, perceived as violence, 
and therefore problematized from the point of view of the difficulty there is in 
controlling it. Hubris is fundamental. In this ethics, one must constitute for oneself 
rules of conduct by which one will be able to ensure that self-control.”173  
From this perspective it is important to remind ourselves that ὕβϱις is the 
most execrable sin for the Greeks. The hybristes is in fact the person who, driven 
by his own daimon, goes beyond the limits of his own human condition so far as 
to defy the gods. But what does it exactly mean to defy the gods for the Greek 
culture? It means to step outside the category to which one belongs in accord with 
nature (κατα φυσιν). When the forces that psychoanalysis labels as drive erupt 
from the unconscious, they overwhelm the subject, leading him to behave in a 
manner inconsistent with his own status. Extricating the person from himself, the 
forces end up pushing him outside the category to which he belongs. This is why 
they are so terrifying. “Some even advised to indulge only ‘if one wants to do 
harm to oneself.’ A very ancient fear, therefore”174 concludes Foucault.  
For this reason, the most important skill for the Greeks is to manage one’s 
own forces or drives, to develop the ability to resist them. 175 Failing this 
																																																						
173 M. Foucault, The Concern for Truth, (interview) in M. Foucault, Politics Philosophy Culture: 
interview and Other Writings 1977-1984, cit., p. 261. 
174 M. Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, Volume II of The History of Sexuality, cit., p. 17. 
175 “These are almost the same words that Antiphon the Sophist employed on his own account: 
"He is not wise [sōphrōn] who has not tried the ugly and the bad; for then there is nothing he has 
conquered [kratein] and nothing that would enable him to assert that he is virtuous [kosmios]. 
"'One could behave ethically only by adopting a combative attitude toward the pleasures. As we 
have seen, the aphrodisiac were made not only possible but desirable by an interplay of forces 
whose origin and finality were natural, but whose potential, by the fact that they had their own 
energy, was for revolt and excess. These forces could not be used in the moderate way that was 
fitting unless one was capable of opposing, resisting, and subduing them. Of course, if it was 
necessary to confront them, this was because they were inferior appetites that humans happen to 
share – like hunger and thirst – with the animals; but this natural inferiority would not of itself be a 
reason for having to combat them, if there was not the danger that, winning out over all else, they 
would extend their rule over the whole individual, eventually reducing him to slavery. In other 
words, it was not their intrinsic nature, their disqualification on principle that necessitated this 
"polemical" attitude toward oneself, but their possible ascendancy and dominion.” Ibid., p. 66. 
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imperative means being brought to one’s own downfall. Therefore, what is 
important is not to renounce pleasure or turn away from all  sexual activity but 
rather to manage its inherent and frightening “force”: 
 
If it was necessary, as Plato said, to bridle it [sexual activity] with the three 
strongest restraints: fear, law, and true reason; if it was necessary, as Aristotle 
thought, for desire to obey reason the way a child obeyed his tutor; if Aristippus 
himself advised that, while it was all right to "use" pleasures, one had to be careful 
not to be carried away by them" – the reason was not that sexual activity was a 
vice, nor that it might deviate from a canonical model; it was because sexual 
activity was associated with a force, an energeia, that was itself liable to be 
excessive. In the Christian doctrine of the flesh, the excessive force of pleasure had 
its principle in the Fall and in the weakness that had marked human nature ever 
since. For classical Greek thought, this force was potentially excessive by nature, 
and the moral question was how to confront this force, how to control it and 
regulate its economy in a suitable way.176 
 
The energeia that drives sexual activity – a force produced, according to the 
Greeks, by pleasure and desire – is intrinsic to that activity and cannot be avoided. 
What the Greeks believed was possible was to learn how to manage this energeia 
in order to remain master of themselves. They believed that “the battle to be 
fought, the victory to be won, the defeat that one risked suffering, these were 
processes and events that took place between oneself and oneself. The adversaries 
the individual had to combat were not just within him or close by; they were part 
of him.”177 This is the reason why in an interview with Rabinow and Dreyfus, 
Foucault admits that the question at stake in the moderation of pleasures that 
sustained the ethics of the Greeks was always: “Are you a slave of your own 
desires or their master?”178  
Thus Foucault’s ethics, although aspiring to the creation of an art de vivre 
																																																						
176 Ibid., p. 50. 
177 Ibid., p. 67. 
178 M. Foucault, On the Genealogy of Ethics, (interview), in Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, cit., p. 
260. 
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that could lead to a de-subjectivated askēsis of pleasure(s), arises from the ethics 
of the Greeks, an ethics concerned with a strong subjectivity able to moderate the 
forces driving sexual activity. It is true that, as we have seen, Foucault’s return to 
the Greeks is not a return stictu sensu. About this Deleuze rightly observes that 
“Foucault n’emploie pas le mot sujet comme personne ni comme forme d’identité, 
mais les mots «subjectivation» comme processus, et «Soi» comme rapport 
(rapport à soi).” But then he acutely adds “Et de quoi s’agit-il? Il s’agit d’un 
rapport de la force avec soi,”179 unmasking the problem of Foucault’s anti-
psychoanalytic perspective. What is this force against which the subject has to 
fight? What kind of force is it that, operating inside the subject, resists its will and 
even imposes itself, threatening the subject’s relation to his pleasures and his 
desires? If Foucault’s ethics oscillates constantly between an askēsis of 
pleasure(s) that leads to a de-subjectivated art de vivre and a care of those same 
pleasure(s) in order to remain master of himself it is because Foucault, despite 
himself, ultimately shows that what really de-subjectivates the subject is not a 
willing pursuit of pleasure(s) but an unwilling fall into the abyss of the drives. 
Therefore, even if we ignore either Bersani’s critique, which reads S/M as 
the eroticization of power instead of a parodic performance that relaxes the 
fixation of its social structure;180 or Gratton’s, which shows the “miraculously 
unsullied”181 quality of the notion of pleasure as theorized by Foucault; or 
Deleuze’s, which shows that pleasure is not inherently extraneous to social 
constraints,182 we still reach the same conclusion. Even, that is, if we naively 
embrace the askēsis of pleasure(s) theorized by Foucault, and sustained by 
theorists of S/M like Califia183, we paradoxically arrive at the same point 
maintained by psychoanalysis – namely the inconsistency of the Cartesian subject 
																																																						
179 G. Deleuze, Pourparlers, cit., p. 127. 
180 See L. Bersani, Homos. 
181 See J. Gratton, Pleasure in Foucault, Journal of Romance Studies, Vol. 1, Number 2, 2001, p. 
32. 
182 See Deleuze, Désir et plaisir par Gilles Deleuze, Lettre de Deleuze à Michel Foucault. 
183 “A good scene does not end with orgasm – it ends with catharsis.” P. Califia, Public Sex: The 
Culture of Radical Sex, cit., p. 163. 
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in relation to his own drives.184 What is this passion that Foucault describes if not 
the drive, or to be more explicit, the death drive? Despite Foucault’s resistance to 
psychoanalysis, what in fact emerges from the Foucauldian attempt to escape 
from psychology is nothing but a subject who encounters the de-subjectivization 
affected by the drives that undermine its putative sovereignty. What are the limit-
experiences to which he refers in the interview with Trombadori if not the 
moment in which we are overwhelmed by forces that tug at and expropriate our 
sovereignty over the world and ourselves? Are not these moments precisely those 
that anti-philosophers such as Nietzsche, Bataille and Blanchot, – and Foucault 
consequently – tried to acknowledge? If the purpose of Foucault’s ethics is to lose 
the self in an “askēsis of pleasure,” what is the precise difference between this 
askēsis and what Bersani (by way of Lacan and Laplanche) called “shattering 
jouissance?”185 If the goal of this askēsis is to “extricate yourself from 
yourself”186 (“c’est déprendre de soi-même”187), then the difference between 
pleasure and desire – a difference on which Foucault based his entire argument – 
becomes nothing more than a terminological dispute unresponsive to the fact that 
the problem lies not in the difference between pleasure and desire, but rather 
between the system pleasure/desire and what is beyond it – namely the drives. 
Thus, even if we understand the reasons that led Foucault to look for a 
discourse other than psychoanalysis with which to articulate an account of 
sexuality, we cannot ignore Foucault’s own unwitting return to the “forces” that 
psychoanalysis recognizes as animating sexuality. Thanks to psychoanalysis we 
understand that pleasure cannot be the reparative loophole by which we escape 
our desires. Indeed, pleasure is nothing but the other face of desire, and, like 
desire, it is a site in which the drives jeopardize the subject and his fantasy of 
sovereignty. For this reason, even if Foucault correctly identified psychoanalysis 
																																																						
184 Foucault had to admit that “Lacan brought up the fact that the theory of the unconscious is not 
compatible with a theory of the subject (in the Cartesian but also the phenomenological sense of 
the term).” M. Foucault, Interview with Michel Foucault, (interview), in Power, cit., p. 251. 
185 See L. Bersani, Homos and L. Bersani, The Freudian Body: Psychoanalysis and Art. 
186 M. Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, Volume II of The History of Sexuality, cit., p. 8. 
187 M. Foucault, Histoire de la sexualité 2 : L’usage des plaisirs, cit., p. 14. 
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as part of the dispositif of sexuality, he failed to create a theory of pleasure(s) that 
escapes the psychoanalytic paradigm; instead, he renames the subject’s willful 
pursuit of defeat by its drives as a creative act of resistance to the sexual dispositif 
– a dispositif in which, psychoanalysis maintains, such defeat is inevitable 
anyway. 
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CHAPTER 3 
DESIRE 
 
 
“The earth keeps some vibration going 
There in your heart, and that is you” 
 
Edgar Lee Masters 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1 
DELEUZE AND GUATTARI’S WAY OF DOING 
PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
 
Before analyzing Deleuze and Guattari’s account of sexuality, it is 
important to note that the complexity of their philosophy does not consist only in 
the concepts that they propose, but also in the way those concepts are expressed. 
Indeed, the problem is not just that they keep creating new concepts – either in the 
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form of neologisms or assemblages of common words188 – but that, instead of 
explaining them, they put those concepts in relation to other concepts that are new 
as well, and that in their turn, have never been defined.189 This gives rise to a 
dystopic map of concepts without a real center190 and real development, a sort of 
conglomeration of synchronic concepts that, although linked to each other, make 
it impossible to show their diachronic development. In this way, they offer a 
“theory” which is actually an anti-theory. Indeed, instead of providing the solid 
foundation for an argument that develops through deductive reasoning, they offer 
partial and rhapsodic illuminations that emerge in unpredictable ways.191  
In an interview on Liberation, Deleuze underlines that this ambiguous 
apparatus of interconnected concepts that both intertwine and move away from 
each other is “ce que Guattari et moi appelons rhizome, précisément un cas de 
système ouvert.”192 Indeed, contrary to the conventional systems of traditional 
philosophy, they do not want to avoid contradictions or enclose their system in a 
rational unity;on the contrary, they want to keep their system fluid, open to 
change and modification. This is why their systemtries to create a fluidity of 
forces that propagate everywhere. Commenting on their way of doing philosophy, 
Robert Maggiori offers an interesting observation: “Mille plateaux ne font pas une 
montagne, mais laissent naitre mille chemins qui, contrairement à ceux 
																																																						
188 “On nous reproche parfois d’employer des mots compliqués pour «faire chic». Ce idiot. Un 
concept a tantôt besoin d’un nouveau mot pour être désigné, tantôt se sert d’un mot ordinaire 
auquel il donne un sens singulier.” G. Deleuze, Pourparlers, cit., p. 49. 
189 “Il n’y a pas de concept simple. Tout concept a des composantes, et se définit par elles. Il a 
donc un chiffre. C’est une multiplicité, bien que toute multiplicité ne soit pas conceptuelle.” G. 
Deleuze and F. Guattari, Qu'est-ce que la philosophie ?, Les éditions de minuit, Paris 2013,  p. 25. 
190 “Il n’y a pas de concept à une seule composante : même le premier concept, celui par lequel 
une philosophie « commence », a plusieurs composantes, puisqu’il n’est pas évident que la 
philosophie doive avoir un commencement, et que, si elle en détermine un, elle doit y joindre un 
point de vue ou une raison.” Ibid., p. 25. 
191 “Créer a toujours été autre chose que communiquer. L’important, ce sera peut-être de créer des 
vacuoles de non-communication, des interrupteurs, pour échapper au contrôle.” G. Deleuze, 
Pourparlers, cit., p. 238. 
192 Ibid., p. 48. 
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d’Heidegger, mènent partout.”193 The intention of Deleuze and Guattari is not in 
fact to build piece by piece a sort of splendid cathedral perfect in itself, but to give 
rise to possibilities of development that find in the open system their multiple and 
propulsive forces leading to no singular destination. 
 “Le style en philosophie,” suggests Deleuze, “est tendu vers trois pôles, le 
concept ou de nouvelles manière de penser, le percept ou de nouvelles manière de 
voir et d’entendre, l’affect ou de nouvelles manière d’éprouver. C’est la trinité 
philosophique, la philosophie comme opéra : il faut le trois pour faire le 
mouvement.”194 Deleuze often defines his philosophy as a nomadic thought195 that 
is more interested in creating new concepts than in having an internal coherence 
or continuity. This movement of creation, since it follows the contradictory 
movement of life, cannot not be contradictory in itself. Indeed, in response to a 
question about the change of perspective between the first and second volume of 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Deleuze responds:  
 
Ni Guattari ni moi nous ne sommes très attachés à la poursuite ni même à la 
cohérence de ce que nous écrivons. Nous souhaiterions le contraire, nous 
souhaiterions que la suite de L'Anti-Œdipe fût en rupture avec ce qui précède, avec 
le premier tome et puis s'il y a des choses qui ne vont pas dans le premier tome, 
aucune importance. Je veux dire que nous ne faisons pas partie des auteurs qui 
conçoivent ce qu'ils écrivent comme une œuvre qui doit être cohérente ; si nous 
changeons, c'est très bien.196  
 
His aim, at least after his “encounter” with Nietzsche, has in fact always 
been to produce a thought of “affects, intensité, expériences, expérimentations,”197 
																																																						
193 Ibid., p. 47. 
194 Ibid., cit., p. 224. 
195 See Pensée nomade in G. Deleuze, L’île déserte : Textes et entretiens (1953 – 1974), Les 
éditions de minuit, Paris 2002, p. 351. 
196 G. Deleuze, L’île déserte, cit., p. 387. 
197 “C’est Nietzsche que j’ai lu tard […] qui vous donne un gout pervers (que ni Marx ne Freud 
n’ont jamais donné à personne, au contraire) : le gout pour chacun de dire des choses simples en 
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namely a thought that, instead of imprisoning life inside rational concepts, is able 
to follow its movement – even if this movement produces contradictory concepts. 
A little further in the interview quoted above, Deleuze explains that “un système 
ouverte c’est quand les concepts sont rapportés à des circonstances et non plus à 
des essences.”198 Although circumstances are the conditions that create a fact, 
determining its nature and importance, circumstances depend on an infinite 
number of influences that change with the changing of time and space. If their 
concepts, then, are not related to immutable and trans-historical essences but 
rather to the uncertainty of circumstances, then the concepts they create will 
necessarily be anything but stable.  
In Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?, which can be read as their philosophical 
testament199, they affirm: 
   
Les concepts philosophiques sont des touts fragmentaires qui ne s’ajustent pas les 
uns aux autres, puisque leurs bords ne coïncident pas. Ils naissent de coups de dés 
plutôt qu’ils ne composent un puzzle. Et pourtant ils résonnent, et la philosophie 
qui les crée présente toujours un Tout puissant, non fragmenté, même s’il reste 
ouvert : Un-Tout illimité, Omnitudo qui les comprend tous sur un seul et même 
plan. C’est une table, un plateau, une coupe. C’est un plan de consistance ou, plus 
exactement, le plan d’immanence des concepts, le planomène. Les concepts et le 
plan sont strictement corrélatifs, mais doivent d’autant moins être confondus. Le 
plan d’immanence n’est pas un concept, ni le concept de tous les concepts. Si on 
																																																																																																																																																					
son propre nome, de parler par affects, intensités, expériences, expérimentations.” G. Deleuze, 
Pourparlers, cit., p. 15. 
198 Ibid., p. 48. 
199 “Peut-être ne peut-on poser la question Qu’est-ce que la philosophie? que tard, quand vient la 
vieillesse, et l’heure de parler concrètement. En fait, la bibliographie est très mince. C’est une 
question qu’on pose dans une agitation discrète, à minuit, quand on n’a plus rien à demander. 
Auparavant on la posait, on ne cessait pas de la poser, mais c’était trop indirect ou oblique, trop 
artificiel, trop abstrait, et on l’exposait, on la dominait en passant plus qu’on n’était happé par elle. 
On n’était pas assez sobre. On avait trop envie de faire de la philosophie, on ne se demandait pas 
ce qu’elle était, sauf par exercice de style ; on n’avait pas atteint à ce point de non-style où l’on 
peut dire enfin : mais qu’est-ce que c’était, ce que j’ai fait toute ma vie?” G. Deleuze and F. 
Guattari, Qu'est-ce que la philosophie ?, cit., p. 5. 
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les confondait, rien n’empêcherait les concepts de faire un, ou de devenir des 
universaux et de perdre leur singularité, mais aussi le plan de perdre son ouverture. 
La philosophie est un constructivisme, et le constructivisme a deux aspects 
complémentaires qui diffèrent en nature : créer des concepts et tracer un plan. Les 
concepts sont comme les vagues multiples qui montent et qui s’abaissent, mais le 
plan d’immanence est la vague unique qui les enroule et les déroule. Le plan 
enveloppe les mouvements infinis qui le parcourent et reviennent, mais les 
concepts sont les vitesses infinies de mouvements finis qui parcourent chaque fois 
seulement leurs propres composantes.200 
 
As we can see, according to Deleuze and Guattari, philosophy produces – 
and is produced by – the exchange between concepts and a “plan d’immanence” 
in which those concepts emerge. To clarify this difficult passage, we can use “the 
states of matter” as metaphor that Deleuze and Guattari would certainly have 
appreciated.  
          
 
 
 
As we can see from the diagram above, the fundamental states of matter are 
four: solid, liquid, gas, and plasma. All of these states can define a “thing” but that 
“thing,” depending upon its state, occupies space in a different manner. Indeed, 
																																																						
200 Ibid., pp. 69 and 70. 
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while a solid matter has a volume and a proper form; a material in the liquid state 
has its own volume, but acquires the shape of the receptacle that contains it; a 
material in the gaseous state has neither volume nor form, but expands to fill the 
available space; and finally, matter in the plasma state has, like a liquid, no 
defined form but can expand like a gaseous substance. The difference between 
those states is the forces that bind together the molecules that constitute the 
matter. If the molecules in the solid state are linked by very intense forces that 
allow only vibration movements, and in the liquid state, the forces between the 
molecules are less intense and therefore can slide on each other, in the gaseous 
and in the plasmatic state the forces that bind the molecules together are so weak 
that they move independently. What is interesting is not just that the matter is the 
same while its state changes completely, but that in order to have this change – in 
order to break the bond between the molecules – heating is necessary. Only heat 
can in fact break the forces that maintain the shape of intact matter, only heat can 
“schizophréniser”201 its molecules. Going back to Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?, 
we can read a passage thanks to which the sense of the metaphor that I am using 
becomes clear: “la part de l’immanence, ou la part du feu, c’est à cela qu’on 
reconnaît le philosophe.”202 In this way, with an unexpected Platonic reference203, 
Deleuze and Guattari finally say what philosophy is. Unlike science that creates 
concepts in order to grasp things, in order to grab their proper form, philosophy is 
able to create particular concepts that, instead of remaining as tsolid, liquid, gas, 
or plasma, adhere to the movement by which the flame of thinking204 does and 
																																																						
201 I use this term in anticipation of the discussion that will begin at the end of this foreword. 
202 G. Deleuze and F. Guattari, Qu'est-ce que la philosophie ?, cit., p. 90. 
203 It is interesting that despite “le reversement du platonisme” by which Deleuze reduces every 
transcendence to a general immanence, it is not possible to ignore the reference to the seventh 
letter in which Plato writes: “For it [philosophy] does not admit of exposition like other branches 
of knowledge; but after much converse about the matter itself and a life lived together, suddenly a 
light, as it were, is kindled in one soul by a flame that leaps to it from another, and thereafter 
sustains itself.” Plato, Seventh Letter, 7.341d. Translated by J. Harward. 
204 “La pensée revendique « seulement » le mouvement qui peut être porté à l’infini. Ce que la 
pensée revendique en droit, ce qu’elle sélectionne, c’est le mouvement infini ou le mouvement de 
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undoes every possible state of matter that belongs to the “plan of immanence” that 
is our life205. If our life, or if we prefer, “l’immanence, ne l’est qu’à soi-même, et 
dès lors prend tout, absorbe Tout-Un, et ne laisse rien subsister à quoi elle pourrait 
être immanente,”206 then the aim of philosophy is 
 
d’acquérir une consistance, sans perdre l’infini dans lequel la pensée plonge (le 
chaos à cet égard a une existence mentale autant que physique). Donner 
consistance sans rien perdre de l’infini, c’est très différent du problème de la 
science qui cherche à donner des références au chaos, à condition de renoncer aux 
mouvements et vitesses infinis, et d’opérer d’abord une limitation de vitesse : ce 
qui est premier dans la science, c’est la lumière ou l’horizon relatif. La philosophie 
au contraire procède en supposant ou en instaurant le plan d’immanence : c’est lui 
dont les courbures variables conservent les mouvements infinis qui reviennent sur 
soi dans l’échange incessant, mais aussi ne cessent d’en libérer d’autres qui se 
conservent. Alors il reste aux concepts à tracer les ordonnées intensives de ces 
mouvements infinis, comme des mouvements eux-mêmes finis qui forment à 
vitesse infinie des contours variables inscrits sur le plan. En opérant une coupe du 
chaos, le plan d’immanence fait appel à une création de concepts.207 
 
For these reasons, to gather a coherent and unitary theory will produce an 
account intrinsically extraneous to the work of Deleuze and Guattari. According 
to them, immanence is immanent to itself and it is not possible to derive from 
immanence a unitary theory other than chaos. The only thing that philosophy can 
do is follow the movement of matter, extrapolating concepts from it. Therefore, 
although I will sometimes highlight the contradictions that their thinking 
inevitably produces, I will in the following pages try to follow the flow of their 
concepts without reducing this movement to a unitary theory. Nevertheless, the 
																																																																																																																																																					
l’infini. C’est lui qui constitue l’image de la pensée.” G. Deleuze and F. Guattari, Qu'est-ce que la 
philosophie ?, cit., p. 65. 
205 “Si la philosophie commence avec la création des concepts, le plan d’immanence doit être 
considéré comme pré-philosophique.” Ibid., p. 70. 
206 Ibid., p. 89 and 90. 
207 Ibid., p. 68 and 69. 
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aim of those pages will not be just to follow the flow of their concepts, but to 
show what this flow is structurally unable to see, namely, the static structure of 
the fantasme masochiste. 
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3.2 
SCHIZOANALYSIS  
 
 
 
The most important account against psychoanalysis but inside 
psychoanalysis comes from Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia208 by 
Deleuze and Guattari. If, as we have seen, Foucault refuses psychoanalysis and, in 
order to avoid the coercive and pathologizing implication of desire, he chooses to 
focus on pleasure, Deleuze and Guattari face directly the psychoanalytic notion of 
desire, freeing it from the Oedipus complex.  
What they call “schizoanalysis” in Anti-Oedipus is the attempt to destroy 
the categories imposed by psychoanalysis: categories according to which the 
unconscious is a theater in which desire can express itself only through the 
bourgeois family scene. If psychoanalysis “part d'énoncés collectifs tout faits, du 
type Œdipe et elle prétend découvrir la cause de ces énoncés dans un sujet 
personnel d'énonciation qui doit tout à la psychanalyse,” 209 the aim of 
schizoanalysis is the opposite: “partir des énoncés personnels de quelqu'un et 
découvrir leur véritable production qui n'est jamais un sujet mais toujours des 
agencements machiniques de désir, des agencements collectifs d'énonciation qui 
le traversent et circulent en lui, creusant ici, bloqués là-bas, toujours sous forme 
de multiplicités, de meutes, de masses d'unités d'ordre différents qui le hantent et 
le peuplent.”210 According to Deleuze and Guattari “l’inconscient n’est pas un 
théâtre, mais une usine, une machine à produire”211 that produces “micro-
																																																						
208 See G. Deleuze and F. Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia.  
209 G. Deleuze, Deux régimes de fous : Texte et entretiens (1975 – 1995), Les éditions de minuit, 
Paris, 2003, p. 76. 
210 Ibid., p. 76. 
211 G. Deleuze, Pourparlers, cit., p. 197. 
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multiplicités” of desire that “leak” like fluxes212 from themselves. “Le désir, they 
affirm in Anti-Oedipus, ne cesse d'effectuer le couplage de flux continus et 
d'objets partiels essentiellement fragmentaires et fragmentés. Le désir fait couler, 
coule et coupe. «J’aime tout ce qui coule, même le flux menstruel qui emporte les 
œufs non fécondés...», dit Miller dans son chant du désir.”213 There is no waste in 
desire, all that is produced by desire is desire itself.214 Desire is in fact an open 
force without castration and lack215, a restless movement that can do nothing but 
continuously produce itself. 
In an interview originally published in Italian with the title Capitalismo e 
schizofrenia, Deleuze explains that desire consists in “faire des coupes, laisser 
couler certains flux, opérer des prélèvements sur les flux, couper les chaînes qui 
épousent les flux,” and he adds, “tout ce système de l'inconscient ou du désir qui 
coule, qui coupe, qui laisse couler, ce système tout à fait littéral de l'inconscient, 
contrairement à ce que pense la psychanalyse traditionnelle, ne signifie rien.” 216 
																																																						
212 “Le processus, c'est ce que nous appelons le flux. Or, là encore, le flux, c'est une notion dont 
nous avions besoin comme notion quelconque pas du tout qualifiée. Ce peut être lin flux de mots, 
d'idées, de merde, d'argent, ce peut être un mécanisme financier ou une machine schizophrénique : 
ça dépasse toutes les dualités. Nous rêvions de ce livre comme d'un livre-flux.” G. Deleuze, L’île 
déserte, cit., p. 305. 
213 G. Deleuze and F. Guattari, L’anti-Œdipe, Capitalisme et schizophrénie 1, Les éditions de 
minuit, Paris 1973, p. 11. 
214 As we will see in the following pages, even the most execrable expressions of humanity are 
produced by desire.  
215 “Le désir ne dépend pas d'un manque, désirer n'est pas manquer de quelque chose, le désir ne 
renvoie à aucune Loi, le désir produit. C'est donc le contraire d'un théâtre. Une idée comme celle 
d'Œdipe, de la représentation théâtrale d'Œdipe, défigure l'inconscient, n'exprime rien du désir. 
Œdipe est l'effet de la répression sociale sur la production désirante. Même au niveau de l'enfant, 
le désir n'est pas œdipien, il fonctionne comme un mécanisme, produit de petites machines, établit 
des liaisons entre les choses. Tout cela, en d'autres termes, signifie peut-être que le désir est 
révolutionnaire. Ce qui ne signifie pas qu'il veuille la révolution. C'est mieux que ça. Il est 
révolutionnaire par nature parce qu'il construit des machines qui, en s'insérant dans le champ 
social, sont capables de faire sauter quelque chose, de déplacer le tissu social. Au contraire, la 
psychanalyse traditionnelle a tout renversé sur une sorte de théâtre.” G. Deleuze, L’île déserte, cit., 
p. 324. 
216 G. Deleuze, L’île déserte, cit., pp. 323 and 324. Italics mine. 
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According to them, the problem of psychoanalysis is in fact that it traps desire 
inside rigid interpretative structures that deny its free and productive forces. Lead 
by the need to understand and manage the unconscious, psychoanalysis 
“territorializes” the fluxes of desire that continuously leak from the unconscious, 
giving them the obligatory reference to the Oedipus. According to Deleuze and 
Guattari, the structure of Oedipus is just a fantasy217 that psychoanalysis has 
invented in order to control desire but that has nothing to do with the real 
production of desire. In the same interview, they explain in fact that 
psychoanalysis gives to the unconscious a structure of meaning that, instead of 
belonging to the unconscious, belongs to psychoanalysis itself: “il n'y a pas de 
sens, il n'y a aucune interprétation à donner, cela [the unconscious] ne veut rien 
dire.”218  
Their argument is that the unconscious does not produce meanings, but 
forces, fluxes, intensities: “l'essentiel est la production désirante, le 
fonctionnement “machinique”, l'établissement de connexions, les points de fuite 
ou de déterritorialisation de la libido s'engouffrant dans l'élément moléculaire 
non-humain, le passage de flux, l'injection d'intensités.”219 Where psychoanalysis 
reads parapraxis, lapses, dreams, and jokes, as signs that lead desire back to the 
structure of the Oedipus,220 schizoanalysis reads these unconscious expressions as 
nothing but “productions désirantes”, nothing but flows from the unconscious that 
propagate everywhere, creating connections with everything.  
																																																						
217 “La psychanalyse nous semblait une fantastique entreprise pour entrainer le désir dans ses 
impasses, et pour empêcher les gens de dire ce qu’ils avaient à dire” G. Deleuze, Pourparlers, cit., 
p. 197. 
218 G. Deleuze, L’île déserte, cit., pp. 324. 
219 G. Deleuze and F. Guattari, L’anti-Œdipe, cit., p. 473. 
220 “Vous n'êtes pas né Œdipe, vous avez fait pousser Œdipe en vous ; et vous comptez vous en 
sortir par le fantasme, par la castration, mais c'est à son tour ce que vous avez fait pousser en 
Œdipe, à savoir vous-même, l'horrible cercle. Merde à tout votre théâtre mortifère, imaginaire ou 
symbolique. Que demande la schizo-analyse ? Rien d'autre qu'un peu de vraie relation avec le 
dehors, un peu de réalité réelle. Et nous réclamons le droit d'une légèreté et d'une incompétence 
radicales, celui d'entrer dans le cabinet de l'analyste, et de dire ça sent mauvais chez vous. Ça sent 
la grande mort et le petit moi.” Ibid., p. 400. 
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Contrary to the unconscious in psychoanalysis, 
 
l'inconscient de la schizo-analyse ignore les personnes, les ensembles et les lois; les 
images, les structures et les symboles. Il est orphelin, comme il est anarchiste et 
athée. Il n'est pas orphelin au sens où le nom du père désignerait une absence, mais 
au sens où il se produit lui-même partout où les noms de l'histoire désignent des 
intensités présentes («la mer des noms propres»).  Il n'est pas figuratif, car son 
figural est abstrait, la figure-schize. Il n'est pas structural ni symbolique, car sa 
réalité est celle du Réel en sa production, dans son inorganisation même. Il n'est 
pas représentatif, mais seulement machinique, et productif.221 
 
Thought in this way, the unconscious does not have a structure that, once 
discovered, gives the key to understand its flows. The unconscious of 
schizoanalysis is in a certain way absolute. However, we must use the term 
absolute avoiding the transcendent implications to which the etymological 
meaning222 of the term can lead. Indeed, the unconscious of schizoanalysis is 
absolute not in the sense that it is unrelated to anything, but that it is unrelated to 
an a-priori structure to which all its acts refer. As we have seen, the unconscious 
proposed by Deleuze and Guattari knows neither parents, nor, party, nor a God. 
What the unconscious knows are rather syntheses that – all the time in a new and 
different way – are created by its desiring propagations. But these syntheses have 
nothing to do with the transcendent structure of the Oedipus, (to which, according 
to a certain version of psychoanalysis, all acts are supposed to refer, and all 
desires, whether “healthy” or “perverted”, are supposed to be bent). These 
syntheses are rather the immanent and accidental product of the movement with 
which desire spreads its fluxes everywhere.  
Deleuze and Guattari call these syntheses machines désirantes.223 In Anti-
																																																						
221 Ibid., p. 371. 
222 Absolute comes from the Latin term “absolutus” that is composed by “ab” (off, away from) and 
“solver” (loosen), and means not related to anything else. 
223 Explaining how they developed this particular concept, Deleuze affirms in an interview: “Felix 
m’a parlé de ce qu’il appelait déjà machines désirantes: toute une conception theorique et pratique 
de l’inconscient-machine, de l’inconscient schizophrénique.” G. Deleuze, Pourparlers, cit., p. 24. 
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Oedipus they explain: “en premier lieu, les machines désirantes sont bien les 
mêmes que les machines sociales et techniques, mais elles sont comme leur 
inconscient: elles manifestent et mobilisent en effet les investissements libidinaux 
(investissements de désir) qui «correspondent» aux investissements conscients ou 
préconscients (investissements d'intérêt) de l'économie, de la politique et de la 
technique d'un champ social déterminé.”224 As we can see with the concept of 
machines désirantes, instead of theorizing a universal and transcendent structure 
of desire, Deleuze and Guattari propose an immanent production of casual hooks 
– synthesis – that find in the connection between desire and the world the 
occasion of their own production.225 The careful reader will notice that although 
the transcendent dimension is absent, we cannot say the same thing regarding the 
transcendental dimension. Indeed, even if the syntheses depend on historical and 
geographical conditions – and for this reason cannot be defined as transcendent 
structures – they are the transcendental conditions that  make possible the 
production of desire. As Deleuze himself admits: “L’Anti-Œdipe avait une 
ambition kantienne, il fallait tenter une sorte de Critique de la Raison pure au 
niveau de l'inconscient. D'où la détermination de synthèses propres à 
l'inconscient; le déroulement de l'histoire comme effectuation de ces synthèses; la 
dénonciation de l'Œdipe comme «illusion inévitable» falsifiant toute production 
historique.”226 For this reason we can define the philosophy of Anti-Oedipus as 
transcendental empiricism.   
																																																						
224 G. Deleuze and F. Guattari, L’anti-Œdipe, cit., p. 483. 
225“Oui, nous donnons à la machine une grande extension: en rapport avec les flux. Nous 
définissons la machine comme tout système de coupures de flux. Ainsi, tantôt nous parlons de 
machine technique, au sens ordinaire du mot, tantôt de machine sociale, tantôt de machine 
désirante. C'est que, pour nous, machine ne s'oppose nullement à homme ni à nature (il faut 
vraiment de la bonne volonté pour nous objecter que les formes et rapports de production ne sont 
pas de la machine). D'autre part, machine ne se réduit nullement au mécanisme. Le mécanisme 
désigne certains procédés de certaines machines techniques: ou bien une certaine organisation d'un 
organisme. Mais le machinisme est tout autre chose: encore une fois, tout système de coupure de 
flux qui dépasse à la fois le mécanisme de la technique et l'organisation de l'organisme, que ce soit 
dans la nature, dans la société, dans l'homme.” G. Deleuze, L’île déserte, cit., pp. 305 and 306. 
226 G. Deleuze, Deux régimes de fous, cit., p. 289. 
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Denied the immutable and trans-historical structure of the unconscious to 
which, according to psychoanalysis, all acts of desire should refer,227 “la schizo-
analyse renonce à toute interprétation”228 based on a supposed unitary structure. 
Indeed, since there is not a structure that determines any correct – and therefore, 
by the same token, any perverted – development of human sexuality, but just 
multiple hooks between desire and its “mechanical productions”, there are no 
signs that have to be interpreted in order to relocate the subject in the “right” 
place. The problem of schizoanalysis will never be how to read the signs that 
desire leaves behind, but “de savoir comment fonctionne l'inconscient. C'est un 
problème d'utilisation des machines, du fonctionnement des «machines 
désirantes».”229 For Deleuze and Guattari  
 
l'inconscient ne veut rien dire. En revanche, l'inconscient fait des machines, qui 
sont celles du désir, et dont la schizo-analyse découvre l'usage et le fonctionnement 
dans l'immanence aux machines sociales. L'inconscient ne dit rien, il machine. Il 
n'est pas expressif ou représentatif, mais productif. Un symbole est uniquement une 
machine sociale qui fonctionne comme machine désirante, une machine désirante 
qui fonctionne dans la machine sociale, un investissement de la machine sociale 
par le désir.230 
 
But how do these machines désirantes work? According to Deleuze and 
Guattari, every time a leak drops from the fluxes of desire and falls on something, 
it produces an object of desire. Although they refer to it as a “partial object”, they 
																																																						
227 In an interview, Guattari underlines that the aim of schizoanalysis is: “se laisser glisser du côté 
des multiplicités réelles. Cesser de renvoyer dos à dos l'homme et la machine dont le rapport, au 
contraire, est constitutif du désir lui-même. Promouvoir une autre logique, une logique du désir 
réel, établissant le primat de l'histoire sur la structure: une autre analyse, dégagée du symbolisme 
et de l'interprétation; et un autre militantisme, se donnant les moyens de se libérer lui-même des 
fantasmes de l'ordre dominant.” G. Deleuze, L’île déserte, cit., p. 304. 
228 G. Deleuze and F. Guattari, L’anti-Œdipe, cit., p. 213. 
229 G. Deleuze, L’île déserte, cit., p. 324. 
230 G. Deleuze and F. Guattari, L’anti-Œdipe, cit., p. 213. 
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underline that it has nothing to do with the “partial object” of psychoanalysis.231 
Indeed, according to them, the object of desire does not lack anything232 and it 
does not refer to anything other than itself.233 The partial object of schizoanalysis 
does not have a symbolic reference to a structure that produces and explains it. It 
																																																						
231 “Mélanie Klein fit la découverte merveilleuse des objets partiels, ce monde d'explosions, de 
rotations, de vibrations. Mais comment expliquer qu'elle rate pourtant la logique de ces objets ? 
C'est que, d'abord, elle les pense comme fantasmes, et les juge du point de vue de la 
consommation, non pas d'une production réelle. Elle assigne des mécanismes de causation (ainsi 
l'introjection et la projection), d'effectuation (gratification et frustration), d'expression (le bon et le 
mauvais) qui lui imposent une conception idéaliste de l'objet partiel. Elle ne le rattache pas à un 
véritable procès de production qui serait celui des machines désirantes. En second lieu, elle ne se 
débarrasse pas de l'idée que les objets partiels schizo paranoïdes renvoient à un tout, soit originel 
dans une phase primitive, soit à venir dans la position dépressive ultérieure (l 'Objet complet). Les 
objets partiels lui paraissent donc prélevés sur des personnes globales ; non seulement ils entreront 
dans des totalités d'intégration concernant le moi, l'objet et les pulsions, mais ils constituent déjà le 
premier type de relation objectale entre le moi, la mère et le père. Or c'est bien là que tout se 
décide en fin de compte. Il est certain que les objets partiels ont en eux-mêmes une charge 
suffisante pour faire sauter Œdipe, et le destituer de sa sotte prétention à représenter l'inconscient, 
à trianguler l'inconscient, à capter toute la production désirante. La question qui se pose ici n'est 
nullement celle d'une importance relative de ce qu'on peut appeler préœdipien par rapport à Œdipe 
(car « préœdipien » est encore en référence évolutive ou structurale avec Œdipe). La question est 
celle du caractère absolument anœdipien de la production désirante. Mais parce que Mélanie Klein 
conserve le point de vue du tout, les personnes globales et des objets complets – et aussi peut-être 
parce qu'elle tient à éviter le pire avec l'Association psychanalytique internationale qui a écrit sur 
sa porte « nul n'entre ici s'il n'est œdipien » –, elle ne se sert pas des objets partiels pour faire 
sauter le carcan d'Œdipe, au contraire elle s'en sert ou feint de s'en servir pour diluer Œdipe, le 
miniaturiser, le multiplier, l'étendre aux bas-âges." Ibid., pp. 52 and 53. 
232 “Telle est la loi des objets partiels. Rien ne manque, rien ne peut être défini comme un manque” 
Ibid., p. 70. 
233 “les objets partiels ne sont qu'en apparence prélevés sur des personnes globales ; ils sont 
réellement produits par prélèvement sur un flux ou une hylé non personnelle, avec laquelle ils 
communiquent en se connectant à d'autres objets partiels. L'inconscient ignore les personnes. Les 
objets partiels ne sont pas des représentants des personnages parentaux ni des supports de relations 
familiales ; ils sont des pièces dans les machines désirantes, renvoyant à un procès et à des 
rapports de production irréductibles et premiers par rapport à ce qui se laisse enregistrer dans la 
figure d'Œdipe.” Ibid., p. 54. 
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is just an object that, from the moment at which it is invested by the flux of desire, 
becomes its object. It is important to underline that since desire is a relentless flux 
that propagates everywhere, the object of desire can never be unique. Desire in 
fact follows neither rules nor patterns, but propagates itself in all directions, 
embracing everything, and since it is composed by a multiplicity of accidental 
fluxes its inner nature is invariably schizophrenic.  
 
Since desire is intrinsically schizophrenic, according to Deleuze and Guattari, only 
a “molecular” unconscious can produce it. Indeed, only a place of multiplicity of 
forces, forces that continuously come together and disperse creating twists of desire 
with the surrounding world, can be the place that houses these exchanges of 
fluxes:l'inconscient moléculaire ignore la castration, parce que les objets partiels ne 
manquent de rien et forment en tant que tels des multiplicités libres; parce que les 
multiples coupures ne cessent de produire des flux, au lieu de les refouler dans une 
même coupure unique capable de les tarir; parce que les synthèses constituent des 
connexions locales et non-spécifiques, des dis jonc-tians inclusives, des 
conjonctions nomades: partout une trans-sexualité microscopique, qui fait que la 
femme contient autant d'hommes que l'homme, et l'homme de femmes, capables 
d'entrer les uns avec les autres, les unes avec les autres, dans des rapports de 
production de désir qui bouleversent l'ordre statistique des sexes. Faire l'amour 
n'est pas ne faire qu'un, ni même deux, mais faire cent mille. C'est cela, les 
machines désirantes ou le sexe non humain: non pas un ni même deux sexes, mais 
n... sexes. La schizo-analyse est l'analyse variable des n... sexes dans un sujet, par-
delà la représentation anthropomorphique que la société lui impose et qu'il se 
donne lui-même de sa propre sexualité. La formule schizo-analytique de la 
révolution désirante sera d'abord: à chacun ses sexes.234 
 
The aim of schizoanalysis then is not just to show the schizophrenic nature 
of desire, but to free the productive forces that emerge from the molecular 
assembly that is its unconscious. In order to achieve this goal, rather than try to 
understand our desires through a structure – the Oedipus – that has nothing to do 
with the productive forces of desire, it is necessary to multiply those forces, to 
																																																						
234 Ibid., pp 351 and 352. 
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disseminate their intensities, and schizophréniser the synthesis with which the 
unconscious hooks the world, producing “micro-multiplicités” of desire: 
“schizophréniser le champ de l'inconscient, et aussi le champ social historique, de 
manière à faire sauter le carcan d'Œdipe et retrouver partout la force des 
productions désirantes, renouer à même le Réel le lien de la machine analytique, 
du désir et de la production.”235 With its ability to “deterritorialise236 the theatrical 
apparatus by which psychoanalysis tries to reduce the productivity of desire to its 
scheme, schizoanalysis gives freedom back to desire, allowing it to propagate 
itself everywhere.237 Thanks to schizoanalysis “le désir est reversé dans l'ordre de 
la production, rapporté à ses éléments moléculaires, et où il ne manque de rien, 
parce qu'il se définit comme être objet naturel et sensible, en même temps que le 
réel se définit comme être objectif du désir.”238  
According to Deleuze and Guattari, the molecular unconscious of 
schizoanalysis allows us to understand the machinique production of objects of 
desire without falling back into a dualistic thought. Indeed, although they use the 
notion of partial objects, they affirm that there is not a desiring subject on one side 
and an object of desire on the other. There are only fluxes of desire that are 
produced at the same time as their objects. “Le désir et son objet ne font qu'un, 
c'est la machine, en tant que machine de machine.”239 “Machine de machine” 
																																																						
235 Ibid., p. 62. 
236 “La psychanalyse se fixe sur les représentants imaginaires et structuraux de re-
territorialisation, tandis que la schizo-analyse suit les indices machiniques de déterritorialisation. 
Toujours l'opposition du névrosé sur le divan, comme terre ultime et stérile, dernière colonie 
épuisée, avec le schizo en promenade dans un circuit déterritorialisé.” Ibid., p. 378. 
237 “la schizo-analyse n 'a rien à interpréter. Il n'y a que des résistances, et puis des machines, 
machines désirantes. Œdipe est une résistance; si nous avons pu parler du caractère 
intrinsèquement pervers de la  psychanalyse, c'est que la  perversion en général est la re-
territorialisation artificielle des flux de désir, dont les machines au contraire sont les indices de 
production déterritorialisée. La psychanalyse re-territorialise sur le divan, dans la représentation 
d'Œdipe et de la castration. La schizoanalyse doit au contraire dégager les flux déterritorialisés du 
désir, dans les éléments moléculaires de la production désirante.” Ibid., p. 375 
238 Ibid., p. 371. 
239 Ibid., p. 34. 
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means that there is not a reality – machine sociales – that produces desire – 
machines désirantes – but that reality and desire come into existence together. 
Reality and desire are always already together in the world as mutual productions. 
Desire produces reality and, in the meantime, it is produced by reality: “Si le désir 
produit, il produit du réel. Si le désir est producteur, il ne peut l'être qu'en réalité, 
et de réalité. Le désir est cet ensemble de synthèses passives qui machinent les 
objets partiels, les flux et les corps, et qui fonctionnent comme des unités de 
production. Le réel en découle, il est le résultat des synthèses passives du désir 
comme auto-production de l'inconscient.”240 Where there is production there is 
also desire and vice versa. Desiring productions emerge everywhere as the result 
of the connective synthesis of reality. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																																						
240 Ibid., p. 34. 
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3.3 
THE INNOCENT FORCE OF DESIRE 
 
 
 
According to Deleuze and Guattari, desire is inscribed in the reality of the 
world. Desire is the inner force of reality; it is the cause of all movement and the 
origin of all intensities. For Deleuze and Guattari, desire is the most intimate 
expression of the reality of the world. Here the Spinozist echoes are evident. The 
philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari, even if it is completely free of the 
metaphysical faith that sees in the world nothing but the perfection of God241, is 
permeated by a deep trust in life and an optimistic confidence in humanity. 
Bracketing the conceptual complexity, sometimes their philosophy can seem to 
have been written by a child who knows only his joy. The philosophy of Deleuze 
is especially pervaded with that joy – a simple joy of existing that can be 
extremely touching. This joy also finds expression in the collaboration with 
Guattari and produces an innocent confidence in humanity that persists even when 
Deleuze and Guattari face the darker sides of human desire. In Anti-Œdipe they 
affirm: “jamais Reich n'est plus grand penseur que lorsqu'il refuse d'invoquer une 
méconnaissance ou une illusion des masses pour expliquer le fascisme,242 et 
réclame une explication par le désir, en termes de désir: non, les masses n'ont pas 
été trompées, elles ont désiré le fascisme à tel moment, en telles circonstances, et 
c'est cela qu'il faut expliquer, cette perversion du désir grégaire.”243 Even if it 
seems that they are condemning desire and the people who desired fascism, in 
reality they are condemning the Fascist machine, namely the machine that was 
able to capture the innocent forces of desire. Indeed, even if Deleuze and Guattari 
																																																						
241 “Quicquid est, in Deo est, et nihil sine Deo esse, neque concipi potest” B. Spinoza, Ethica more 
geometrico demonstrata, Pars I, propositio XV.  
242 Despite the differences between Fascism and Nazism, Deleuze and Guattari use here the term 
fascism as a general term that encompasses both. To avoid confusion, I will do the same. 
243 G. Deleuze and F. Guattari, L’anti-Œdipe, cit., p. 37. Italic mine. 
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acknowledge that the masses were not deceived by fascism but actually desired 
fascism,244 they explain in an interview that this was possible because “le 
fascisme […] a «assumé les désirs sociaux».”245 According to Deleuze and 
Guattari, fascism trapped desire inside its Weltanschauung, and channeling its 
forces, it built up a death machine.  
In this way, we understand how they manage to “save” the innocent nature 
of desire. If in fact as we have seen, the desiring machine works only through the 
social machine – since their syntheses are the conditions of possibility of desire –, 
then the innocence of desire is somehow kept separate from its reification. 
According to Deleuze and Guattari, desire is in itself a force with no purpose or 
goal; it is only the social development of its force that can be perverted. This is 
why they seek to build a “revolutionary machine” able to free desire from the 
perverted coercions of society. As Guattari explains in an interview on Anti-
Œdipe: “ou bien une machine révolutionnaire se montera, capable de prendre en 
charge le désir et les phénomènes de désir, ou bien le désir restera manipulé par 
les forces d’oppression, de répression, et menacera, même du dedans, les 
machines révolutionnaire. […] En un sens, ce que nous proposons comme schizo-
analyse aurait pour point d’application idéal des groupes, et des groupes 
militant.”246 In this way, we understand that the purpose of Deleuze and Guattari, 
far more than theoretical, is political. Indeed, it is not sufficient to acknowledge 
the molecular nature of the unconscious, the schizophrenic and innocent force of 
desire, and the machinique assemblage of production that combines the 
unconscious and desire, but is it necessary to build a “revolutionary machine” able 
to create a new unconscious whose desiring molecules are no longer subjected to 
the structures that imprison desire and exploit its forces: 
 
Une révolution, c'est une formidable production d'inconscient, et il n'y en a pas 
beaucoup d'autre, et ça n'a rien à voir avec un lapsus ou un acte manqué. 
																																																						
244 “Les gens, ils bandaient pour Hitler, pour la belle machine fasciste.” G. Deleuze, L’île déserte, 
cit., p. 373. 
245 Ibid., p. 373. 
246 Ibid., p. 31. 
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L'inconscient n'est pas un sujet qui produirait des rejetons dans la conscience, c'est 
un objet de production, c'est lui qui doit être produit, à condition qu'on n'en soit pas 
empêché. Ou plutôt il n'y a pas de sujet du désir, pas plus que d'objet. Seuls, les 
flux sont l'objectivité du désir lui-même. Le désir, il n'y en a jamais assez. Le désir 
est le système des signes a-signifiants à partir desquels on produit des flux 
d'inconscient dans un champ social historique. Pas d'éclosion de désir, en quelque 
lieu que ce soit, petite famille ou école de quartier, qui ne fasse branler l'appareil ou 
ne mette en question le champ social. Le désir est révolutionnaire parce qu'il veut 
toujours plus de connexions. La psychanalyse coupe et rabat toutes les connexions, 
tous les agencements, c'est sa vocation, elle hait le désir, elle hait la politique.247 
 
According to Deleuze and Guattari, using the revolutionary nature of desire, 
it is possible to schizophréniser the structures that trap, imprison, and pervert the 
innocent forces of desire, producing in this way a new unconscious. Now, before 
proceeding, it is important to make some observations that will help later to 
specify where Deleuze and Guattari have misunderstood masochism. If we accept 
that there is something like what they call a “perversion of desire”, then we have 
to assume that there is a something like a “normal desire” that develops in an 
either “right”, or “correct”, or at least “useful” way – but this is exactly what 
Deleuze and Guattari refuse when they argue that desire is a free force that has 
neither purpose nor meaning. This, however, is not the main problem. Using the 
Deleuzian category of the virtual, we can separate desire into its virtual and its 
actual existence. In L’actuel et le virtuel Deleuze explains the division between 
them in these terms:  
 
Le rapport de l'actuel et du virtuel constitue toujours un circuit, mais de deux 
manières: tantôt l'actuel renvoie à des virtuels comme à d'autres choses dans de 
vastes circuits, où le virtuel s'actualise, tantôt l'actuel renvoie au virtuel comme à 
son propre virtuel, dans les plus petits circuits où le virtuel cristallise avec l'actuel. 
Le plan d'immanence contient à la fois l'actualisation comme rapport du virtuel 
avec d'autres termes, et même l'actuel comme terme avec lequel le virtuel 
s'échange. Dans tous les cas, le rapport de l'actuel et du virtuel n'est pas celui qu'on 
																																																						
247 G. Deleuze, Deux régimes de fous, cit., p. 74. 
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peut établir entre deux actuels. Les actuels impliquent des individus déjà 
constitués, et des déterminations par points ordinaires ; tandis que le rapport de 
l’actuel et du virtuel forme une individuation en acte ou une singularisation par 
points remarquables à déterminer dans chaque cas.248  
 
If we accept this division – if we accept that it is conceptual and it should 
not be diachronically conceived – we can imagine a sort of degree zero of desire 
(virtuality of desire) that is innocent in itself because it is not yet compromised by 
the world (actualization of desire). In this way Deleuze and Guattari can on the 
one hand argue in favor of a pure force of desire that is not yet contaminated by 
its reifications, and on the other hand claim to make a political use of this force. 
However, if the degree zero of desire has a virtual existence then we have to 
recognize that it has not an actual existence. Indeed, even if virtuality and 
actuality are both part of the same reality, only the actual has a concrete existence. 
As Deleuze and Guattari argue, in order to produce its fluxes, desire needs the 
syntheses between the desiring machines and the world. And here is exactly 
where the problem lies. To claim that desire requires an embrace of the world in 
order to move from virtual to actual existence, to claim that it requires entering 
into the “machinique” production that is the real production of desire in order to 
produce its fluxes, means that every reification of desire, every production of the 
desiring machines, every transition from the virtual to the actual, every political 
use that we make of the pure forces of desire, is in itself a perversion of the 
“innocence” of virtual or zero degree desire. Following Deleuze and Guattari’s 
analysis of desire can only lead to the conclusion that every reification of desire is 
a perversion. In this way, we understand that it does not make sense to speak of 
perversion of desire since perversion is intrinsic to desire’s actualization in the 
world.  
But if any reification of desire is a perversion of its innocent nature, why 
define the fascist desire as perverse? And above all, how can a value judgment be 
given to different desiring productions? Why do we consider the “revolutionary 
machine” less perverted that the “fascist machine”? Are they not part of the same 
																																																						
248 G. Deleuze and C. Parnet, Dialogues, Flammarion, Paris 1996, p.185. 
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perversion that is the real making of desire?  
Furthermore, as an important parenthesis, we have to acknowledge that, 
even if it seems obvious now to consider fascist desire perverted, we must be 
cautious about making value judgments about desire. Indeed, from what 
privileged point of view may we pronounce a judgement on desire? From the 
point of view of either the "sane desire"? The “correct desire”? The “natural 
desire”? But is this not already in itself a fascist way of judging? Was it not 
fascism that condemned, imprisoned, and killed people on the basis of their 
desires? The myth of the Aryan race did not seek only the elimination of Gypsies, 
disabled persons, and Jews, but also of homosexuals, those perverts whose desire 
was indeed “perverse.” This is the reason why the judgment that we pronounce on 
fascism should be historical; it must be made on the basis of the deprivation of 
liberty of thought, on the ethnic and sexual cleansing, on the military adventurism, 
and not on whether or not the Nazis desired torturing and burning communists, 
Gypsies, homosexuals, and Jewish people. Judging fascism on the basis of desire 
can only save fascism, not condemn it, for the simple reason that desire is 
something that we cannot choose. We can choose how to enact our desires, but we 
cannot choose what we desire. Thus, we cannot judge desires but only the actions 
that derive from desires. As we will see in the next chapter, the masochistic 
fantasy is not a considered a problem because it relies on a – more or less hidden 
– death wish, but rather because it produces actions, because it expresses itself 
within a symbolic order to which it is accountable. 
The division between “good” and “bad” desire is always problematic 
because it implies a privileged perspective not shaped by the logic of desire itself 
– a perspective that, as Foucault well understood, implies a supposed normality 
from which to identify perversity. This is why Foucault, in order to avoid the 
inevitable implications of desire, not only refrains from making any value 
judgments on desire, but tries to eliminate the concept entirely. If he decides to 
focuses on pleasure(s) instead, it is precisely because, according to him, desire has 
nothing to do with such pleasure(s), for pleasure(s) imply nothing beyond the 
surface of the  body.  
As we have seen, Foucault’s account of sexuality is gradually more and 
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more insistent on what he calls practices of de-subjectification – aesthetic 
practices that do not offer any political program. Deleuze and Guattari, to the 
contrary, use desire to propose a program that goes beyond the aesthetics of the 
individual and aspires to be political in the most general sense of the term. As 
Guattari underlines, “ce que nous proposons comme schizo-analyse aurait pour 
point d’application idéal des groupes, et des groupes militant,”249 namely groups 
of interests. Certainly, their program is not prescriptive. They are very careful to 
not dictate any rules for distinguishing “good” from the “bad” desire. 
Nevertheless, they propose a program that consists in building up a revolutionary 
machine that could keep desire free from interests. During a conference held in 
Milan, Deleuze said:  
 
Alors quand Jervis dit que notre discours se fait de plus en plus politique, je crois 
qu'il a raison, parce que, autant nous insistions, dans la première partie de notre 
travail, sur de grandes dualités, autant nous cherchons à présent le nouveau mode 
d'unification dans lequel, par exemple, le discours schizophrénique, le discours 
drogué, le discours pervers, le discours homosexuel, tous les discours marginaux 
puissent subsister, que toutes ces fuites et ces discours se greffent sur une machine 
de guerre qui ne reproduise pas un appareil d'Etat ni de Parti. C'est pour cela même 
que nous n'avons plus tellement envie de parler de schizo-analyse, parce que cela 
reviendrait à protéger un type de fuite particulier, la fuite schizophrénique. Ce qui 
nous intéresse, c'est une sorte de maillon qui nous ramène au problème politique 
direct, et le problème politique direct est à peu près celui-ci pour nous: jusqu'ici, les 
partis révolutionnaires se sont constitués comme des synthèses d'intérêts au lieu de 
fonctionner comme des analyseurs de désirs des masses et des individus. Ou bien, 
ce qui revient au même: les partis révolutionnaires se sont constitués comme des 
embryons d'appareils d'Etat, au lieu de former des machines de guerre irréductibles 
à de tels appareils.250 
 
In this way, Deleuze and Guattari surreptitiously define the “good” desire as 
a free desire. According to them, as long as the innocent forces of desire are kept 
																																																						
249 G. Deleuze, Pourparlers, cit., p. 31. 
250 G. Deleuze, L’île déserte, cit., p. 389 and 390. 
		
	
	
	
101	
free from constraints impose by society, desire is good. The problem however is 
not only that they define a good desire, but that they ignore, or pretend to ignore, 
that only a system of values – a symbolic order – can evaluate freedom over 
servitude. They invoke the revolutionary machine as if this machine were not a 
product of society, as if this machine were not an actual reification of desire. They 
extrapolate the revolutionary machine out of the context that produces it in order 
to make it appear as the only way of keep free the forces of desire. But as they 
themselves says: “partout ce sont des machines, pas du tout métaphoriquement: 
des machines de machines, avec leurs couplages, leurs connexions.”251 The 
revolutionary machine is nothing more than a machine between machines, a 
machine that is produced as much as the other machines are produced. The 
militant groups to which they refer are not external to the production of desire, 
they are part of the production, which is to say, a particular production of desire. 
Even if those groups are anarchist groups that constitute themselves against the 
state apparatuses, they are not external to the symbolic battlefield that produced 
them. 
As Foucault and Edelman showed – each one in his own way and with his 
own language –  there is no possibility of situating oneself outside of the structure 
of reality. Foucault showed that “where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, 
or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in 
relation to power. It should be said that one is always "inside" power, there is no 
"escaping" it.”252 And Edelman showed that “no one, including those who assume 
the figural status of the social order’s death drive, can choose to stand outside that 
order or the Symbolic logic that shapes it.”253 Schizoanalysis cannot be external to 
the clash of forces that characterizes every society, it is part of it, it is one of the 
forces involved; and even if it were able to destroy the Oedipus and all the 
symbolic structures related to it, it could  do nothing but produce another 
symbolic formation within the context of the symbolic order.  
Deleuze and Guattari are aware of this problem and in fact in the years that 
																																																						
251 G. Deleuze and F. Guattari, L’anti-Œdipe, cit., p. 7. 
252 M. Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Introduction, cit., pp. 95 and 96. 
253 L. Berlant and L. Edelman, Sex, or the Unbearable, cit., p 18. 
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separate Anti-Œdipes from Mille Plateaux they feel the necessity to move away 
from the concept of Schizoanalysis while maintaining the political program that 
produced  it. In the conference just mentioned, responding to a question 
concerning the evolution of their work, Deleuze affirmed: 
 
Mais Jervis dit deux choses qui sont importantes: actuellement nous ne nous en 
prenons pas trop à l'Œdipe mais plus à l'institution à la machine psychanalytique 
dans son ensemble. Il va de soi que la machine psychanalytique comprend des 
dimensions au-delà de l'Œdipe, il y a donc pour nous des raisons pour que ce ne 
soit plus le problème essentiel. Jervis ajoute que la direction de notre travail actuel 
est plus politique et que nous avons aussi renoncé ce matin à utiliser le terme de 
schizo-analyse. Je voudrais dire plusieurs choses à cet égard, de la façon la plus 
modeste possible. Quand un terme est lancé, et qu'il a un minimum de succès 
comme il est arrivé pour « machine désirante » ou pour « schizo-analyse », ou on le 
reprend et alors c'est très fâcheux, c'est déjà la récupération, ou bien on y renonce, 
et il faut en trouver d'autres, pour tout déplacer. Il y a des mots dont, Félix et moi, 
nous sentons qu'il est urgent de ne plus les utiliser: schizo-analyse, machine 
désirante, c'est horrible, si nous les utilisons, nous sommes pris au piège. Nous ne 
savons pas très bien, nous ne croyons pas aux mots; lorsque nous utilisons un mot, 
nous avons envie de dire: si ce mot ne vous plaît pas, trouvez-en un autre, on 
s'arrange toujours. Les mots sont de substituts possibles à l'infini.254 
 
They know that words always refer to meanings and that meanings are 
always supported by a woven structure of common signifiers – what Lacan calls 
the signifying chain of the symbolic order. Without this structure, we would not 
even be able to communicate with each other. There is no way of escaping the 
symbolic order since the symbolic order is not just the totality of all symbolic 
productions, but also the general structure of meaning. The neologisms invented 
by Deleuze and Guattari are part of the Symbolic order although they emerge in 
opposition to it.  
In continually creating new concepts, Deleuze and Guattari try to escape the 
structure of the symbolic. But they inevitably fall back into it each time they 
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express themselves. Indeed, if they want to produce concepts, they can only do so 
inside the symbolic order. What escapes the symbolic can never be a concept, but 
only a non-meaning, a hole or gap in the logic of meaning that constitutes the 
Real. The Real is the negativity that the rationality of conceptscan never capture. 
Even if it is expressed in the language of the symbolic, The Real is  a concept that 
gestures toward what refuses conceptualization. Even if we define it as “the thing 
that escapes every signification,” we should not think that we have really 
understood what it is. Since it is beyond any possible meaning and signification, 
the Real is incomprehensible, which is to say, it falls outside the order of 
comprehension. 
Deleuze and Guattari look for something that – like the Real – seems 
beyond the grasp of words.  But what they look for has a meaning, a meaning so 
profound that it can create a political movement capable of freeing desire from the 
meshes of the symbolic order. Obviously, the meaning pertaining to the concepts 
they create thoroughly embeds them in the Symbolic, pushing them toward the 
endless creation of new concepts described by new signifiers.  
Even if, moreover, we accept the possibility of freeing desire from the 
symbolic order, affirming with Deleuze and Guattari that this liberation will ipso 
facto create a political movement not related to the state apparatuses, what 
assurance is there that this freed desire will not eventuate in death and 
destruction? Who can tell whether a desire without castration will not take the 
form of “the pleasure of having the right to exercise power over the powerless 
without a thought, the pleasure «de faire le mal pour le plaisir de le faire», the 
enjoyment of violating?”255 Who can say with certainty that pain and sufferance 
are not just extremely pleasurable to see but maybe even to experience? If every 
society, in every place and at every time, always ritualized death and suffering, 
making it not only the instrument of power, but also of pleasure, we must ask 
ourselves – and we will do so at greater length in the next chapter – if death and 
suffering are inseparable human nature and if they are not themselves bound up 
with the drive that leads Deleuze and Guatarri continually to abandon, turn away 
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from, or dismiss their creations in order to generate new ones. For their part, 
however, Deleuze and Guattari have no doubts about either the feasibility or the 
promise of a desire freed from social constraint. Having removed the emphasis 
from schizoanalysis, their theoretical and political program continues in Mille 
plateaux – the book in which they explicitly try to achieve the movement of 
concepts I described in the foreword, and in which they implicitly try to solve the 
theoretical problems that we have just highlighted. As Deleuze declares: Mille 
plateaux configures itself as a “théorie des multiplicités pour elles-mêmes, là où le 
multiple passe à l'état de substantif, tandis que L’Anti-Œdipe le considérait encore 
dans des synthèses et sous les conditions de l'inconscient.”256 In Mille plateaux 
they move from a Kantian ambition that wanted to show the syntheses of desire to 
an “ambition post-kantienne (bien que résolument anti-hégélienne).”257 Setting 
aside the transcendental synthesis of the unconscious, and rejecting the Hegelian 
system that pretends to overcomes any contradictions in the synthesis of the 
Aufhebung, Deleuze and Guattari try to establish a plan d’immanence in which 
only movements of intensities that configure themselves as multiplicités exist: 
 
Mille Plateaux […] essaie de montrer comment les multiplicités débordent la 
distinction de la conscience et de l'inconscient, de la nature et de l'histoire, du corps 
et de l'âme. Les multiplicités sont la réalité même, et ne supposent aucune unité, 
n'entrent dans aucune totalité, pas plus qu'elles ne renvoient à un sujet. Les 
subjectivations, les totalisations, les unifications sont au contraire des processus qui 
se produisent et apparaissent dans les multiplicités. Les principales caractéristiques 
des multiplicités concernent leurs éléments, qui sont des singularités; leurs 
relations qui sont des devenirs, leurs événements qui sont des hecceités (c'est-à-dire 
des individuations sans sujet); leurs espaces-temps, qui sont des espaces et des 
temps lisses; leur modèle de réalisation, qui est le rhizome (par opposition au 
modèle de l'arbre); leur plan de composition qui constitue des plateaux (zones 
d'intensité continue); les vecteurs qui les traversent, et qui constituent des 
territoires et des degrés de déterritorialisation.258 
																																																						
256 G. Deleuze, Deux régimes de fous, cit., p. 289. 
257 Ibid., p. 289. 
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In this context where any duality is overcome and everything configures 
itself as endless movements of multiplicities, Deleuze and Guattari accent259 the 
Body without organs as the political tool able to maintain the flux of desire. 
According to Mille plateaux “le corps sans organes est un corps affectif, intensif, 
anarchiste, qui en comporte que des pôles, des zones, des seuils et des gradients. 
C’est une puissante vitalité non-organique qui le traverse.”260 The BwO261 is in 
fact neither something that I have, nor something that I am, but is rather a process 
of creation of new ways of being in the world. For Deleuze and Guattari even to 
say “I” is misleading. Being in the world in fact has nothing to do with the 
Geworfenheit of the Dasein and it is not linked with a subjectivity incarnated in a 
Leib. From this perspective, there is neither a subject nor an organism but just an 
infinite number of molecules that move around transported by desire. “Being in 
the world” should then be thought of as a process of becoming in which what 
matters is neither the initial state nor the arrival state but the becoming itself. 
Indeed, there is no more a proper starting point than there is a proper ending point. 
Everything is just always in the process of becoming. Deleuze affirms in fact that 
“il n'y a pas un terme dont on part, ni un auquel on arrive ou auquel on doit 
arriver. Pas non plus deux termes qui s'échangent. La question «qu'est-ce que tu 
deviens?» est particulièrement stupide. Car à mesure que quelqu'un devient, ce 
qu'il devient change autant que lui-même.262  
According to Deleuze and Guattari, the movement of becoming is not 
simply intrinsic to the things themselves but is the thing itself. What in fact we 
call “states of being” or simply “things” are nothing but immobilizations of 
becoming. Any object of the world is constantly changing although the subject is 
not always able to perceive it. The boundaries of things then have to be seen as 
abstractions of the becoming that the things really are. This is the reason why we 
																																																						
259 “Nous n'avons jamais compris de la même façon le « corps sans organes».” Ibid., p. 220. 
260 G. Deleuze, Critique et clinique, Les éditions de minuit, Paris 1993, p. 164. 
261 From now on I will use the same acronym that Deleuze and Guattari often use to refer to le 
corps sans organes: CsO (or BwO in English). 
262 G. Deleuze and C. Parnet, Dialogues, cit., p. 8. 
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should think of becoming not as the intermediary between two states but as the 
intrinsic nature of every “state of being”. According to Deleuze and Guattari in 
fact, the states of being are just conceptual fictions that, in creating a fixed image 
of the movement of molecules, miss their intrinsic movement. As a sort of 
philosophical reinterpretation of Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle263, Deleuze 
and Guattari are not suggesting that there is not a physical reality, in fact they 
affirm that you certainly see things and that you can even describe their 
proprieties, but they maintain that in doing so you miss the movement that the 
things really are, you confuse the abstraction that you just described with the 
“thing itself.” The core issue for them is that a “thing itself” does not really exist – 
like as there is not a subject who can grasp it. For Deleuze and Guattari there are 
just multiplicities that continuously become.  
However, Deleuze and Guattari do not assert that becoming is either the 
metaphysical structure of the world, or its ἀρχή. Through a Nietzschean 
perspective, they simply affirm that everything becomes and that, in this 
becoming, the subject and the object, the whole and the part, the form and chaos 
are no longer distinguishable except as intellectual abstractions. As appears clear 
Deleuze and Guattari are trying in this way to checkmate the dualistic thought that 
has accompanied philosophy since its birth. 
In this scenario where nothing is stable and everything becomes, what 
emerges as a common point among all becoming(s) is the repetition of difference. 
If in fact is true that all things that become become different from themselves, 
then it is also true that the only thing that constantly repeats itself through all 
becomings is difference itself, the difference that belongs to the becoming that all 
things are. From this perspective, difference and repetition appear as the concave 
and convex versions of the same movement that is the becoming of all things: the 
difference is in the repetition with which things continuously become different 
from themselves, and the repetition is in the difference through  which things 
continue to be different from themselves.  
																																																						
263 According to Heisenberg’s Uncertainty principle, you cannot determine both the position and 
the momentum of an elementary particle at exactly the same time. 
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Deleuze and Guattari call this moving and open milieu of multiplicities that 
continuously become “plan d’immanence” and refer to the BwO as the part of it 
that can be used as a political tool to freely maintain the movement of desire. The 
BwO in fact is not just something that is continuously different from itself, but 
something that inherently opposes itself to all dimensions that, in giving it an 
organization and a structure, would immobilize it: 
 
Considérons les trois grandes strates par rapport á nous, c'est-à-dire celles qui nous 
ligotent le plus directement: l'organisme, la signifiance et la subjectivation. La 
surface d'organisme, l'angle de signifiance et d'interprétation, le point de 
subjectivation ou d'assujettissement. Tu seras organisé, tu seras un organisme, tu 
articuleras ton corps – sinon tu ne seras qu'un dépravé. Tu seras signifiant et 
signifié, interprète et interprété – sinon tu ne seras qu'un déviant. Tu seras sujet, et 
fixé comme tel, sujet d'énonciation rabattu sur un sujet d'énoncé – sinon tu ne seras 
qu'un vagabond. A l'ensemble des strates, le CsO oppose la désarticulation (ou les 
n articulations) comme propriété du plan de consistance, l'expérimentation comme 
opération sur ce plan (pas de signifiant, n'interprétez jamais!), le nomadisme 
comme mouvement (même sur place, bougez, ne cessez pas de bouger, voyage 
immobile, désubjectivation).264 
 
The BwO is in fact an endless practice of becoming that, following the 
movement of desire, embraces everything without belonging to anything. If its 
enemies are organization, signification, and subjectivization, it is because each of 
these seeks to trap the BwO inside functions, meanings, and purposes instead of 
leaving it free to expand everywhere. But despite these attempts, the BwO escapes 
their grasp and configures itself as a flux of mobile and variable intensities. “Un 
CsO est fait de telle manière qu'il ne peut être occupé, peuplé que par des 
intensités. Seules les intensités passent et circulent.”265 This is the reason why the 
BwO rejects any unified organization, be it in the form of a subject, an organism, 
or a society. 
																																																						
264 G. Deleuze and F. Guattari, Mille plateaux : Capitalisme et schizophrénie 2, Les éditions de 
minuit, Paris 1980, pp. 197 and 198. 
265 Ibid., p. 189. 
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The expression Corps sans organes originally comes from a radio play266 in 
which Artaud declared war against the organs267, but in Deleuze and Guattari’s 
interpretation the enemies of the BwO are not the organs in themselves but the 
organism, namely the unitary structure of organization of the body:  
 
On ne croira pas toutefois que le véritable ennemi du corps sans organes soit 
les organes eux-mêmes. L'ennemi, c'est l'organisme, c'est-à-dire l'organisation 
qui impose aux organes un régime de totalisation, de collaboration, de synergie, 
d'intégration, d'inhibition et de disjonction. En ce sens, oui, les organes sont bien 
l'ennemi du corps sans organes qui exerce sur eux une action répulsive et dénonce 
en eux des appareils de persécution. Mais aussi bien, le corps sans organes attire les 
organes, se les approprie et les fait fonctionner dans un autre régime que celui de 
l'organisme, dans des conditions où chaque organe est d'autant plus tout le corps 
qu'il s'exerce pour lui-même et inclut les fonctions des autres. Les organes alors 
sont comme «miraculés» par le corps sans organes, suivant ce régime machinique 
qui ne se confond ni avec des mécanismes organiques ni avec l'organisation de 
l'organisme.268 
 
Lead by the fluxes of desire, the BwO is able on the one hand to break the 
existing connection between the organs and their functions, and on the other hand 
to give them unusual intensities. In this way, the BwO releases the body from the 
																																																						
266 “L'homme est malade parce qu'il est mal construit. Il faut se décider à le mettre à nu pour lui 
gratter cet animalcule qui le démange mortellement, dieu, et avec dieu ses organes. Car liez-moi si 
vous le voulez, mais il n'y a rien de plus inutile qu'un organe. Lorsque vous lui aurez fait un corps 
sans organes, alors vous l'aurez délivré de tous ses automatismes et rendu à sa véritable liberté. 
Alors vous lui réapprendrez à danser à l'envers comme dans le délire des bals musette et cet envers 
sera son véritable endroit” A. Artaud, Pour en finir avec le jugement de dieu, in Œuvres 
Complètes, t. XIII, p. 104. 
267 “Le 28 novembre 1947, Artaud déclare la guerre aux organes: Pour en finir avec le jugement de 
Dieu, «car liez-moi si vous le voulez, mais il n'y a rien de plus inutile qu'un organe». C'est une 
expérimentation non seulement radiophonique, mais biologique, politique, appelant sur soi censure 
et répression. Corpus et Socius, politique et expérimentation. On ne vous laissera pas expérimenter 
dans votre coin.”  G. Deleuze and F. Guattari, Mille plateaux, cit., p. 186. 
268 G. Deleuze, Deux régimes de fous, cit., p. 20. 
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prison of the organism and gives it new and unexpected possibilities of 
expression.  
Deleuze and Guattari explain also that the enemy of the BwO is not just the 
organism but all dimensions that try to give it a unitary and organized structure. 
For this reason, it is not sufficient to separate the body from the organism but it is 
also necessary  “arracher la conscience au sujet pour en faire un moyen 
d'exploration, arracher l'inconscient à la signifiance et à l'interprétation pour en 
faire une véritable production.”269 According to Deleuze and Guattari, thanks to 
the BwO we can experience the intensities of desire without trapping those 
intensities in the false reifications of  suvbjectivity, meaning, or the organism. The 
political force of the BwO is precisely that in having no pre-existing path to 
follow, and no established purpose to achieve, it can roam freely, following only 
the casual intensities that it finds in its wanderings.  
Nothing better expresses the BwO than the metaphor of “la promenade du 
schizo.” But in contrast to the claims of  Anti-Oedipus, the schizophrenic 
paradigm is no longer required to achieve a BwO. There are in fact mille plateau 
to lean on and infinite possibilities of building a BwO: le corps 
hypocondriaque,270 le corps paranoïaque,271 le corps schizo,272 le corps drogué,273 
																																																						
269 G. Deleuze and F. Guattari, Mille plateaux, cit., p. 198. 
270 “du corps hypocondriaque dont les organes sont détruits, la destruction est déjà faite, plus rien 
ne se passe, «Mlle X affirme qu'elle n'a plus ni cerveau ni nerfs ni poitrine ni estomac ni boyaux, il 
ne lui reste plus que la peau et les os du corps désorganisé, ce sont là ses propres expressions».” 
Ibid., p. 186. 
271 “du corps paranoïaque, où les organes ne cessent d'être attaqués par des influences, mais aussi 
restaurés par des énergies extérieures («il a longtemps vécu sans estomac, sans intestins, presque 
sans poumons, l'œsophage déchiré, sans vessie, les cotes broyées, il avait parfois mangé en partie 
son propre larynx, et ainsi de suite, mais les miracles divins avaient toujours á nouveau régénéré ce 
qui avait été détruit...»).” Ibid., p. 186. 
272 “du corps schizo, accédant á une lutte intérieure active qu'il mené lui-même contre les organes, 
au prix de la catatonie.” Ibid., p. 186. 
273 “du corps drogué, schizo expérimental: «l'organisme humain est d'une inefficacité scandaleuse; 
au lieu d'une bouche et d'un anus qui risquent tous deux de se détraquer, pourquoi n'aurait-on pas 
un seul orifice polyvalent pour l'alimentation et la défécation? On pourrait murer la bouche et le 
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le corps masochiste, are just some examples. However, as Deleuze and Guattari 
make clear, care should be taken not to turn the BwO into an identity – “le corps 
sans organes n'est jamais le tien, le mien... C'est toujours un corps.”274 According 
to Deleuze and Guattari it is fundamental to keep a “mouvement de 
déterritorialisation généralisée ou chacun prend et fait ce qu'il peut, d'après ses 
gouts qu'il aurait réussi á abstraire d'un Moi, d’après une politique ou une stratégie 
qu'on aurait réussi á abstraire de telle ou telle formation, d'après tel procédé qui 
serait abstrait de son origine.”275 In this way, no one runs the risk of reproducing 
coercive structures dictated by either the subject, the organism, the signification, 
or the society. The right question concerning the BwO should never be what – or 
even worse, who – is a BwO, but always “comment se faire un Corps sans 
Organes?”276 How to use the inherent becoming of all things as a political tool 
that keeps the movement of desire free from any social constraint: “Là où la 
psychanalyse dit: Arrêtez, retrouvez votre moi, il faudrait dire: Allons encore plus 
loin, nous n'avons pas encore trouvé notre CsO, pas assez défait notre moi. 
Remplacez l’anamnèse par l'oubli, l’interprétation par l'expérimentation. Trouvez 
votre corps sans organes, sachez le faire, c'est question de vie ou de mort, de 
jeunesse et de vieillesse, de tristesse et de gaieté. Et c'est là que tout se joue.”277  
According to Deleuze and Guattari, the BwO is constantly threatened by a 
“triple curse” that weighs on desire: 
 
Chaque fois que le désir est trahi, maudit, arraché à son champ d'immanence, il y a 
un prêtre là-dessous. Le prêtre a lancé la triple malédiction sur le désir : celle de la 
loi négative, celle de la règle extrinsèque, celle de l'idéal transcendant. Tourné vers 
le nord, le prêtre a dit: Désir est manque (comment ne manquerait-il pas de ce qu'il 
désire?) Le prêtre opérait le premier sacrifice, nommé castration, et tous les 
hommes et les femmes du nord venaient se ranger derrière lui, criant en cadence 
																																																																																																																																																					
nez, combler l'estomac er creuser un trou d'aération directement dans les poumons, ce qui aurait dû 
être fait dès l’origine».” Ibid., p. 186. 
274 Ibid., p. 203 
275 Ibid., p. 195. 
276 Ibid., p. 185. 
277 Ibid., p. 187. 
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«manque, manque, c'est la loi commune». Puis, tourné vers le sud, le prêtre a 
rapporté le désir au plaisir. Car il y a des prêtres hédonistes et même orgastiques. 
Le désir se soulagera dans le plaisir; et non seulement le plaisir obtenu fera taire un 
moment le désir, mais l'obtenir est déjà une manière de l'interrompre, de le 
décharger á l'instant et de vous décharge de lui. Le plaisir-décharge: le prêtre opère 
le second sacrifice nommé masturbation. Puis, tourné vers l’est, il s'écrie: 
Jouissance est impossible, mais l’impossible jouissance est inscrite dans le désir. 
Car tel est l'Idéal, en son impossibilité même, «le manque-á-jouir qu'est la vie». Le 
prêtre opérait le troisième sacrifice, fantasme ou mille et une nuits, cent vingt 
journées, tandis que les hommes de l'est chantaient: oui, nous serons votre 
fantasme, votre idéal et votre impossibilité, les vôtres et les nôtres aussi. Le prêtre 
ne s'était pas tourné vers l'ouest, parce qu'il savait qu'il y était rempli d'un plan de 
consistance, mais croyait que cette direction était bouchée par les colonnes 
d'Hercule, sans issue, non habitée des hommes. C'est pourtant là que le désir était 
tapi, l'ouest était le plus court chemin de l'est, et des autres directions redécouvertes 
et déterritorialisées.278 
 
With a clear reference to the Genealogy of Morality, Deleuze and Guattari 
use the figure of the priest as the trans-historic instance that programmatically 
jeopardizes the forces of desire. This is the reason why, although the curses have 
historical references, they should be thought of as concentric arcs that fold back 
on themselves in every historical period. “La première malédiction du désir, la 
première malédiction qui pèse comme une malédiction chrétienne, qui pèse sur le 
désir et qui remonte aux Grecs, c'est le désir est manque.” 279 Deleuze and Guattari 
indicate the North – the high, the top, the heaven – as the direction of the first 
curse because from Plato to Christianity the object of desire is located in the 
transcendent world – a world to which humans aspire but that is unreachable in 
this world and, for that reason, constitutes desire as lack.  
The second curse is located in the South – the low, the bottom, the earth – 
because it is the place of a “false immanence.” Although the object of desire 
																																																						
278 Ibid., pp. 191 and 192. 
279 G. Deleuze, Dualisme, monisme et multiplicités : Cours Vincennes 1973, available online : 
https://www.le-terrier.net/deleuze/anti-oedipe1000plateaux/1126-03-73.htm. P. 3. 
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transcends the subject, he does not stop looking for it. But unfortunately, since 
desire “c'est inatteignable, c'est le pur transcendant,” the subject will always 
confuse appearances with the true object of desire. Perpetually unsatisfied by the 
absence of the true object, the subject tries desperately to fill with pleasure the 
lack that desire structurally inscribed in him. Pleasure comes then to quell the pain 
that desire creates. As Deleuze underlines: “ce qui vient le remplir ou le satisfaire, 
qui vient lui donner une pseudo-immanence, ça va être ce qu'on appelle l'état de 
plaisir, mais dès ce second niveau, il est entendu que cette immanence est une 
fausse immanence puisque le désir a été défini fondamentalement en rapport avec 
une transcendance, que ce remplissement c'est, à la lettre, une illusion, un leurre. 
Seconde malédiction du désir : il s'agit de calmer le désir pour l'instant, et puis la 
malédiction recommencera. Et puis il faudra le réclamer, et puis c'est la 
conception du plaisir-décharge.”  The hedonistic priest, in pain for the absence of 
the true object, creates a pseudo-immanence that is useful to unload the tension 
generated by desire but that is not true since it is still connected with a 
fundamental transcendence. Confusing the immanent flux of desire that passes 
through the BwO with pleasure and discharge, the hedonistic priest does nothing 
but territorialize and arrest the free movement of desire. As I have explained, 
Deleuze and Guattari see desire as a flux of forces and intensities that should 
move freely, without constraint or predetermination. Indeed, as Deleuze states 
emphatically during one of his courses at Vincennes, “le plaisir ou l'orgasme, ce 
n'est pas du tout l'achèvement du processus, c'est, ou son interruption, ou son 
exaspération, or les deux reviennent au même et c'est tout à fait fâcheux!”280 
Here we find not only an attack on Freud and the problem of the tension of 
sexual excitement281 but also on Reich282 and in a certain way on Foucault as well. 
																																																						
280 Ibid., p. 5. 
281 “L'idée du plaisir, c'est une idée complètement pourrie - y'a qu'à voir les textes de Freud, au 
niveau désir-plaisir, ça revient à dire que le désir c'est avant tout une tension désagréable. Il y a un 
ou deux textes où Freud dit que, après tout, il y a peut-être des tensions agréables, mais encore ça 
ne va pas loin. En gros, le désir est vécu comme une tension tellement désagréable que, il faut, mot 
horrible, mot affreux, pour s'en sortir tellement c'est mauvais ce truc là, il faut une décharge. Et 
cette décharge, et bien c'est ça le plaisir! Les gens auront la paix, et puis, hélas, le désir renaît, il 
		
	
	
	
113	
In a series of notes that Deleuze took just after the publication of the first volume 
of The History of Sexuality, Deleuze summarizes his own position, explicating his 
wariness about the privileging of pleasure: 
 
La dernière fois que nous nous sommes vus, Michel me dit, avec beaucoup de 
gentillesse et affection, à peu près: je ne peux pas supporter le mot désir; même si 
vous l’employez autrement, je ne peux pas m’empêcher de penser ou de vivre que 
désir = manque, ou que désir se dit réprimé. Michel ajoute: alors moi, ce que 
j’appelle «plaisir», c’est peut-être ce que vous appelez «désir»; mais de toute façon 
j’ai besoin d’un autre mot que désir. Évidemment, encore une fois, c’est autre 
chose qu’une question de mot. Puisque moi, à mon tour, je ne supporte guère le 
mot «plaisir». Mais pourquoi? Pour moi, désir ne comporte aucun manque; ce n’est 
pas non plus une donnée naturelle; il ne fait qu’un avec un agencement 
d’hétérogènes qui fonctionne; il est processus, contrairement à structure ou genèse; 
il est affect, contrairement à sentiment; il est «haecceité» (individualité d’une 
journée, d’une saison, d’une vie), contrairement à subjectivité; il est événement, 
contrairement à chose ou personne. Et surtout il implique la constitution d’un 
champ d’immanence ou d’un «corps sans organes», qui se définit seulement par 
des zones d’intensité, des seuils, des gradients, des flux. Ce corps est aussi bien 
biologique que collectif et politique; c’est sur lui que les agencements se font et se 
défont, c’est lui qui porte les pointes de déterritorialisation des agencements ou les 
lignes de fuite. […] Si je l’appelle corps sans organes, c’est parce qu’il s’oppose à 
toutes les strates d’organisation, celle de l’organisme, mais aussi bien aux 
organisations de pouvoir. C’est précisément l’ensemble des organisations du corps 
qui briseront le plan ou le champ d’immanence, et imposeront au désir un autre 
																																																																																																																																																					
faudra une nouvelle décharge. Les types de conceptions que l'on appelle en termes savants: 
hédonistes, à savoir la recherche du plaisir, et les types de conceptions mystiques qui maudissent 
le désir, en vertu de ce qui est fondamental dans le manque, je voudrais que vous sentiez juste que 
de toutes manières, ils considèrent le désir comme le sale truc qui nous réveille, et qui nous 
réveille de la manière la plus désagréable, c'est à dire - soit en nous mettant en rapport avec un 
manque fondamental qui peut être dès lors apaisé avec une espèce d'activité de décharge, et puis 
on aura la paix, et puis ça recommencera.” Ibid., p. 3 and 4. 
282 In The Function of the Orgasm, Reich explains the nucleus of neuroses in terms of tension and 
release of energy. 
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type de «plan», stratifiant à chaque fois le corps sans organes. Si je dis tout cela 
tellement confus, c’est parce que plusieurs problèmes se posent pour moi par 
rapport à Michel: je ne peux donner au plaisir aucune valeur positive, parce que le 
plaisir me paraît interrompre le procès immanent du désir; le plaisir me paraît du 
côté des strates et de l’organisation; et c’est dans le même mouvement que le désir 
est présenté comme soumis du dedans à la loi et scandé du dehors par les plaisirs; 
dans les deux cas, il y a négation d’un champ d’immanence propre au désir. Je me 
dis que ce n’est pas par hasard si Michel attache une certaine importance à Sade, et 
moi au contraire à Masoch. Il ne suffirait pas de dire que je suis masochiste, et 
Michel, sadique. Ce serait bien, mais ce n’est pas vrai. Ce qui m’intéresse chez 
Masoch, ce ne sont pas les douleurs, mais l’idée que le plaisir vient interrompre la 
positivité du désir et la constitution de son champ d’immanence (de même, ou 
plutôt d’une autre façon, dans l’amour courtois, constitution d’un plan 
d’immanence ou d’un corps sans organes où le désir ne manque de rien, et se garde 
autant que possible de plaisirs qui viendraient interrompre son processus). Le 
plaisir me paraît le seul moyen pour une personne ou un sujet de «s’y retrouver» 
dans un processus qui la déborde. C’est une re-territorialisation. Et de mon point de 
vue, c’est de la même façon que le désir est rapporté à la loi du manque et à la 
norme du plaisir.283 
 
This long quote is the answer that Deleuze gives to Foucualt’s ethics of 
pleasure(s). As we can see, Deleuze has for pleasure the same reluctance that 
Foucault has for desire. For Deleuze, the problem consists in the fact that pleasure 
on the one hand interrupts the flux of desire and on the other hand territorializes 
the BwO. According to Deleuze, pleasure permits a person to find himself again 
amid the experience of being overwhelmed, it allows him to reclaim his body and 
his identity.  
Although Deleuze and Foucault have the same goal – namely the 
dissolution of the subject and the resistance to social constraints – they consider 
the impact and the consequences of pleasure and desire in opposite ways. What is 
fascinating is that this structural disagreement leads them both in the same 
direction: toward masochism. Although in completely different ways, the 
																																																						
283 G. Deleuze, Deux régimes de fous, cit., pp. 118/120. 
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potential bound up with masochism becomes fundamental for Foucault as well as 
for Deleuze and Guattari. Though both positions aim to liberate masochism from 
its psychoanalytic interpretation, according to which masochism (and all other 
sexual “perversions”) reveals the hidden truth about a subject and his past, they 
nonetheless interpret masochism in opposite ways. If as we have seen, Foucault 
thinks of masochism as “the real creation of new possibilities of pleasure”284 freed 
from desire and for this reason able to resist the dispositif of sexuality, Deleuze 
and Guattari think of masochism “not as a source of pleasure, but as a flow to be 
followed in the constitution of an uninterrupted process of desire,”285 as one of the 
ways by which it is possible to fabricate a BwO. Although in their different 
fashions, both Deleuze and Guattari and Foucault reinterpret masochism as a way 
to experiment with new and unexpected possibilities of life, as a way to increase 
the intensities of a life and as a way to act politically against the constraints of 
society.  
Now, what is important to point out is that these two opposite 
(anti)psychoanalytic re-interpretations of masochism are similarly intent on 
denying the most important and philosophically interesting intuition of 
psychoanalysis: namely the (death) drive. It’s not surprising where Foucault is 
concerned, since he rejects psychoanalysis in toto, but this denial is more 
complicated in the case of Deleuze. Indeed, before the encounter with Guattari, 
Deleuze was very much interested in the death drive. In Le froid et le cruel, he in 
fact affirms that: “of all the writings of Freud, the masterpiece which we know as 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle is perhaps the one where he engaged most directly 
– and how penetratingly – in specifically philosophical reflection.”286 What is 
really interesting is that in trying to sustain the philosophical impact of Freudian 
analysis, Deleuze (without Guattari) ends up finding in the death drive the 
condition of possibility of pleasure and desire. Indeed, analyzing Beyond the 
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Pleasure Principle he asks: if it is true that the psychic life of every human being 
is regulated by the pursuit of pleasure, how is it possible to turn this tension into a 
principle that regulates the psychic life of the mind? For Deleuze, only from a 
transcendental point of view it is possible to establish pleasure as the foundation 
of psychic life. It is then necessary to find “the ‘ground-less’ from which the 
ground itself emerged.”287 The intuition of Deleuze is that the beyond that Freud 
discovered works de facto not so much as a state of exception that jeopardizes the 
pursuit of pleasure, but as the transcendental foundation of pleasure itself. In 
Deleuze’s interpretation of Freud “there are no exceptions to the principle but 
there is a residue that is irreducible to it; nothing contradicts the principle, but 
there remains something which falls outside it and is not homogeneous with it - 
something, in short, beyond…”288 precisely because it is its condition of 
possibility. From the standpoint of the Deleuze of Le froid et le cruel, the death 
drive is the root of the entire Freudian philosophical speculation.  
In Différence et répétition – a text written a year later than Le froid et le 
cruel and that belongs entirely to the “former” Deleuze – the philosopher develops 
his thinking concerning the transcendental dimension of the death drive. In the 
second chapter of the book called La répétition pour elle-même, he explains that 
there is not a pre-determinate structure of mind. On the contrary, the mind builds 
itself step by step from the groundlessness that it is. In order to understand this 
groundlessness, we have to imagine the nature of the mind as a sort of radical 
nudity that is always and constantly invaded by life. During those invasions, the 
bare surface of the mind can do nothing but suffer its own condition, but in the 
meantime, it creates the scars – or to use a philosophical expression, the synthesis 
– to which the subject will always return in its dealing with life. As Aaron 
Schuster explains: “it is because of this groundlessness and radical exposure that 
every mind, in the course of its ‘incomplete constitution’ or ‘failed synthesis,’ will 
acquire its pathological skew, its idiosyncratic modes of enjoyment, its touch of 
madness (if not more than a touch) – it is these unique deviances and distortions 
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that hold it together, that compose the secret coherence of the individual and 
express its abyssal freedom.”289  
In this way, we understand that Deleuze overturns the classical 
interpretation of Freud. According to the classical interpretation of trauma, 
repetition occurs because there is a traumatized mind. For Deleuze, on the 
contrary, the mind itself emerges from repetition. The repetition of trauma(s) is 
the condition that generates the mind itself.  Hence the famous sentence of 
Différence et répétition: “Je ne répète pas parce que je refoule. Je refoule parce 
que je répète.”290 From the classical interpretation of the Freudian paradigm, 
repetition is the way in which the subject survives those unbearable events that 
cannot be faced. “According to this scheme, the mind defends itself against 
painful thoughts and traumatic events by pushing them into the unconscious, but 
the price it pays for this is that they are never truly left behind or forgotten; they 
continue to haunt the psyche, returning unpredictably in different guises and 
contexts, disrupting the smooth flow of psychic life.”291 From this perspective the 
unconscious is a structure that can be traumatized – and will be – but that does not 
find its origin and structure in trauma. Deleuze, by contrast, considers the 
traumatic event(s) as the spur by which mind constitutes itself. From this 
perspective, trauma is not an accident, it is the condition from which every mind 
emerges. For this reason, “repetition is not a secondary effect or the consequence 
of something going wrong, but expresses the very core of the drives, the fact that 
they are skewed from the start. Put otherwise, repression does not take place in a 
neutral psychic space, disrupting a prior equilibrium or harmony, but intervenes in 
a space that is already distorted or awry.”292  
According to Deleuze, there are three syntheses that are connected with 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle and that are the expression of the temporality of 
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mind: Habitus (present)293, Mnemosyne (past)294, and Thanatos or the death drive 
(transcendental synthesis of time).295 “The passive synthesis of habit is submitted 
to the passive synthesis of memory, which is enabled by the transcendental 
instance of the death instinct, which is nothing other than the guarantee of the 
failure of synthesis.”296 In this way we understand how close Deleuze is to Lacan 
in affirming that it is not possible to trace a linear genesis of mind. “At its earliest 
beginnings what one discovers is not some first cause or positively definable 
primal scene, but a rupture or a gap or, in Deleuze’s vocabulary, pure difference. 
There is a break in the causal chain, a missing link. And the drama of psychic life 
consists in the process of living this break and repeating it, of cracking up in one’s 
own fashion.”297 For the earlier Deleuze, the death drive represents, then, not only 
an important concept in the Freudian itinerary, but the condition of possibility of 
the formation of the mind, its own foundation and the rock upon which it 
continually bumps throughout its existence. 
Only after the encounter with Guattari does Deleuze become reluctant to use 
the death drive to explain the formation of the mind and starts to think of desire as 
productive connections of forces. In Mille Plateaux Deleuze and Guattari assert 
without hesitation: “We are not invoking any kind of death drive. There are no 
internal drives in desire, only assemblages.”298 The death drive, however, is not 
just thrown away, but, in the form of Lacanian jouissance, it becomes the worst 
enemy of Deleuze and Guattari. According to them, the death drive is in fact the 
heart of what they call the third curse of desire. 
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As Deleuze affirms during his course at Vincennes the third curse is the one 
that goes east namely toward right-wing conservatism299. In Mille Plateaux they 
in fact affirm: “La figure la plus récente du prêtre est le psychanalyste avec ses 
trois principes, Plaisir, Mort et Réalité. Sans doute la psychanalyse avait montré 
que le désir n'était pas soumis á la procréation ni même à la génitalité. C'était son 
modernisme. Mais elle gardait l'essentiel, elle avait même trouvé de nouveaux 
moyens pour inscrire dans le désir la loi négative du manque, la règle extérieure 
du plaisir, l'idéal transcendant du fantasme.”300 According to Deleuze and 
Guattari, even if psychoanalysis does not connect desire with a transcendent 
world, it keeps the transcendent separation implicit in the postulation of desire as 
lack. “On voit bien comment ça fait partie du même truc de dire que la jouissance 
ce n'est pas le plaisir, ça fait partie d'une espèce de système, que pour tout 
simplifier, je présenterais comme une conception circulaire du désir où, à la base, 
il y a toujours le postulat de départ.”301 Indeed, since it is accepted that the 
“première soudure désir-manque, dès lors, ça va de soi que le désir est défini en 
fonction d'un champ de transcendance.”302  
According to Deleuze and Guattari, with the Lacanian division between 
pleasure and jouissance, psychoanalysis does nothing but perpetrate the idea of a 
transcendence of desire, although inside the pseudo-immanence of pleasure. 
Jouissance works on two fronts. Although it is connected with pleasure, it is not 
reachable by pleasure. Jouissance is in fact beyond pleasure, in a beyond that, as 
such, is unreachable by pleasure. In this way, psychoanalysis condemns the 
subject on the one hand to the dissatisfaction of pleasure, and on the other hand to 
a tension that leads him beyond pleasure. The same old curse that always 
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imprisons desire still falls on the subject, although with a different form and a 
different name. With jouissance,303 psychoanalysis creates then the third curse or, 
as Deleuze affirms in his course at Vincennes, the third arc of the curse that 
always trapped desire:304  
 
Mais, comme dans toute bonne construction, puisque tout ça c'est de la pure 
construction, c'est pas vrai, c'est faux d'un bout à l'autre, il faut un troisième pour 
boucler le truc, puisque vous avez cette vérité supposée du désir branchée sur une 
transcendance de l'Autre, cette illusion ou ce leurre par lequel le désir rencontre des 
décharges calmantes à l'issue desquelles il disparaît, quitte à reparaître le 
lendemain, il faut bien un troisième arc pour rendre compte de ceci: que même à 
travers ces états de sommeil, de satisfaction, etc. Il faut bien que soit réaffirmé sous 
une forme nouvelle l'irréductibilité du désir aux états de plaisir qui l'ont satisfait 
que en apparence, il soit réaffirmé sur un autre mode: la transcendance. Et cette 
réaffirmation c'est le rapport jouissance impossible-mort. Et du début à la fin, 
c'était la même conception, et quand on nous dit: attention, faut pas confondre le 
désir, le plaisir, la jouissance, évidemment il ne faut pas les confondre puisqu'ils en 
ont besoin pour faire trois arcs d'un même cercle, à savoir les trois malédictions 
portées sur le désir. Les trois malédictions c'est: tu manqueras chaque fois que tu 
désireras, tu n'espéreras que des décharges, tu poursuivras l'impossible jouissance. 
Alors le désir est complètement piégé, il est pris dans un cercle.305 
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All the work that Deleuze and Guattari have done together tries to destroy 
this apparatus, showing that desire “n'est rapporté à aucune transcendance, il n'est 
rapporté à aucun manque, il n'est mesuré à aucun plaisir et il n'est transcendé par 
aucune jouissance, sous la forme ou sous le mythe de l'impossible. Le désir est 
posé comme pur processus”306 of forces and intensities that cross the BwO and 
that only through the BwO can stay free.  
As I have already mentioned, although Deleuze and Guattari give some 
examples of possible BwO, they refer frequently to masochism. The reason is not 
that masochism is a better BwO – no one is better than the others – but that it 
occupies a fundamental place inside psychoanalytic thought. First with Freud who 
not only sees masochism as a fundamental step in sexual development307 but also 
places it at the heart of human sexuality – at least in Bersani’s interpretation.308 
And second with Lacan, who refers to masochism not only as the “cœur du 
problème sur le sujet des perversions existantes”309 but also as the core of desire 
itself since “ce que nous trouvons au fond de l'exploration analytique du désir c'est 
le masochisme.”310 However, the principle enemy that Deleuze and Guattari have 
in mind in Milles Plateaux is no longer Freud, but Lacan. It is in fact Lacan who 
gave a new meaning to jouissance and who, through the Real, put the death drive 
again at the center of the psychoanalytic debate. 
In La logique du fantasme, Lacan argues that desire is inscribed in the 
divided subject through a logic that firmly separates the subject itself from the 
object of desire (objet a). “L'important [explains Lacan] est d'apercevoir qu'ils 
[objects a] ne tiennent cette fonction dans le désir qu'à y être aperçus comme 
solidaires de cette refente (d'y être à la fois inégaux, et conjoignant à la 
disjoindre), de cette refente où le sujet s'apparaît être dyade – soit prend le leurre 
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de sa vérité même. C'est la structure du fantasme notée par nous de la parenthèse 
dont le contenu est à prononcer: S barré poinçon a.”311 According to Lacan, the 
objects of desire are desired only if they are related to a structure that, through a 
bar, keeps them separate from the subject. This structure that combines in the 
separation – and that Lacan call fantasme – is the logic that sustains the relation 
between subject and desire. If Lacan affirms that the core of desire is masochism 
it is because the logic of fantasy to which the subject of desire is structurally 
linked condemns him to the pain of separation: “le sujet se saisit comme 
souffrant, il saisit son expérience d'être vivant comme souffrant, c'est-à-dire 
comme étant sujet du désir.”312 The difference between the masochist and the 
non-masochist, or to use Lacan’s terms, the difference between the pervert and the 
non-pervert, is simply that the former has “affronté de beaucoup plus près à 
l'impasse de l'acte sexuel. Sujet autant que lui bien sûr [the normal one], mais qui 
fait des rets du fantasme l'appareil de conduction par où il dérobe en court-circuit 
une jouissance dont le heu de l'Autre ne le sépare pas moins.”313 This is the reason 
why, according to Lacan, if it is true that “il n'y a pas d'autre entrée pour le sujet 
dans le réel que le fantasme,”314 then it is also true that “le masochisme est le 
majeur de la jouissance que donne le Réel.”315 We will come back to this structure 
in the following chapter, for the moment it is important just to point it out as the 
structure to which Deleuze and Guattari oppose their account of desire. 
From Deleuze and Guattari’s perspective, to show the incompatibility 
between masochism and the fantasme, does not mean only to take masochism 
away from the interpretative meshes of psychoanalysis, but also to destroy the 
entire apparatus on which psychoanalysis builds its account of sexuality. The aim 
of Deleuze and Guattari is not just to “save” desire from lack, pleasure, and 
jouissance – the triptych that forms the “curse of desire” – but also, and at the 
same time, to give the final blow to psychoanalysis. 
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Talking about masochism, Deleuze and Guattari write in Mille Plateaux: 
 
«Maitresse, 1) tu peux me ligoter sur la table, solidement serré, dix á quinze 
minutes, le temps de préparer les instruments; 2) cent coups de fouet au moins, 
quelques minutes d'arrêt; 3) tu commences la couture, tu couds le mou du gland, la 
peau autour de celui-ci au gland l'empêchant de décalotter, tu couds la bourse des 
couilles à la peau des cuisses. Tu cordé les seins, mais un bouton à quatre trous 
solidement sur chaque téton. Tu peux les réunir avec un élastique á boutonnière – 
tu passes à la deuxième phase: 4) tu as le choix soit de me retourner sur la table, 
sur le ventre ligoté, mais les jambes réunies, soit de m'attacher au poteau seul, les 
poignets réunis, les jambes aussi, tout le corps solidement attaché; 5) tu me fouettes 
le dos les fesses les cuisses, cent coups de fouet au moins; 6) tu couds les fesses 
ensemble, toute la mie du cul. Solidement avec du fil double en arrêtant chaque 
point. Si je suis sur la table, tu m'attaches alors au poteau; 7) tu me cravaches les 
fesses cinquante coups; 8) si tu veux corser la torture et exécuter ta menace de la 
dernière fois, tu enfonces dans les fesses les épingles á fond; 9) tu peux alors 
m'attacher sur la chaise, tu me cravaches le seins trente coup et tu enfonces les 
épingles plus petites, si tu veux tu peux les faire rougir au réchaud avant, toutes ou 
quelques-unes. Le ligotage sur la chaise devrait être solide et les poignets dans le 
dos pour faire ressortir la poitrine. Si je n'ai pas parlé des brûlures, c'est que je dois 
passer d'ici quelque temps une visite et c'est long á guérir.» – Ce n'est pas un 
fantasme, c'est un programme: différence essentielle entre l'interprétation 
psychanalytique du fantasme et l'expérimentation anti-psychanalytique du 
programme. Entre le fantasme, interprétation elle-même á interpréter, et le 
programme moteur d'expérimentation. Le CsO, c'est ce qui reste quand on a tout 
ôté. Et ce qu'on ôte, c'est précisément le fantasme, l'ensemble des signifiances et 
des subjectivations. La psychanalyse fait le contraire: elle traduit tout en fantasmes, 
elle monnaie tout en fantasmes, elle garde le fantasme, et par excellence rate le 
réel, parce qu'elle rate le CsO.316 
 
As we can see, Deleuze and Guattari attack psychoanalysis and the logic of 
phantasy that psychoanalysis affirms. From their perspective, masochism does not 
refer at all to a fantasme that orients its acts. On the contrary, masochism is a 
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“program” of creation thanks to which it is possible to establish new relations 
with the parts of the body that, from that moment, stop having predetermined 
functions and become loci of unexpected intensities. The tortures to which the 
masochist submits do not follow a fantasy of humiliation but serve to create a flat 
surface on which he can transport the forces of desire. “On le comprend mal à 
partir de la douleur, c’est d’abord une affaire de CsO; Il se fait coudre par son 
sadique ou sa putain, coudre les yeux, l'anus, l'urètre, les seins, le nez; il se fait 
suspendre pour arrêter l'exercice des organes, dépiauter comme si les organes 
tenaient á la peau, enculer, étouffer, pour que tout soit scellé bien clos.”317 
According to Deleuze and Guattari, the masochist is not an algophile. He does not 
like pain in itself and he does not even use pain to get pleasure. On the contrary he 
follows the intensities of pain only to create a BwO thanks to which he can live in 
the uninterrupted flux of desire without breaking it with the discharge of pleasure:  
 
Soit l'interprétation du masochisme: quand on n'invoque pas la ridicule pulsion de 
mort, on prétend que le masochiste, comme tout le monde, cherche le plaisir, mais 
ne peut y arriver que par des douleurs et des humiliations fantasmatiques qui 
auraient pour fonction d'apaiser ou de conjurer une angoisse profonde. Ce n'est pas 
exact; la souffrance du masochiste est le prix qu'il faut qu'il paie, non pas pour 
parvenir au plaisir, mais pour dénouer le pseudo-lien du désir avec le plaisir 
comme mesure extrinsèque. Le plaisir n'est nullement ce qui ne pouvait être atteint 
que par le détour de la souffrance, mais ce qui doit être retardé au maximum 
comme interrompant le procès continu du désir positif. C'est qu'il y a une joie 
immanente au désir, comme s'il se remplissait de soi-même et de ses 
contemplations, et qui n'implique aucun manque, aucune impossibilité, qui ne se 
mesure pas davantage au plaisir, puisque c'est cette joie qui distribuera les 
intensités de plaisir et les empêchera d'être pénétrées d'angoisse, de honte, dé 
culpabilité. Bref, le masochiste se sert de la souffrance comme d'un moyen pour 
constituer un corps sans organes et dégager un plan de consistance du désir. Qu'il y 
ait d'autres moyens, d'autres procédés que le masochisme, et meilleurs 
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certainement, c'est une autre question; il suffit que ce procédé convienne á 
certains.318 
 
But if any BwO works as well as any other since each produces an intense 
“joy” devoid of anguish, shame, pleasure, or guilt, why do Deleuze and Guattari 
affirm in the end of the paragraph that there are better ways then masochism to 
build a BwO? From what perspective can they judge the value of the masochistic 
BwO? Is it because the tortures to which the masochist submits in order to 
interrupt the functions of his own body are dangerous for his health? But this 
would require judging the BwO of the masochist from an organicist perspective – 
precisely the one that the BwO is meant to eliminate. If this is true then their 
argument wobbles dangerously; and they know that. Indeed, in order to protect 
the BwO from this kind of critique, they explain that it's all a matter of dosage: “la 
prudence est l’art commune”319 to all BwO. But who exactly is supposed to dose 
the intensities of the BwO, who has to learn the art of prudence, who if not the 
subject that the BwO was meant to destroy? In this way, we can see that Deleuze 
and Guattari fall into another paradox, reintroducing the very subject whom the 
BwO aspired to eliminate. Although it is reduced toa bare minimum, this subject 
is nonetheless required to determine whento flow with the forces of desire and 
when, on the contrary, to resist them in order to keep control over itself and its 
political efficacy: “L'organisme, il faut en garder assez pour qu'il se reforme à 
chaque aube; et des petites provisions de signifiance et d'interprétation, il faut en 
garder, même pour les opposer á leur propre système quand les circonstances 
l'exigent, quand les choses, les personnes, même les situations vous y forcent; et 
de petites rations de subjectivité, il faut en garder suffisamment pour pouvoir 
répondre à la réalité dominante.”320  
For Deleuze and Guattari, it is crucial to keep a fine dust of subjectivityin 
order to defend oneself against the threats posed by reality. Now, beyond the fact 
that in this way they fall back into yet another contradiction – since the subject 
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that the BwO disorganizes is also the subject that in the end is invested with the 
power of choosing if it is better to flow with the intensities of desire or to resist 
them – why do Deleuze and Guattari feel the need to emphasize how important it 
is for the subject to maintain control and not abandon itself completely to the 
intensities of the BwO? “Beaucoup sont vaincus dans cette bataille”321 they 
affirm. But defeated by what? What kind of battle is at stake since they are not 
talking about the forces of society but of the intensities liberated by the BwO? 
After invoking the necessity of creating a BwO to resist the constraints of society, 
Deleuze and Guattari now pull back from the full implications of the BwO. They 
affirm in fact “il peut être terrifiant, il peut vous mener à la mort!”322 But why is 
the BwO so dangerous? Why should anyone need to manage its intensities by 
preserving the subjectivity from which it aims to free us? Is it because the forces 
of desire are out of control? Is it because the intensities produced by the BwO do 
not belong to the subject, but to something else, something that he cannot really 
master? Even if Deleuze and Guattari want to deny the drive – and in particular 
the death drive323 – they end up recognizing them in the very form of the BwO. 
Indeed, even if the subject of Mille plateau can play hide and seek with the BwO, 
it must always keep an eye open because the forces that go along with desire – 
and that the BwO lets emerge – have the power to overwhelm the putative 
sovereignty of the subject, leading him to death. 
Despite their program of liberating the forces of desire, a program in which 
the subject and its organism have to get lost in the multiple productions of desire, 
Deleuze and Guattari paradoxically end up claiming the necessity of a return of a 
subject that has to fight against the BwO –against those intensities that he cannot 
control because they are the expression of the drive.  
Masochism is not a choice. Certainly, people can decide if they want, or if 
they do not want, to practice masochism, but they cannot decide whether or not 
pain and humiliation lure them. Obviously, I am not saying that masochism is the 
																																																						
321 Ibid., p. 187. 
322 Ibid., p. 186. 
323 “On invente des autodestructions qui ne se confondent pas avec la pulsion de mort.” Ibid., cit., 
p. 198. 
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"true nature" of a person. There is no a such thing as the “true nature” of a person. 
Using the same argument that Foucault used concerning homosexuality, we can 
say that masochism is nothing more than a historical fiction. Nevertheless, this 
fiction takes the form of a person which embodies certain aspects of masochism, 
making the fiction real. Therefore, when we talk of masochism we should never 
refer to “a mysteriously predetermined and permanently fixed orientation, but to 
the inevitable, unpredictable, and variable process by which desire becomes 
attached to persons.”324 This process is unpredictable and variable because it 
happens differently for each person, but it is also inevitable because no one can 
avoid the encounter with the death drive. As Deleuze himself explained in 
Difference et repetition, the encounter with the death drive is not an accident, but 
it is the very condition of the structure of human desire: 
 
Nous ne voyons donc aucune raison pour poser un instinct de mort qui se 
distinguerait d'Érôs, soit par une différence de nature entre deux forces, soit par une 
différence de rythme ou d'amplitude entre deux mouvements. Dans les deux cas, la 
différence serait déjà donnée, et Thanatos indépendant. Il nous semble, au 
contraire, que Thanatos se confond entièrement avec la désexualisation d'Érôs, 
avec la formation de cette énergie neutre et déplaçable dont parle Freud. Celle-ci ne 
passe pas au service de Thanatos, elle le constitue: il n'y a pas entre Érôs et 
Thanatos une différence analytique, c'est-à-dire déjà donnée, dans une même « 
synthèse » qui les réunirait tous deux ou les ferait alterner. Non pas que la 
différence soit moins grande; au contraire, elle est plus grande, étant synthétique, 
précisément parce que Thanatos signifie une tout autre synthèse du temps qu'Érôs, 
d'autant plus exclusive qu'elle est prélevée sur lui, construite sur ses débris. C'est en 
même temps qu'Érôs reflue sur le moi – que le moi prend sur lui-même les 
déguisements et déplacements qui caractérisaient les objets, pour en faire sa propre 
affection mortelle – que la libido perd tout contenu mnésique, et que le Temps perd 
sa figure circulaire, pour prendre une forme droite impitoyable – et que l'instinct de 
mort apparaît, identique à cette forme pure, énergie désexualisée de cette libido 
narcissique.325 
																																																						
324 L. Bersani, Homos, cit., p. 60. 
325 G. Deleuze, Différence et répétition, cit., pp. 149 and 150. 
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To understand why this encounter leads different people to desire different 
things is impossible, as Deleuze and Guattari recognize. The reason why certain 
people eroticise pain and humiliation is unfathomable. Nevertheless – as the early 
Deleuze understood – what psychoanalysis points out is that if all people have to 
deal with a complicated and often contradictory desire that “s’exprime souvent 
dans les paradoxes insondables d'un plaisir lié à la douleur,”326 it is because, 
beyond each one’s personal modulations, the encounter with the death drive is the 
unavoidable encounter that structures our unconscious. 
Certainly, to believe that masochism solves the paradox of a pleasure 
related to pain with a simple identification would be naïve. For the masochist, 
pain and pleasure are still two different things. Neither banging their head against 
the kitchen shutter nor kicking their toe against the corner of the bed is arousing 
for a masochist. Nobody finds random pain attractive – especially the masochist 
who knows pain so well since he has learned to modulate even the most intense 
nuances of it. The only form of pain that the masochist loves is in fact the one that 
gets routed through his own fantasy, namely through the symbolic structure that 
allows him to eroticize it. Without this structure, pain is terrible. The difference 
between masochism and torture – the one on which the activists of the BDSM 
community programmatically insist – is that the masochist voluntarily submits to 
any kind torture as long as these tortures reproduce his fantasy. This explains the 
importance of the safeword as the way the masochist can stop the play if, for 
some reason, it no longer reproduces the rigid structure of the fantasme. In this 
way, BDSM activists argue, even the worst form of torture has nothing to do with 
“real” violence. 
For these reasons, I agree with Deleuze and Guattari when they affirm that 
the masochist is not simply looking for pain. Pain is not in itself a source of 
pleasure. The relation of pleasure and pain is much more complicated, much more 
sophisticated. Pleasure is never simply the consequence of pain and pain is never 
simply the cause of pleasure. But I cannot follow Deleuze and Guattari when they 
																																																						
326 Ibid., p. 151. 
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affirm that “le masochiste s'est fait un CsO dans de telles conditions que celui-ci 
ne peut plus dès lors être peuplé que par des intensités de douleur, ondes 
dolorifères”327 without problematizing the fact that “les douleurs sont les 
populations, les meutes, les modes du masoroi dans le désert qu'il a fait naitre et 
croitre.”328 It is not sufficient to say that the masochist “cherche un CsO, mais 
d'un tel type qu'il ne pourra être rempli, parcouru que par la douleur, en vertu des 
conditions mêmes où il a été constitué.”329 Who constitutes the intensities of 
BwO? The masochist himself? But then why did he decide to go through all this 
pain if, according to Deleuze and Guatatri, “il y ait d'autres moyens, d'autres 
procédés que le masochisme, et meilleurs certainement?”330 Deleuze and Guattari 
just say “il suffit que ce procédé convienne á certains,” as if it were a choice to be 
masochistic, as if between numerous possibilities someone at a certain point 
decided to pick the masochistic one, as if at the root of desire there was a clear 
political stance. Deleuze and Guattari refuse to acknowledge that masochism is 
not a choice, that the masochist cannot decide what is arousing for him. The 
“intensities” that attract the masochist – as much as the intensities that lead each 
of us in one direction rather than another – do not depend on him but on his 
relation to the the drive that he encounters through the screen of fantasy, on what 
Lacan identifies as the “sinthome” that radically particularizes each subject’s 
access to jouissance. Certainly, not all masochists follow the same fantasy, each 
masochist has his or her own fantasme. But this fantasme it is not something that 
can be changed at will by the subject; it has, instead, a rigid structure that 
connects the subject to the drives. 
If Deleuze and Guattari insist so much on the supposed “program” of the 
masochist instead of acknowledging the structure of its “fantasy,” it is because a 
program is manageable and can be changed by the subject. Insofar as the political 
aim of Mille plateaux is to use the BwO to follow the becoming multiple of desire 
– a becoming that allows escape from the constraints imposed by society –the 
																																																						
327 G. Deleuze and F. Guattari, Mille plateaux, cit., p. 188. 
328 Ibid., p. 188. 
329 Ibid., p. 188. 
330 Ibid., p. 192. 
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BwO of the masochist must be free and in perpetual movement. But as I have 
shown, even this BwO follows intensities that do not depend on the subject. 
Unfortunately for Deleuze and Guattari, the movement of becoming that, 
according to them, bears desire, has to stop before the death drive. 
Prior to his encounter with Guattari, when Deleuze was still “a highly elitist 
author, indifferent toward politics”331 and did not have feel compelled to present 
masochism as a political choice, he offered a more lucid image of the fantasme 
masochiste, presenting the masochist as the great prisoner of his own passion, the 
one unable to escape from the fantastic framework of his perversions. This was 
not, for Deleuze, because the masochist is unable control himself, but because, 
like everyone, he eroticizes the world through the screen of his own fantasy. 
If one of the principal aims of Le froid et le cruel is to break the Freudian 
dyad sado-masochism, it is because Deleuze there wants to underline not only the 
peculiarity of masochism and sadism, but also to show the incommunicability 
between their fantastic frameworks. If Deleuze describes Sacher-Masoch as the 
great puppet master, the one able to transform the woman into a doll, into an 
obedient mistress who acts perfectly the role that she is assigned, it is not because 
he wants to reverse the dialectical sovereignty informing the couple – reaffirming 
in this way their specular union. On the contrary, he wants to divide masochism 
from sadism, showing how much le fantasme masochiste and le fantasme sadique 
are different and fixed in an unchanging framework where they cannot 
communicate. Deleuze writes: “the woman torturer of masochism cannot be 
sadistic precisely because she is in the masochistic situation, she is an integral part 
of it, a realization of the masochistic fantasy. She belongs in the masochistic 
world, not in the sense that she has the same tastes as her victim, but because her 
‘sadism’ is of a kind never found in the sadist; it is as it were the double or the 
reflection of masochism.”332  The woman and her personal tastes and preferences 
are not taken into account at all, even if she is supposed to be the dominant partner 
of the couple. She is just the product of masochism, the reification of a fantasy, 
																																																						
331 S. Zizek, Organs without bodies, Deleuze and Consequences, Routledge, New York and 
London 2004, p. 20. 
332 G. Deleuze, Masochism: Coldness and Cruelty, cit., p. 41. 
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the puppet that exists only for the time of her performance.  
The intrinsic problem in Deleuze and Guattari’s joint account of masochism 
is that they refuse to acknowledge what Deleuze himself perfectly understood in 
Le froid et le cruel, namely that “the art of masochism is the art of fantasy”333 and 
that this fantasy does not depend on the subject since it is the expression of the 
death drive. Deleuze and Guattari pretend to transform something that is beyond 
control into something manageable and even useful for the subject. But the drives, 
as the forces that sustain and create our sexual fantasies and that push us in 
unpredictable ways toward often undesired places, are not under control. The 
drives speak the language of the unconscious and although they are the most 
intimate part of the subject, they exert a control over him he can never exert over 
them.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																																						
333 G. Deleuze, Masochism: Coldness and Cruelty, cit., p. 66. 
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CHAPTER 4 
MASOCHISM 
 
 
“Mentre che l’uno spirto questo mi disse, 
l’altro piangëa; sì che di pietade 
io venni men così com’io morisse. 
E caddi come corpo morto cade.” 
 
Dante 
 
 
 
Human history is characterized by a radical and incomprehensible lust for 
violence. Violence has held the hand of humanity since its birth, forming with it 
so close a symbiosis as to suggest that the two cannot live apart. Violence and 
humanity are in fact bound together so tightly that it is impossible to know which 
creates the other. Every form of humanity shows a deep need to regulate violence, 
often by institutionalizing it. The ritual of σπαραγµός in ancient Greece334, the 
torture of a Hundred Pieces in China335, the Conquistadores of the New World336, 
Auschwitz337, and Guantanamo Bay338 are just some examples of how violence 
																																																						
334 See K. Kerényi, Dionysos: Urbild des unzerstörbaren Lebens. 
335 See G. Bataille, Les larmes d’Eros. 
336 See T. Todorov, La Conquête de l’Amérique: La question de l’autre. 
337 See T. W. Adorno, Minima Moralia. Reflexionen aus dem beschädigten Leben. 
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has been and continues to be ritualized historically and globally.  
The intention of this final chapter is first to investigate the intimate 
connection between violence and humanity through the concept of effervescence 
and then, by turning to the concept of jouissance, to show the masochistic ground 
of human sexuality. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																																																																																																																																					
338 See G. Agamben, Stato di eccezione. 
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4.1 
EFFERVESCENCE 
 
 
 
An experiment conducted by Philip Zimbardo at Stanford University has 
shown that regardless of origins or cultural background, any individual in a given 
situation can produce and take pleasure in violence and suffering. Zimbardo's 
study, called The Stanford Prison Experiment339, was conducted in 1971 by a 
team of researchers who selected 24 young men deemed to be the most 
psychologically stable and healthy to impersonate the role of either guards or 
prisoners. What Zimbardo wished to study were the psychological reactions of the 
people in charge as well as the psychological reactions of the people under their 
control. The astonishing results of the experiment showed not only that the 
torturers340 took pleasure in their role but also that the victims too seemed to 
develop an attachment to their role, as if they were enjoying it. Especially peculiar 
is the episode in which Zimbardo, noticing that one of the prisoners was suffering 
enormous mental distress, “rushed to check on him. What he found was 819 [the 
number assigned to the this particular “prisoner”] hunched over into a quivering 
mass, hysterical. He put his arms around him trying to comfort him, assuring him 
																																																						
339 See P. Zimbardo, The Lucifer Effect: Understanding How Good People Turn Evil. 
340 “Hellmann moves back to center stage: ‘This time, sing it.’ As the prisoners start to count off 
again, he interrupts. ‘Didn't I say that you had to sing? Maybe you gentlemen have those stocking 
caps too tight around your head and you can't hear me too well.’ He is becoming more creative in 
control techniques and dialogue. He turns on Prisoner 1037 for singing his number off key and 
demands twenty jumping jacks. After he finishes, Hellmann adds, ‘Would you do ten more for 
me? And don't make that thing rattle so much this time.’ Because there is no way to do jumping 
jacks without the ankle chain making noise, the commands are becoming arbitrary, but the guards 
are beginning to take pleasure in giving commands and forcing the prisoners to execute them.” P. 
Zimbardo, The Lucifer Effect: Understanding How Good People Turn Evil, Random House, New 
York, 2007, p. 49. Italics mine. 
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that he will be all right once he has left and gone home. To his surprise, he refused 
to leave with him to see a doctor and then go home. ‘No, I can't leave. I have to go 
back in there,’ he insisted through his tears.”341 Although the prisoners were 
clearly suffering in their situation and they were well aware of that, they seemed 
strangely attached to the situation. 
Zimbardo thought it was because of the money that they were earning every 
day of the experiment. Indeed, although the subjects were not indigent, they were 
still students for whom money was always a significant motivation. In order to 
better understand this possibility, Zimbardo proposed to let them “forfeit their pay 
in exchange for parole.”342 The prisoners accepted it, showing in this way “that 
money was less important than their freedom,” but then, adds Zimbardo, “each 
prisoner passively submitted to the system, holding out his hands to be 
handcuffed, submitting to the bag being put back over his head, accepting the 
chain on his leg, and, like sheep, following the guard back down to that dreadful 
prison basement.”343 This lead Zimbardo to wonder “why did none of them say: 
‘Since I do not want your money, I am free to quit this experiment and demand to 
be released now.’ We would have had to obey their request and terminate them at 
that moment. Yet none did.”344 According to Zimbardo, the experimental subjects 
assumed the role so deeply, they were no longer able to discern the reality from 
the simulation. They identified themselves as real prisoners. Indeed, “if they were 
prisoners, only the Parole Board had the power to release them, but if they were, 
as indeed they were, experimental subjects, each of the students always held the 
power to stay or quit at any time. It was apparent, observed Zimbardo, that a 
mental switch had been thrown in their minds, from ‘now I am a paid 
experimental volunteer with full civil rights’ to ‘now I am a helpless prisoner at 
the mercy of an unjust authoritarian system.’”345 
The experiment that was planned to last for two weeks was abruptly 
																																																						
341 Ibid., p. 107. 
342 Ibid., p. 140. 
343 Ibid., p. 141. 
344 Ibid., p. 141. 
345 Ibid., p. 141. 
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interrupted after only six days because of the uncontrolled violence that was 
spreading. Indeed, all the subjects involved – the guards as well as the prisoners – 
were so immersed in the simulation that they were unable to stop the play. 
Zimbardo himself later said that he was so involved that he failed to recognize 
how the situation was degenerating. It was Christina Maslach – a graduate student 
close to Zimbardo but actually not involved in the experiment and for this reason 
not absorbed by the situation – who asked him to stop the experiment 
immediately. Only in this way did Zimbardo realize that the seductiveness of 
violence had clouded his  moral sensibility as well as that of the participants, 
preventing them from seeing clearly what was going on.  
In The Lucifer Effect: Understanding How Good People Turn Evil, the book 
in which he draws his conclusions from the experiment, Zimbardo points out: the 
“forces [enacted by the experiment] that exist in many common behavioral 
contexts are more likely to distort our usual good nature by pushing us toward 
engaging in deviant, destructive, or evil behavior when the settings are new and 
unfamiliar. When embedded in them, our habitual ways of thinking, feeling, and 
acting no longer function to sustain the moral compass that has guided us reliably 
in the past.”346 The experiment proved in the end that the simulation produced a 
surplus of enjoyment that disabled the conscience of the participants and trapped 
them in a spiral of violence and pleasure. Unable to stop, they reproduced the 
same plot every day with an increasing level of violence, degradation and 
humiliation as well as pleasure. 
As Durkheim showed with his work Les formes élémentaires de la vie 
religieuse347, when people are doing something together – for instance when they 
manage to kill an animal that will allow them to survive – it can happen that an 
enormous joy takes possession of them and they start to act in an unusual way 
while sharing this powerful feeling:  
 
																																																						
346 Ibid., p. VII. Italics mine. 
347 E. Durkheim, Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse: Le système totémique en Australie, 
Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1990. 
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Le seul fait de l’agglomération agit comme un excitant exceptionnellement 
puissant. Une fois les individus assemblés il se dégage de leur rapprochement une 
sorte d’électricité qui les transporte vite à un degré extraordinaire d’exaltation. 
Chaque sentiment exprimé vient retentir, sans résistance, dans toutes ces 
consciences largement ouvertes aux impressions extérieures : chacune d’elles fait 
écho aux autres et réciproquement. L’impulsion initiale va ainsi s’amplifiant à 
mesure qu’elle se répercute, comme une avalanche grossit à mesure qu’elle avance. 
Et comme des passions aussi vives et aussi affranchies de tout contrôle ne peuvent 
pas ne pas se répandre au dehors, ce ne sont, de toutes parts, que gestes violents, 
que cris, véritables hurlements, bruits assourdissants de toute sorte qui contribuent 
encore à intensifier l’état qu’ils manifestent.348 
 
Durkheim calls this feeling effervescence and describes it as an internal 
force that erases one's self-control and will, a sort of drug that lets people act like 
euphoric animals in ecstasy.  
Although it seems at first that these situations are dangerous because they 
can result in uncontrolled violence between people,349 what really happens, 
according to Durkheim, is that these moments of common madness, far from 
dividing people, blend them together in a common feeling of belonging that 
creates the first division between sacred and profane350 and consequently the 
																																																						
348 E. Durkheim, Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse: Le système totémique en Australie, 
cit., pp. 308 and 309. 
349 “L'effervescence devient souvent telle qu'elle entraîne à des actes inouïs. Les passions 
déchaînées sont d’une telle impétuosité qu’elles ne se laissent contenir par rien.” Ibid., p. 309. 
350 “Parvenu à cet état d’exaltation, l’homme ne se connaisse plus. Se sentant dominé, entraîné 
par une sorte de pouvoir extérieur qui le fait penser et agir autrement qu’en temps normal, il a 
naturellement l’impression de n’être plus lui-même. Il lui semble être devenu un être nouveau: les 
décorations dont il s’affuble, les sortes de masques dont il se recouvre le visage figurent 
matériellement cette transformation intérieure, plus encore qu’ils ne contribuent à la déterminer. 
Et comme, au même moment, tous ses compagnons se sentent transfigurés de la même manière et 
traduisent leur sentiment par leurs cris, leurs gestes, leur attitude, tout se passe comme s’il était 
réellement transporté dans un monde spécial, entièrement différent de celui où il vit d’ordinaire, 
dans un milieu tout peuplé de forces exceptionnellement intenses, qui l’envahissent et le 
métamorphosent. Comment des expériences comme celles-là, surtout quand elles se répètent 
chaque jour pendant des semaines, ne lui laisseraient-elles pas la conviction qu'il existe 
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appearance of the first archaic societies symbolized by the Totem with which the 
group identifies itself.351 Analyzing Australian aboriginal societies, which,  
according to Durkheim, are the most archaic form of societies352 and, for this 
reason, the most useful to understand the origin of religion,353 he concluded that 
																																																																																																																																																					
effectivement deux mondes hétérogènes et incomparables entre eux ? L’un est celui où il traîne 
languissamment sa vie quotidienne; au contraire, il ne peut pénétrer dans l’autre sans entrer 
aussitôt en rapports avec des puissances extraordinaires qui le galvanisent jusqu’à la frénésie. Le 
premier est le monde profane, le second, celui des choses sacrées.” Ibid., cit., p. 312. 
351 “Puisque la force religieuse n’est autre chose que la force collective et anonyme du clan, et 
puisque celle-ci n’est représentable aux esprits que sous la forme du totem, l’emblème totémique 
est comme le corps visible du dieu. C’est donc de lui que paraissent émaner les actions, ou 
bienfaisantes ou redoutées, que le culte a pour objet de provoquer ou de prévenir; par suite, c’est 
tout spécialement à lui que s’adressent les rites. Ainsi s’explique que, dans la série des choses 
sacrées, il occupe le premier rang.” Ibid., pp. 316 and 317. 
352 “Nous avons l’assurance que cette religion est la plus primitive qui soit actuellement 
observable, et même, selon toute vraisemblance, qui ait jamais existé. Elle est, en effet, inséparable 
de l’organisation sociale à base dedans. Non seulement, comme nous l’avons montré, on ne peut la 
définir qu’en fonction de cette dernière, mais il ne semble pas que le dan, sous la forme qu’il a 
dans un très grand nombre de sociétés australiennes, ait pu exister sans le totem. Car les membres 
d’un même dan ne sont unis les uns aux autres ni par la communauté de l’habitat ni par celle du 
sang, puisqu’ils ne sont pas nécessairement consanguins et qu’ils sont souvent dispersés sur des 
points différents du territoire tribal. Leur unité vient donc uniquement de ce qu’ils ont un même 
nom et un même emblème, de ce qu’ils croient soutenir les mêmes rapports avec les mêmes 
catégories de choses, de ce qu’ils pratiquent les mêmes rites, c’est-à-dire en définitive de ce qu’ils 
communient dans le même culte totémique. Ainsi le totémisme et le clan, tant, du moins, que ce 
dernier ne se confond pas avec le groupe local, s’impliquent mutuellement. Or l’organisation à 
base de clans est la plus simple que nous connaissions. Bile existe, en effet, avec tous ses éléments 
essentiels, dès que la société comprend deux clans primaires ; par suite, il ne saurait y en avoir de 
plus rudimentaire, tant qu’on n'aura pas découvert de sociétés réduites à un seul clan, et jusqu’à 
présent, nous ne croyons pas qu’on en ait trouvé de traces. Une religion aussi étroitement solidaire 
du système social qui dépasse tous les autres en simplicité peut être regardée comme la plus 
élémentaire qu’il nous soit donné de connaître. Si donc nous parvenons à trouver les origines des 
croyances qui viennent d'être analysées, nous avons des chances de découvrir du même coup les 
causes qui firent éclore le sentiment religieux dans l’humanité.” Ibid., pp. 238 and 239. 
353 “Nous nous proposons de limiter notre recherche aux sociétés australiennes. Elles remplissent 
toutes les conditions qui viennent d'être énumérées. Elles sont parfaitement homogènes; bien 
qu’on puisse discerner entre elles des variétés, elles ressortissent à un même type. L'homogénéité 
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what welds people together in the primitive religious communities is not the 
feeling that animated the Aristotelian ζῷον πολιτικόν,354 but this sort of 
experience.355 “C’est […] dans ces milieux sociaux effervescents et de cette 
effervescence même que paraît être née l’idée religieuse.”356 For Durkheim, social 
conformism, far from being the original cause of society, appears when a society 
has already full-formed a rigid and complex structure of ritual and symbols, 
namely when people are called to participate again, all together, in the ritual that 
reminds them of and renews the common feeling of belonging that characterized 
effervescence. Durkheim also maintains that this common feeling is the reason 
																																																																																																																																																					
en est même si grande que les cadres de l’organisation sociale non seulement sont les mêmes, mais 
sont désignés par des noms ou identiques ou équivalents dans une multitude de tribus, parfois très 
distantes les unes des autres. D’un autre côté, le totémisme australien est celui sur lequel nous 
avons les documents les plus complets. Enfin, ce que nous nous proposons avant tout d'étudier 
dans ce travail, c'est la religion la plus primitive et la plus simple qu'il soit possible d’atteindre. Il 
est donc naturel que, pour la découvrir, nous nous adressions à des sociétés aussi rapprochées que 
possible des origines de l’évolution ; c’est là évidemment que nous avons le plus de chances de la 
rencontrer et de la bien observer. Or, il n’est pas de sociétés qui présentent ce caractère à un plus 
haut degré que les tribus australiennes. Non seulement leur technique est très rudimentaire, – la 
maison et même la hutte y sont encore ignorées – mais leur organisation est la plus primitive et la 
plus simple qui soit connue; c’est celle que nous avons appelée ailleurs organisation à base de 
clans.” Ibid., pp. 135 and 136.  
354 Aristotle, Politics, 1, 2, 1253a. 
355 “si la vie collective, quand elle atteint un certain degré d’intensité, donne l’éveil à la pensée 
religieuse, c’est parce qu’elle détermine un état d’effervescence qui change les conditions de 
l’activité psychique. Les énergies vitales sont surexcitées, les passions plus vives, les sensations 
plus fortes ; il en est même qui ne se produisent qu’à ce moment. L’homme ne se reconnaît pas ; il 
se sent comme transformé et, par suite, il transforme le milieu qui l’entoure. Pour se rendre compte 
des impressions très particulières qu’il ressent, il prête aux choses avec lesquelles il est le plus 
directement en rapport des propriétés qu'elles n'ont pas, des pouvoirs exceptionnels, des vertus que 
ne possèdent pas les objets de l’expérience vulgaire. En un mot, au monde réel où s’écoule sa vie 
profane il en superpose un autre qui, en un sens, n’existe que dans sa pensée, mais auquel il 
attribue, par rapport au premier, une sorte de dignité plus haute. C'est donc, à ce double titre, un 
monde idéal.” E. Durkheim, Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse: Le système totémique en 
Australie, cit., p. 603. 
356 Ibid., p. 313. 
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why every form of society presents a complex structure of rituals:357 their deep 
motivation is in fact to re-enact the effervescence in a ceremony that, by imitating 
the first moment of effervescence, renews the social cohesion that was generated 
by it.  
Responding to this analysis, Girard affirms the concept of effervescence and 
its cohesive power, but criticizes Durkheim for assuming that this overwhelming 
feeling of common euphoria may simply run out, leaving people in a common 
peace. For Girard, once people succumb to this overwhelming and relentless force 
they can do nothing but enact a series of blood feuds, of people seeking revenge 
on one another. According to Girard, the only possibility of escaping such endless 
massacre is to channel the force of effervescence against one single person who – 
by virtue of his social queerness358 – is alien to the others and whom no one, 
therefore, will be interested in avenging:  
 
C’est l’unité d’une communauté qui s’affirme dans l’acte sacrificiel et comme 
unité surgit au paroxysme de la division, au moment où la communauté se prétend 
déchiré par la discorde mimétique, vouée à la circularité interminable des 
																																																						
357 “la vie sociale, sous tous ses aspects et à tous les moments de son histoire, n’est possible que 
grâce à un vaste symbolisme.” Ibid., p. 331. 
358 “If we look at the extremely wide spectrum of human victims sacrificed by various societies, 
the list seems heterogeneous, to say the least. It includes prisoners of war, slaves, small children, 
unmarried adolescents, and the handicapped; it ranges from the very dregs of society, such as the 
Greek pharmakos, to the king himself. Is it possible to detect a unifying factor in this disparate 
group? We notice at first glance beings who are either outside or on the fringes of society: 
prisoners of war, slaves, pharmakos. In many primitive societies children who have not vet 
undergone the rites of initiation have no proper place in the community; their rights and duties are 
almost nonexistent. What we are dealing with, therefore, are exterior or marginal individuals, 
incapable of establishing or sharing the social bonds that link the rest of the inhabitants. Their 
status as foreigners or enemies, their servile condition, or simply their age prevents these future 
victims from fully integrating themselves into the community. But what about the king? Is he not 
at the very heart of the community? Undoubtedly—but it is precisely his position at the center that 
serves to isolate him from his fellow men, to render him casteless. He escapes from society, so to 
speak, via the roof, just as the pharmakos escapes through the cellar.” R. Girard, Violence and the 
Sacred, The John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1989, p. 12. 
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représailles vengeresses. A l’opposition de chacun contre chacun succède 
brusquement l’opposition de tous contre un. A la multiplicité chaotique des conflits 
particuliers succède d’un seul coup la complicité d’un antagonisme unique: tous la 
communauté d’un côté et de l’autre la victime. On comprend sans peine en quoi 
consiste cette résolution sacrificielle; la communauté se retrouve tout entière 
solidaire, au dépens d’une victime non seulement incapable de se défendre, mais 
totalement impuissante à susciter la vengeance ; sa mise à mal ne saurait provoquer 
de nouveaux troubles et faire rebondir la crise puisqu’elle unit tout le monde contre 
elle. Le sacrifice n’est qu’une violence de plus, une violence qui s’ajoute à d’autres 
violences. Mais c’est la dernière violence, c’est le dernier mot de la violence.359 
 
When the butchers have torn him apart, they feel so relieved and purified 
from their violent act that they enter into a state of catharsis and raise the victim to 
divinity.360 According to Girard, this original act of effervescence that restores 
social coherence to the group by uniting against the one, is the very origin of 
religion. This is why Girard maintains that “le sacré c’est la violence.”361 From 
this spring the rituality of the sacrifice whose function “is to quell violence within 
the community and to prevent conflicts from erupting:”362 
 
																																																						
359 R. Girard, Des choses caché depuis la fondation du monde, recherches avec J.M. Oughourlian 
and G. Lefort, Grasset, Paris, 1974, p. 33. 
360 “La communauté assouvit sa rage contre cette victime arbitraire, sans la conviction absolue 
qu’elle a trouvé la cause unique de son mal, elle se trouve ensuite privé d’adversaire, purifiée de 
toute hostilité à l’égard de ceux contre qui, un instant plus tôt, elle manifestait une rage extrême. 
Le retour au calme parait confirmer la responsabilité de cette victime dans les troubles mimétiques 
qui ont agité la communauté. La communauté se perçoit comme parfaitement passive face à sa 
propre victime qui apparait, au contraire, comme le seul agent responsable de l’affaire. Il suffit de 
comprendre que l’inversion de rapport entre la victime et la communauté se perpétue dans la 
résolution de la crise pour comprendre pourquoi cette victime passa pour sacrée. Elle passe pour 
responsable de retour au calme aussi bien que des désordres qui le précèdent. Elle passe pour 
manipulatrice même de sa propre mort.” Ibid., p. 35 and 36. 
361 Ibid., p. 41. 
362 R. Girard, Violence and the Sacred, cit., p. 14. 
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The community is both attracted and repelled by its own origins. It feels the 
constant need to re-experience them, albeit in veiled and transfigured form. By 
means of rites the community manages to cajole and somewhat subdue the forces 
of destruction. But the true nature and real function of these forces will always 
elude its grasp, precisely because the source of the evil is the community itself. The 
only way in which the ritualistic imagination can succeed in its self-appointed task 
– a task both painstaking and elusive – is by allowing violence a certain amount of 
free play, as in the original instance, but not too much; that is, by exercising its 
memory of the collective expulsion on carefully designated objects and within a 
rigorous framework.363 
 
From this analysis, humanity appears to be linked to violence not simply 
because of its animal past, but especially because of its religious and cultural 
development. Human society appears as something that, in order to emerge and 
flourish, needs violence. Instead of existing only as a means of survival or 
protection, violence becomes the founding act of the human community itself.  
The theoretical perspective that Girard proposes – namely that violence 
creates the symbolic order of the common life – necessitates hypostatizing the 
concept of violence, making it a sort of degree zero of civilization, a kind of 
καιρός, from which the beginning of humanity is possible. Unlike Girard, I have 
hard time according violence any archetypical status that can explain the origin of 
culture just as I resist hypostatizing any instance as the foundational principle of 
reality. Reality is always beyond our categories of understanding and is always 
too stratified and complex to be reduced to a single concept. Nevertheless, Girard 
makes an important point in showing that violence is neither simply a side effect 
of war nor merely a consequence of people’s urge to dominate and defeat, but 
something more radical, something that belongs to humanity and that can show up 
as a relentless force inseparable from a disorienting pleasure.  
The problem with Girard’s account is that he considers violence as 
something that produces pleasure only if it is perpetrated in the outside of the 
subject and against someone else. In this way, he can show the positive and 
																																																						
363 Ibid., p. 99. 
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productive side of violence while ignoring, or pretending to ignore, its most 
insidious aspect. Girard presents violence as a sort of dispositif – to use the 
Foucauldian expression – that blends people together, hiding in this way the 
antisocial side of violence, the one that takes pleasure from loss and self-defeat. 
Violence in fact produces pleasure, not only in the form of domination and control 
that brings people together – effervescence – but also in the loss of self – 
jouissance –the loss of that sociability that is the crux of any general theory of 
society. The notion of the death drive, developed by Freud364 and further 
elaborated by Lacan with reference to jouissance, shows that there is something in 
human nature that works against its flourishing and drives the individual through 
the dispersion of the self in a repetition of enjoyment that is unable to produce 
anything other than enjoyment. As Lacan says in the Seminar XX: “La jouissance, 
c’est ce qui ne sert à rien.”365 Jouissance in fact has no purpose but it is a 
compulsory repetition of a useless pleasure similar to pain that conduces to a 
dispersion of the self that is incompatible with the sociability that Girard gets 
from violence.  
The limitation of theorists like Girard is that they consider the human being 
as a fixed entity always looking for wellbeing, an entity without negativity and 
devoid of an unconscious. But after the psychoanalysis of Freud, Lacan, 
Laplanche, and the antisocial queer theorists, every theory that does not consider 
the elusive instances of the unconscious ignores a fundamental aspect of the 
subject. What is important in the psychoanalytic tradition int his regard is its 
theorization of the death drive, a theorization that radically challenges every 
theory that tries to understand the human as an entity without negativity, a sort of 
																																																						
364 As we read in the first pages of Beyond the Pleasure Principle, the person who first has this 
radiant insight was not Freud but Sabine Spielrein: “A considerable portion of these speculations 
have been anticipated by Sabina Spielrein (1912) in an instructive and interesting paper which, 
however, is unfortunately not entirely clear to me. She there describes the sadistic components of 
the sexual instinct as 'destructive'.” S. Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Norton & Company, 
New York and London, 1961, p. 49. 
365 “Jouissance is what serves no purpose” J. Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: On Feminine 
Sexuality, the Limits of Love and Knowledge, W. W. Norton & Company, New York, 1988, p. 10. 
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animal always seeking wellness. 366 As Leo Bersani argued, the death drive us to 
understand that pain can afford the pleasure of self-defeat, the pleasure of being 
overwhelmed by unconscious drives or of overcoming or even humbling the 
subject’s presumption of sovereignty. Indeed, through his careful analysis of the 
work of Freud, Bersani argued in The Freudian Body that “sexuality is a tautology 
of masochism.”367  
The death drive as the antisocial, anti-economical, and anti-symbolic 
insistence of the unconscious erupts from within the Symbolic to checkmate every 
theory that seeks to understand the human condition without considering its 
problematic link to the overwhelming force of the drives. As we will see in the 
following pages, when Lacan affirms that “There is no sexual encounter”368, he 
means that every sexual encounter is a manque à etre, an unbearable event that 
needs symbolization in order to be sublimated into a bearable event. By virtue of 
symbolization we can experience sex without being overwhelmed, but this does 
not mean that its threat has been completely dissipated by the Symbolic. The force 
of the Real continues to insist in the form of the drives. 
If the critique of the phenomenological approach and the analysis of the 
Silence of the Lambs in the first chapter led us to understand that the structural 
division that characterizes every human being prevents any kind of separation 
between the subject and the death drive, and if the critique of Foucault’s account 
of pleasure(s) and of Deleuze and Guattari’s account of desire in the second and 
third chapters led us to understand that neither pleasure nor desire can be used to 
separate the death drive from masochism, the critique that unveils the jouissance 
hidden behind the effervescence theorized by Durkheim and reformulated by 
Girard finally allows us to close the circle, showing that masochism – far more 
than a sexual peculiarity – is the root of sexuality itself and for this reason cannot 
																																																						
366 “Psychoanalysis is an unprecedented attempt to give a theoretical account of precisely those 
forces which obstruct, undermine, play havoc with theoretical accounts themselves.” L. Bersani, 
The Freudian Body: Psychoanalysis and Art, Columbia University Press, New York, 1986, p. 4. 
367 Ibid. p. 39. 
368 J. Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: On Feminine Sexuality, the Limits of Love and 
Knowledge, cit., p. 30. 
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be separated from the subject. In the following pages then, rather than base my 
argument on Girard’s conclusion, I will take into account his premises and, 
broadening his perspective with the help of Lacan’s concept of jouissance, I will 
show the intimate bond between eroticism and death that masochism exposes. 
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4.2 
JOUISSANCE 
 
 
 
As we have seen, according to Lacan, everything we do as human beings is 
a product of the Symbolic. We are humans because we are born in an already 
made structure of meaning – the Metonymic Chain of Signifiers – in  which every 
human being becomes a link.369 The subject is in fact a signifier that is structurally 
connected with the other signifiers, forming all together the fabric of reality. If we 
can give meaning to things and then communicate this meaning to each other it is 
because, paraphrasing Shakespeare, we are such stuff as the Symbolic is made on: 
or, rather, we are constructed as subjects from the stuff of the Symbolic as it 
colonizes the animal materiality that we were. Nevertheless, as I have shown in 
the first chapter, there is something in human nature that exceeds the Symbolic, 
something that naturally escapes from the meshes of rationality that characterize 
the Symbolic itself, something that for this reason the Symbolic cannot articulate 
– the Real.  Since it is “le domaine de ce qui subsiste hors de la symbolisation,”370 
the Real cannot be understood by rational thinking, but only encountered in the 
overwhelming force of the drives. The drives are that which reveal the subject’s 
implication in the Real and the source of the jouissance of which the subject 
prefers to know nothing. As Lacan affirms in L’éthique de la psychanalyse: 
“problème de la jouissance, en tant qu'elle se présente comme enfouie dans un 
champ central, avec des caractères d'inaccessibilité, d'obscurité et d'opacité, dans 
un champ cerné d'une barrière qui en rend l'accès au sujet plus que difficile, 
																																																						
369 “Notre définition du signifiant (il n'y en a pas d'autre) est: un signifiant, c'est ce qui représente 
le sujet pout un autre signifiant. Ce signifiant sera donc le signifiant pour quoi tous les autres 
signifiants représentent le sujet : c'est dire que faute de ce signifiant, tous les autres ne 
représenteraient rien. Puisque rien n'est représenté que pour.” J. Lacan, Subversion du sujet et 
dialectique du désir, in Ecrits, Editions de Seuil, Paris, 1966, p. 819. 
370 J. Lacan, Réponse au commentaire de Jean Hyppolite, in Ecrits, cit., p. 388. 
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inaccessible peut-être pour autant que la jouissance se présente non purement et 
simplement comme la satisfaction d'un besoin, mais comme la satisfaction d'une 
pulsion.”371 Jouissance is in fact the reaction of the subject to the Real, it is the 
fold that assumes his unwitting return to what characterizes his structural division. 
This return however, although endless and inevitable, cannot be fully 
accomplished. The union with the Real is made impossible by the Law of the 
Other inscribed in the subject itself and jouissance is there to prove it. If, 
according to Lacan, jouissance is what takes the place of the impossible, it is not 
because it does not exist but because it is located at the limit of humanity beyond 
which the subject – as living body that thinks – cannot enter. In Subversion du 
sujet et dialectique du désir Lacan writes: 
 
Ce à quoi il faut se tenir, c'est que la jouissance est interdite à qui parle comme tel, 
ou encore qu'elle ne puisse être dite qu'entre les lignes pour quiconque est sujet de 
la Loi, puisque la Loi se fonde de cette interdiction même. La loi en effet 
commanderait-elle: Jouis, que le sujet ne pourrait y répondre que par un: J'ouïs, où 
la jouissance ne serait plus que sous-entendue. Mais ce n'est pas la Loi elle-même 
qui barre l'accès du sujet à la jouissance, seulement fait-elle d'une barrière presque 
naturelle un sujet barré. Car c'est le plaisir qui apporte à la jouissance ses limites, le 
plaisir comme liaison de la vie, incohérente, jusqu'à ce qu'une autre, et elle non 
contestable, interdiction s'élève de cette régulation découverte par Freud comme 
processus primaire et pertinente loi du plaisir.372 
 
According to Lacan, pleasure serves as a limit or barrier to jouissance. 
Indeed, although it is always perceived by the subject as an irresistible force, 
jouissance is never experienced as pleasurable but always as painful and 
disagreeable.373 This is the reason why the subject rejects it. If in fact “pain is the 
																																																						
371 J. Lacan, Le Séminaire : Livre VII, L’éthique de la psychanalyse, 1959-1960, cit., pp. 247 and 
248. Italics mine. 
372 J. Lacan, Subversion du sujet et dialectique du désir, in Ecrits, cit., p. 821 
373 As the expression of the death drive, jouissance is in fact structurally located beyond the 
pleasure principle. 
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organism’s protection against self-dissolution”374, it appears clear that the body 
tries nothing but to escape from jouissance.375 According to Lacan, the only case 
in which the body endures the pain of jouissance without escaping from it is when 
pain is a structural part of the subject’s fantasme. As Lacan underlines in “Kant 
avec Sade”: “Le plaisir donc, de la volonté là-bas rival qui stimule, n'est plus ici 
que complice défaillant. Dans le temps même de la jouissance, il serait tout 
simplement hors de jeu, si le fantasme n'intervenait pour le soutenir de la discorde 
même où il succombe.”376 We will come back on the structure of the fantasme in a 
minute, but first we have to point out that pleasure is not the only resistance to the 
force of jouissance. According to Lacan, desire also works against it. In 
Subversion du sujet et dialectique du désir, he affirms that “le désir est une 
défense, défense d'outre-passer une limite dans la jouissance.”377 But why is 
desire a defense against jouissance? In the Séminaire on Transfert, Lacan explains 
that the object – cause of desire – is always a missing object. Desire arises and is 
nourished by the lack which deprives desire of its object. Lacan defines this object 
in various way – das Ding378, άγαλµα379, object a380, etc –  but always referring to 
																																																						
374 L. Bersani, Homos, cit., p. 94. 
375 As we have seen also with Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of BwO, the body follows 
homeostatic rules useful to preserving its functional wellbeing. 
376 J. Lacan, Kant avec Sade, in Ecrits, cit., p. 773. 
377 J. Lacan, Subversion du sujet et dialectique du désir, in Ecrits, cit., p. 825. 
378 “La question de das Ding reste aujourd'hui suspendue à ce qu'il y a d'ouvert, de manquant, de 
béant, au centre de notre désir.” J. Lacan, Le Séminaire : Livre VII, L’éthique de la psychanalyse, 
1959-1960, cit., p. 102. 
379 “chaque fois que vous rencontrez άγαλµα – faites bien attention – même s’il semble s’agir des 
statues des dieux, vous y regarderez de près, vous vous apercevrez qu’il s’agit toujours d’autre 
chose.” J. Lacan, Le transfert, transcript of records (http://www.valas.fr/Jacques-Lacan-Le-
transfert-VIII-1960-1961-J-Lacan-Le-transfert-dans-sa-disparite-subjective-sa-pretendue-situation-
ses,271) p. 238. 
380 “C’est en tant que l’obsessionnel est en ce point précis de l’Autre où il est en état de doute, de 
suspension, de perte, d’ambivalence, d’ambiguïté fondamentale, que sa corrélation à l’objet, à un 
objet toujours métonymique… car pour lui l’autre, c’est vrai, est essentiellement 
interchangeable… que sa relation à l’autre objet est essentiellement gouvernée par quelque chose 
qui a rapport à la castration et qui ici prend forme directement agressive : absence, dépréciation, 
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it as the thing that does not let itself be captured.381 It is its structural lack that 
keeps desire alive. This is interesting in relation to jouissance because if desire 
survives only in the absence of its object, then the symbolical interdiction of the 
Law382 that prevents the subject from accessing the Real – namely that prevents 
the subject from fully accomplishing the jouissance of the object a – is what 
constitutes the essence of desire:  
 
Cet objet [a] est le principe qui me fait désirer, qui me fait désirant d’un manque – 
manque qui n’est pas manque du sujet, mais un défaut fait à la jouissance qui se 
situe au niveau de l’Autre. C’est en cela que toute fonction du a ne se réfère qu’à la 
béance centrale qui sépare, au niveau sexuel, le désir du lieu de la jouissance, et 
nous condamne à cette nécessité qui veut que pour nous la jouissance ne soit pas, 
de nature, promise au désir. Le désir ne peut faire que d’aller à sa rencontre, et, 
pour le rencontrer, il ne doit pas seulement comprendre, mais franchir le fantasme 
même qui le soutien et le construit.383 
 
In this way, we can see not only that desire is correlative to the lack of the 
object a, but also that this same absence characterizes the sexual encounter 
through which the subject tries to reach his desire. Indeed, the subject who seeks 
the object a the “jouissance qui se situe au niveau de l’Autre” can find nothing but 
																																																																																																																																																					
rejet, refus du signe du désir de l’Autre comme tel, non pas abolition ni destruction du désir de 
l’Autre, mais rejet de ses signes. Et c’est de là que sort et se détermine cette impossibilité si 
particulière qui frappe la manifestation de son propre désir.” Ibid., pp. 417 and 418. 
381 See in particular J. Lacan, Le transfer. 
382 “Cet acte est tout le mystère. Il est fait pour nous voiler ceci, que non seulement le meurtre du 
père n'ouvre pas la voie vers la jouissance que la présence de celui-ci était censée interdire, mais il 
en renforce l'interdiction. Tout est là, et c'est bien là, dans le fait comme dans l'explication, la 
faille. L'obstacle étant exterminé sous la forme du meurtre, la jouissance n'en reste pas moins 
interdite, et bien plus, cette interdiction est renforcée.” J. Lacan, Le Séminaire: Livre VII, 
L’éthique de la psychanalyse, 1959-1960, cit., p. 207. 
383 J. Lacan, Le Séminaire: Livre X, L’angoisse, 1962-1963, Éditions de Seuil, Paris, 2004, pp 382-
383. 
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the structural absence of the sexual rapport. The Other384 in fact, since it is the 
place of the Symbolic,385 can never be the place of the object a, but only the place 
of the fantasme that binds together – and at the same time separates by way of  the 
bar – desire and jouissance. Lacan renders the structure of the fantasme thus: 
 
$ 
_ 
a 
 
Lacan shows that the Symbolic divides the subject two times. The first time is 
when the Symbolic creates the subject as $, and the second time, which is 
correlated with the first one, is when the Symbolic separates the subject from the 
object a to which the subject will always aspire through his desire. These two 
division are not two different things: because the subject is divided it enters the 
logic of desire and the object a is “created” as lost. We now understand that desire 
works as a screen against the jouissance of the object a. Although desire impels 
the subject to toward its metonymic  object, that desire exists only insofar as the 
jouissance of the object does not take place, namely if the distance from the object 
																																																						
384 “Loi en que, dès longtemps, je vous ai appris à la considérer comme fondée sur l'Autre.” J. 
Lacan, Le Séminaire : Livre VII, L’éthique de la psychanalyse, 1959-1960, cit., p. 227. 
385 “Le désir s'ébauche dans la marge où la demande se déchire du besoin: cette marge étant celle 
que la demande, dont l'appel ne peut être inconditionnel qu'à l'endroit de l'Autre, ouvre sous la 
forme du défaut possible qu'y peut apporter le besoin, de n'avoir pas de satisfaction universelle (ce 
qu'on appelle: angoisse). Marge qui, pour linéaire qu'elle soit, laisse apparaître son vertige, pour 
peu qu'elle ne soit pas recouverte par le piétinement d'éléphant du caprice de l'Autre. C'est ce 
caprice néanmoins qui introduit le fantôme de la Toute-puissance non pas du sujet, mais de l'Autre 
où s'installe sa demande (il serait temps que ce cliché imbécile fût, une fois pour toutes, et pour 
tous, remis à sa place), et avec ce fantôme la nécessité de son bridage par la Loi” J. Lacan, 
Subversion du sujet et dialectique du désir, in Ecrits, cit., p. 814. 
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a is preserved.386 Pleasure and desire constitute together both the barrier against 
the jouissance that we can never fully attain or fully evade and the hook that ties 
the subject to its symbolic reality, preserving him from the dispersion that 
characterizes the abyss of jouissance.387 This function of protection from the death 
drive is what constitutes la logique du fantasme that, mixing together pleasure, 
desire and jouissance, creates the unique way in which the subject experiences – 
and survives – the reality of his own sexuality. If in fact on the one hand it is true 
that “le désir ne peut faire que d’aller à la rencontre avec la jouissance” on the 
other hand it is also true that desire goes there always wrapped in the “safe” 
casing of its own fantasme. To fully embrace the jouissance of the object a would 
mean to “franchir le fantasme même qui le soutien et le construit” as subject,388 in 
other words, it would mean to embrace one’s own desubjectivization, one’s death 
as a subject. Lacan states very clearly in L’envers de la psychanalyse: “le chemin 
vers la mort n'est rien d'autre que ce qui s'appelle la jouissance.”389 
The sentence “Il n'y a pas de rapport sexuel” means then that the encounter 
with the Real that the drives make us feel is unbearable and needs, for this reason, 
the Symbolic reframing that only the structure of fantasme makes possible. In 
itself, “l’acte (sexuel) est impossible. Quand je dis ça, je ne dis pas qu’il n’existe 
pas, ça ne suffit pas qu’on le dise, puisque l’impossible c’est le Réel, tout 
																																																						
386 “a, l'objet du désir, au point de départ où le situe notre modèle, est, dès qu'il y fonctionne..., 
l'objet du désir. Ceci veut dire qu'objet partiel il n'est pas seulement partie, ou pièce détachée, du 
dispositif imaginant ici le corps, mais élément de la structure dès l'origine, et si l'on peut dire dans 
la donne de la partie qui se joue. En tant que sélectionné dans les appendices du corps comme 
indice du désir, il est déjà l'exposant d'une fonction, qui le sublime avant même qu'il l'exerce, celle 
de l'index levé vers une absence dont l'est-ce n'a rien à dire, sinon qu'elle est de là où ça parle.” J. 
Lacan, Remarque sur le rapport de Daniel Lagache, in Ecrits, cit., p. 682. 
387 It is interesting to notice that the two deepest theories on sexuality born against psychoanalysis 
– namely Foucault and Deleuze and Guattari – ground their argument precisely on pleasure and 
desire, although as we have seen, both fail in providing a subject undivided by the death drive who 
for this reason is immune to the jouissance that jeopardizes him. 
388 Subject of desire namely subject that desires because it is divided and protected from the object 
a by the bar of the Symbolic. 
389 J. Lacan, Le Seminaire: Livre XVII, L'envers de la psychanalyse, 1969-1970, Paris, Edition de 
Seuil, Paris, 1991, pp. 17-18. 
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simplement, le Réel pur, la définition du possible exigeant toujours une première 
symbolisation: si vous excluez cette symbolisation, elle vous apparaîtra beaucoup 
plus naturelle, cette formule de l’impossible, c’est le Réel.”390 The only way to 
survive the encounter with the Real is through the distance that characterizes the 
non-existence of the sexual encounter reified by the fantasme by which the Real is 
given to us through the screen of the Symbolic. In other words, the only way by 
which the subject can endure the pressure of his drives “returning” to the Real is 
by maintaining the distance that Lacan identifies as the absence of the sexual 
encounter. This distance i one imposed by symbolization, one that protects the 
subject from what otherwise would destroy him. Lacan explains in L’étique de la 
psychanalyse “le seul moment de jouissance que connaisse l'homme est à la place 
même où se produisent les fantasmes, qui représentent pour nous la même barrière 
quant à l'accès à cette jouissance, la barrière où tout est oublié.”391 Nevertheless, it 
would be a drastic simplification to think that the fantasme is the unpassable 
barrier that divides sharply the subject from the drives. In fact, in La logique du 
fantasme, Lacan also underlines that “il n'y a pas d'autre entrée pour le sujet dans 
le réel que le fantasme.”392 In this way he clarifies that if on the one hand it is true 
that the fantasme is what protects the subject from the threat of the Real, on the 
other hand it is also true that the fantasme is what exposes the subject to the abyss 
of jouissance. A very thin and problematic threshold393 divides the castration of 
the Symbolic and the transgression of the Real, and it is precisely on that 
threshold that the subject plays with his own fantasmes while jouissance emerges 
to lure him. 
As long as “la métonymie du manque à être”394 that, as we have seen in the 
diagram of the fantasme, structurally keeps the subject of desire separated from 
the object a, is preserved, the encounter with the Real is foreclosed. Nevertheless, 
																																																						
390 J. Lacan, La logique du fantasme, transcript of records, (http://www.valas.fr/Jacques-Lacan-La-
logique-du-fantasme-1966-1967) pp. 442 and 443. 
391 J. Lacan, Le Séminaire : Livre VII, L’éthique de la psychanalyse, 1959-1960, cit., p. 345 
392 J. Lacan, La logique du fantasme, in Autre Ecrits, cit., p. 326. 
393 See in particular J. Lacan, Kant avec Sade and J. Lacan, L’éthique de la psychanalyse. 
394 J. Lacan, La direction de la cure, in Ecrits, cit., p. 623. 
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the Real is not erased. As Lacan reminds us, “l'important est d'apercevoir que 
l’objet a ne tiens cette fonction dans le désir qu'à y être aperçu comme solidaire 
de cette refente (d'y être à la fois inégaux, et conjoignant à la disjoindre), de cette 
refente où le sujet s'apparaît être dyade.”395 In other words, we cannot forget that, 
although the fantasme subtracts the object a from jouissance, and, in order to 
protect the subject, transfers it to the Other, the place of the object a remains the 
Real.396 This is the reason why the subject never finds its object in the Symbolic – 
the Other is in fact structurally unable to receive it. 
Lacan uses the sentence “Il n'y a pas de rapport sexuel”  
 
to translate the formulation “I ask you” – what? – “to refuse” – what? – “what I 
offer you” – why? – “because that's not it.” You know what “it” is; it's object 
a. Object a is no being. Object a is the void presupposed by a demand, and it is 
only by situating demand via metonymy, that is, by the pure continuity assured 
from the beginning to the end of a sentence, that we can imagine a desire that is 
based on no being – a desire without any other substance than that assured by knots 
themselves. Enunciating that sentence, “I ask you to refuse what I offer you,” I 
could only motivate it by the “that's not it” that I took up again last time. “That's 
not it” means that, in the desire of every demand, there is but the request for object 
a, for the object that could satisfy jouissance. The latter would then be the 
Lustbefriedigung presupposed in what is improperly called the “genital drive” in 
psychoanalytic discourse, that drive in which the full, inscribable relationship of 
the one with what remains irreducibly the Other is supposedly inscribed.397 
 
The difference between effervescence and jouissance arises precisely at this 
point. If in fact both effervescence and jouissance look for their object in the 
Symbolic, only effervescence can really find its object there. If Durkheim and 
Girard showed us that effervescence emerges from a violence directed against an 
external object and that, in the destruction of that object, finally leaves the subject 
																																																						
395 J. Lacan, La logique du fantasme, in Autres écrits, cit., p. 324. Italics mine. 
396 “L'objet a du fantasme, se situe dans le réel.” J. Lacan, Kant avec Sade, in Ecrits, cit., p. 775. 
397 J. Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: On Feminine Sexuality, the Limits of Love and 
Knowledge, cit., p. 126. 
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in peace, with Lacan we understand that jouissance is a violence that cannot stop 
since the object that it finds in the Symbolic is just a metonymic displacement the 
object a. The Real object of jouissance, the one that jouissance destroys, is the 
subject itself. Therefore, according to Lacan, jouissance is impossible.398 For the 
subject to attain to jouissance would mean that it had managed to to “franchir le 
fantasme”, to remove the division that he himself is and to succumb to the 
destruction of the (Symbolic) subject by the Real. It is only through the screen of 
the fantasme that this impossible jouissance is replaced by an external object that 
is located at the place of the Other. Thanks to the fantasme, the object of 
jouissance is foreclosed and transferred to the outside as the Imaginary object of 
desire that finds in the Symbolic order the occasion to avoid its Real threat. This is 
the reason why any time the subject thinks he has grasped the object, he discovers 
that what he has in his hand is not the Real object of desire but just a fantasmatic 
placeholder that occasions the observation, “that’s not it.” Only through the 
fantasme is the subject kept in the “métonymie du manque à être” that constitutes 
him as divided subject, namely as subject divided between an impossible 
jouissance and a desire always located in the place of the Other.  
In the unpublished version of the Seminar Ou pire, Le savoir du 
psychanalyste, Lacan tries to imagine a jouissance without fantasme and affirms 
that it is  
 
l'instinct de mort de Freud, qui porte peut-être à dire que le seul acte, somme toute 
- s'il y en a un - qui serait un acte achevé… entendez bien que je parle, comme 
l'année dernière je parlais d'Un discours qui ne serait pas du semblant dans un cas 
comme dans l'autre il n'y en a pas, ni de discours, ni d'acte tel…cela donc serait, s'il 
pouvait être, le suicide. C'est ce que Freud nous dit. Il nous le dit pas comme ça, en 
cru, en clair, comme on peut le dire maintenant.399  
																																																						
398 “la jouissance est impossible ou mortelle. Elle est structurellement inaccessible: la 
transgression est seulement imaginaire, et la jouissance fantasmée.” S. Lippi, Transgression, 
Bataille Lacan, Erès, Paris, 2008, p. 22. 
399 J. Lacan, Ou pire, Le savoir de le psychanalyste, transcript of records, 
(http://www.valas.fr/Jacques-Lacan-Ou-PIRE-1971-1972,216) p. 21. First italics mine. 
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Lacan talks about suicide but he underlines that suicide is not really what he 
is trying to say. The problem is not that he cannot find the right word but that any 
word, precisely because it is a word, is wrong. Indeed, that to which Lacan is 
trying to refer to is the impossible act that could accomplish the death drive. 
Obviously, this act is impossible since every act happens in the Symbolic. This is 
the reason why suicide cannot work, even if the subject succeeds in giving himself 
over to death; and this is why Lacan chose to refer to it above. Suicide is a 
voluntary act that happens in relation to the Other. Regardless of the varied and 
complicated – conscious and unconscious – reasons that lead a person to commit 
suicide, what defines that act is its status as a choice. Lacan, on the contrary, is 
looking for an unwilled act – a pure act of the drives. But since the subject is 
divided, this act is impossible. Nevertheless, it is only through imagining this 
impossible act of destruction that, according to Lacan, we can picture a jouissance 
undivided by the Law of the Other.  
In La logique du fantasme Lacan writes: 
 
Car il se voit aux mises en acte du névrosé, que le fantasme, il ne l'approche qu'à la 
lorgnette, tout occupé qu'il est à sustenter le désir de l'Autre en le tenant de diverses 
façons en haleine. Le psychanalyste pourrait ne pas se faire son servant. Ceci 
l'aiderait à en distinguer le pervers, affronté de beaucoup plus près à l'impasse de 
l'acte sexuel. Sujet autant que lui bien sûr, mais qui fait des rets du fantasme 
l'appareil de conduction par où il dérobe en court-circuit une jouissance dont le heu 
de l'Autre ne le sépare pas moins. Avec cette référence à la jouissance s'ouvre 
l'ontique seule avouable pour nous. Mais ce n'est pas rien qu'elle ne s'aborde même 
en pratique que par les ravinements qui s'y tracent du lieu de l'Autre.400 
 
With this passage, we understand that for Lacan there is not an ontological 
difference between the neurotic and the pervert, both of them in fact are subjected 
to the Law of the Other as much as they are subjected to the death drive. 
Nevertheless, according to Lacan, the “pervert” is much closer to jouissance than 
																																																						
400 J. Lacan, La logique du fantasme, in Autres écrits, cit., p. 327. 
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the neurotic because he is able to “short-circuit” the Other. But what does it mean 
to “short-circuit” the Other? In order to answer this question, it is important to 
understand what Lacan is referring to when he talks about perversion. Indeed, a 
few lines later we discover that Lacan is not referring to perversion in general but 
to masochism in particular. This might not sound particularly surprising since we 
know already from L’éthique de la psychanalyse that Lacan considers masochism 
the core of all perversion. In that seminar, he in fact affirms that “ce serait 
pourtant un signe sûr de ce que nous sommes vraiment arrivés au cœur du 
problème sur le sujet des perversions existantes, que de parvenir à approfondir le 
rôle économique du masochisme.”401 However, what is really interesting is that in 
La logique du fantasme Lacan does not use masochism to explain the core of 
perversion(s), but to explain the core of human sexuality in general. Indeed, not 
only, as we have seen, does he not make an ontological distinction between the 
neurotic and the pervert, but he goes so far as to say that “la monstration du 
masochisme suffit à y révéler la forme la plus générale à abréger les vains essais 
où se perd l'acte sexuel, monstration d'autant plus facile qu'il procède à s'y doubler 
d'une ironique démonstration.”402  
In this way, we arrive at a crucial ambivalence of Lacan’s thought. Indeed, 
if on the one hand Lacan is very much concerned with defining masochism as a 
perversion, on the other hand he considers it as the root of human sexuality. This 
ambivalence comes from the fact that, according to Lacan, “la dimension de la 
jouissance” that is at the root of human sexuality “c'est la dimension de la 
descente vers la mort.”403 Certainly as we have seen, jouissance is produced only 
in its intimate relation to the Symbolic. As in fact Lacan explains, “la jouissance 
sexuelle elle-même, quand vous voulez mettre la main dessus, si je puis 
m'exprimer ainsi, elle n'est plus sexuelle du tout, elle se perd”404 between the 
meshes of the fantasme. Masochism is no exception; as a product of the Symbolic 
																																																						
401 J. Lacan, Le Séminaire : Livre VII, L’éthique de la psychanalyse, 1959-1960, cit., p. 24. 
402 J. Lacan, La logique du fantasme, in Autres écrits, cit., p. 327. 
403 J. Lacan, Ou pire, Le savoir de le psychanalyste, transcript of records, 
(http://www.valas.fr/Jacques-Lacan-Ou-PIRE-1971-1972,216) p. 19. 
404 Ibid. p. 23. 
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it cannot avoid the Other. Nevertheless, if what we have shown is true, namely 
that the fantasme protects the subject, transferring the object a to the outside and 
situating it in a metonymic object, then masochism seems the only case in which 
the object a is brought back into the subject through the fantasme. In fact, in 
masochism the subject no longer follows the object a in the jouissance that takes 
the place of the Other – he becomes the object a. Filling the lack that characterizes 
the non-existence of the sexual encounter with its own body and making the 
destruction of the self the core of his pleasure and the object of his desire, he 
makes the fantasme coincide with his own “death.” This is the “short-circuit” of 
the Other that masochism achieves: use the fantasme to remove the object a from 
the Other and replace it with himself. In Subversion du sujet et dialectique du 
désir Lacan states it clearly: “seule notre formule du fantasme permet de faire 
apparaître que le sujet [masochiste] se fait l'instrument de la jouissance de 
l'Autre.”405  
What is important is to not confuse the Other with the other. The Other is 
not another person, but the Law, the Symbolic, castration – it is that which, 
limiting jouissance, structures the subject’s desire in the diagram of the fantasme 
that I have explained. To turn himself into the Other’s object of jouissance then, 
does not mean that the masochist voluntary sacrifices his own jouissance to please 
another person. As we have also seen with Deleuze’s analysis of Sacher-Masoch, 
the masochist is anything but a docile slave who sacrifices himself for his 
‘mistress.’406 On the contrary, to turn himself into the Other’s object of jouissance 
means that the Other, instead of being the non-space that, by figuring 
metonymically the object a, protects the subject from his own jouissance, 
becomes what here leads the subject to the jouissance of the object a. Hence the 
imperative role that symbols play in masochism and that we have discovered in 
criticizing Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari: pain, humiliation, and destruction are 
endorsed only if they belong to the fantasme of the masochist. In masochism, the 
																																																						
405 J. Lacan, Subversion du sujet et dialectique du désir, in Ecrits, cit., p. 823. 
406 “In Venus, Wanda only becomes sadistic because she can no longer maintain the role that 
Severin has imposed on her («It was you who stifled my feelings with your romantic devotion and 
insane passion»).” G. Deleuze, Masochism: Coldness and Cruelty, cit., p. 50. Second italics mine. 
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fantasme is not destroyed or surpassed. The fantasme is in a certain way 
indestructible: the link to the Symbolic is unavoidable since it is what structures – 
together with the death drive – the division that the subject is. Nevertheless, in 
masochism, the symbolic screen with which the subject approaches the Real 
becomes the instrument of his “death,” the instrument by which the masochist 
reaches – as much as his fantasme allows him to – the deadly jouissance that is 
located at the root of human sexuality. “C’est dans ce nœud que gît en effet le 
rapport de l'image à la tendance suicide que le mythe de Narcisse exprime 
essentiellement. Cette tendance suicide qui représente à notre avis ce que Freud a 
cherché à situer dans sa métapsychologie sous le nom d'instinct de mort ou encore 
de masochisme primordial.”407  
In March 2011, Germany learned the story of Armin Meiwes and Bernd 
Jürgen Armando Brandes, two men in their forties who met in a chatroom on the 
internet. After long conversations that led to a first encounter that went  “wrong”, 
they decided	 to meet again. This second time, with a one-way ticket and more 
courage than the first time, Brandes reached the friend who, in accord with their 
prior agreement, proceeded to kill and eat him. The couple documented the entire 
encounter with a video clip that was shown at Meiwes’s murder trial to prove that 
the cannibalistic ritual took place in a completely consensual environment. 
Brandes always desired to die in a cannibalistic ritual and after years of fantasies 
and small attempts, he finally found in Meiwes the perfect partner. Brandes is thus 
the extreme case of a person who dissolves himself in a deadly act of Lacanian 
“suicide” as jouissance. In providing this example I am not arguing that every 
masochist aspires to such a ritualistic death,. not only because each masochist is 
different but also because it is impossible to establish where exactly masochism 
begins. Where is the line that sharply divides the “neurotic” from the “pervert”? 
How much pain and humiliation must one desire to be a masochist? And must the 
pain I seek be physical or can it be mental instead? These questions allow no 
																																																						
407 J. Lacan, Propos sur la causalité psychique, in Ecrits, cit., pp. 186 and 187. 
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definitive answer.408 Nevertheless, the fact that is impossible to establish the 
limits of a thing does not imply that this thing does not exist. Masochism exists 
and exists in an endless variety of forms. From a philosophical point of view, 
what is interesting is not try to define its components, but rather to find the 
constant that repeats itself in them all. This is what philosophy does and this is 
what Lacan did in talking about masochism: he established what, according to 
him, is its general structure. In describing the structure of masochism, he 
recognized the general structure of human sexuality. The drive toward this deadly 
jouissance – to which masochism gets close by “short-circuiting” the fantasme – 
belongs to all human beings. From this perspective, the story of Brandes does not 
appears simply as the radical expression of masochism but as the radical 
expression of the drives that, independently of the will of the subject, seek the 
subject’s destruction, which is also to say, its escape from the Symbolic circuit to 
which it is chained. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																																						
408 “Nul ne peut dire où commence le masochisme repoussant, où s’arrête le noble goût du risque 
et l’ambition dite «légitime».” R. Girard, Mensonge romantique et vérité romanesque, Grasset, 
Paris 1961, p. 295. 
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